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I. Introduction 
We live in a divided society, from gated communities to cell 
blocks congested with disproportionate numbers of young 
African-American men.1 There are rich and poor, privileged and 
                                                                                                     
 * Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law; Adjunct 
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center; Of Counsel, Berens & Miller, 
P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota. 
 1.  See F. MICHAEL HIGGINBOTHAM, GHOSTS OF JIM CROW: ENDING RACISM IN 
POST-RACIAL AMERICA 14, 18, 29, 39, 157–58, 161–62, 212 (2013) (noting that the 
victimization and unequal treatment of blacks persists in present-day society). 
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homeless, Democrats and Republicans, wealthy zip codes and 
stubbornly impoverished ones. There are committed ―Black Lives 
Matter‖ protestors, and there are those who—invoking ―Blue 
Lives Matter‖—demonstrate in support of America‘s hard-
working police officers.2 In her new article, ―Matters of Strata: 
Race, Gender, and Class Structures in Capital Cases,‖ George 
Washington University law professor Phyllis Goldfarb highlights 
the stratification of our society and offers a compelling critique of 
America‘s death penalty regime—one, she notes, that is ―deeply 
affected by structures of race, gender, and class.‖3 With the 
number of death sentences and executions declining,4 Professor 
Goldfarb‘s article exposes the grim realities—miscarriages of 
justice, runaway arbitrariness, and persistent discrimination—
that may ultimately lead to a judicial declaration that America‘s 
                                                                                                     
 2.  See 31 EX AUDITU: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE THEOLOGICAL 
INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE ix (2015) (the journal‘s ―Race and Racism‖ issue). 
The recent U.S. presidential election—one in which Donald Trump won the 
Electoral College vote but in which Hillary Clinton won the popular vote—
illustrates the current ideological divisions in American life. Zachary Roth, 
Electoral College Lesson: More Voters Chose Clinton, But Trump Will Be 
President, NBC NEWS (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2016-
election-day/electoral-college-lesson-more-voters-chose-hillary-clinton-trump-
will-n681701 (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); see also Byron Tau, With Clinton Far Ahead in Popular Vote, Hill 
Democrats Explore Electoral College Overhaul, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 6, 2016), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2016/12/06/with-clinton-far-ahead-in-popular-
vote-hill-democrats-explore-electoral-college-overhaul/ (last visited Dec. 19, 
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review) (―A number of Capitol 
Hill Democrats have revived proposals to reform or abolish the Electoral 
College, in reaction to Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton‘s 
popular vote lead of more than 2.6 million over Republican President-elect 
Donald Trump.‖). The Electoral College is itself rooted in the institution of 
southern slavery. Akhil Reed Amar, The Troubling Reason the Electoral College 
Exists, TIME (Nov. 8, 2016), http://time.com/4558510/electoral-college-history-
slavery/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (describing the origins of the Electoral 
College) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3.  See Phyllis Goldfarb, Matters of Strata: Race, Gender, and Class 
Structures in Capital Cases, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 2 (2016) (finding that the 
American criminal justice system exemplifies institutions that are deeply 
affected by race, gender, and class). 
 4.  See Facts about the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. 1, 3 (Oct. 
6, 2016), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (showing 
the declining number of death sentences and executions); see also Texas 
Executions Drop to Lowest Level in 20 Years, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Oct. 13, 
2016), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6577 (showing the statistics behind 
the death penalty‘s decline in Texas). 
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death penalty violates the U.S. Constitution‘s Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.5   
The self-described goal of Goldfarb‘s essay: ―to cultivate a 
deeper understanding of the more hidden ways that race, gender, 
and class can affect the death penalty system, including the ways 
it can threaten the accuracy of fact-finding on which the 
legitimacy of the capital sanction depends.‖6 Capital punishment 
is, let there be no doubt, meted out erratically and often errantly,7 
in a racially discriminatory manner,8 and in a way that condemns 
more men than women.9 And it is—and long has been—closely 
                                                                                                     
 5.  See Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 3. The Eighth Amendment prohibits 
―cruel and unusual punishments,‖ and the Fourteenth Amendment made the 
Eighth Amendment applicable to the states. U.S. CONST. amends. VIII & XIV. 
The Eighth Amendment was first held applicable to the states in Robinson v. 
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 238 (2002). The U.S. Supreme Court‘s long, tortured 
relationship with capital punishment is chronicled in an important new book. 
See generally CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2016). As that book notes: ―The 
American death penalty has come full circle over the past fifty years. Capital 
punishment was the subject of a concerted constitutional litigation campaign in 
the 1960s that led to the Supreme Court‘s bold abolition in 1972, followed by its 
chastened reauthorization of the death penalty four years later.‖ Id. at 3.  
 6.  Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 2. 
 7.  See Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and Its 
Ramifications, 92 BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. 227 (2012) (discussing the death 
penalty‘s arbitrary administration); JAMES S. LIEBMAN, JEFFREY FAGAN & 
VALERIE WEST, A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973-1995 
(2000) (providing statistics illustrating the American death penalty‘s 
arbitrariness). 
 8.  See Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Paul G. Davies, Valerie J. Purdie-Vaughns 
& Sheri Lynn Johnson, Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black 
Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383, 383 
(2006) (finding that the more stereotypically ―black‖ a defendant is perceived to 
be, the more likely that person is to be sentenced to death); Lincoln Caplan, 
Racial Discrimination and Capital Punishment: The Indefensible Death 
Sentence of Duane Buck, NEW YORKER, Apr. 20, 2016 (discussing a prime 
example of racial discrimination in death penalty litigation); Robert J. Smith, 
There‟s No Separating the Death Penalty and Race, SLATE (May 5, 2016), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/05/foster_v_
chatman_race_infects_death_penalty_to_the_core.html (last visited Dec. 19, 
2016) (concluding that the only way to do away with racial bias in death penalty 
cases is to outlaw the death penalty altogether) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 9.  See Elizabeth Rapaport, The Death Penalty and Gender Discrimination, 
25 LAW & SOC. REV. 367 (1991); Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Female 
Offenders, Jan. 1, 1973, through Dec. 31, 2012, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. 
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associated with race and poverty and invidious stereotypes and 
bad lawyering.10 ―Were it not for the distortions introduced by 
race, gender, and class ideologies,‖ Goldfarb concludes of the 
tragic story of one former Virginia death row inmate, Joseph 
Giarratano, ―his life might have been altered, and his treatment 
by the criminal justice system might have been more attentive 
and accurate.‖11 
A victim of child abuse who fell into substance abuse and 
who may have falsely confessed to a horrific rape and double 
murder, Joe Giarratano is still imprisoned for a crime committed 
in 1979 in Norfolk, Virginia. In February 1979, Giarratano awoke 
to find the lifeless bodies of two women with whom he shared an 
apartment. Michelle Kline—a fifteen-year-old girl—had been 
raped and strangled in her bed, and the body of her mother, Toni, 
was found in the bathroom, her carotid artery severed. A suicidal 
alcoholic who frequently had blackouts and hallucinations, 
Giarratano had no memory of what had happened and thus 
assumed he was responsible. After confessing to the horrific 
crime, giving five inconsistent confessions to police over two days, 
he waived his right to a jury trial, asked to be put to death, and 
was sent to death row. Only later was exculpatory forensic 
evidence, including unidentified bloody bootprints, fingerprints 
and hair samples, examined more closely, calling into question 
the validity of Giarratano‘s admission of guilt.12  
                                                                                                     
(2013), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FemDeathDec2012.pdf 
(citing statistics showing the disproportionate number of men who are 
sentenced to death and executed in comparison to women). 
 10.  See JAMES R. ACKER, QUESTIONING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LAW, POLICY, 
AND PRACTICE 197–223 (2014) (discussing racial discrimination and 
arbitrariness in the death penalty‘s application); MACHINERY OF DEATH: THE 
REALITY OF AMERICA‘S DEATH PENALTY REGIME 20 (David R. Dow & Mark Dow 
eds. 2002) (―[C]lose to 100 percent of capital murder defendants are indigent.‖); 
Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst 
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 (1994) (discussing 
how poor people accused of capital crimes are often defended by lawyers who 
lack the skills, resources, and commitment to handle such serious matters); 
Stephen B. Bright, The Role of Race, Poverty, Intellectual Disability, and Mental 
Illness in the Decline of the Death Penalty, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 671, 671–75 
(2015) (describing the role played by race, poverty, intellectual disabilities and 
mental illness in the death penalty‘s administration).  
 11.  See Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 49–50 & n.177 (noting the costs and 
effects on lives in death penalty cases and the gravity of the sentence). 
 12.  See HERBERT H. HAINES, AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE ANTI-
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In prison, Giarratano—a ninth-grade dropout who, behind 
bars, transformed his life through reading literature, philosophy 
and law—later advocated successfully to save the life of another 
death row inmate, Earl Washington Jr. Working as a ―jailhouse‖ 
lawyer, Giarratano filed a section 1983 action on Washington‘s 
behalf that set in motion a series of events that led to a stay of 
execution for Washington and his subsequent exoneration in 
2000. A black, intellectually disabled man, Washington had been 
convicted of raping and murdering a young white woman, 
Rebecca Williams, in her Culpeper, Virginia apartment—and he 
spent seventeen years in prison before DNA evidence confirmed 
his innocence.13 Giarratano was not afraid to challenge the 
                                                                                                     
DEATH PENALTY MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1972-1994, at 129 (1996); Goldfarb, 
supra note 3, at 24 (discussing Joseph Giarratano‘s case); Joseph Giarratano, 
WRONGFULLY CONVICTED GROUP WEBSITE, 
https://wronglyconvictedgroup.wordpress.com/category/4-main-cause-of-
wrongful-conviction/false-confession/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, 
Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of 
Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 
429, 489–90 (1988): 
In 1979, Norfolk, Virginia police extracted five contradictory 
confessions from Joseph Giarratano to the rape and murder of fifteen-
year-old Michelle Kline and her forty-four-year-old mother, Toni 
Kline. Sperm, hair samples, and bloody shoeprints found at the crime 
scene did not link Giarratano to the crime. In addition, Giarratano‘s 
confessions were demonstrably inaccurate on significant points: One 
of the victims died from a severed artery and bled profusely, but 
police found no blood on Giarratano‘s clothing; the victims were 
strangled and stabbed by someone who is right-handed, but 
Giarratano is left-handed and has only limited use of his right hand 
due to neurological damage from childhood; Giarratano confessed to 
strangling one of his victims with his hands, but an independent 
pathologist testified that the hallmarks of manual strangulation were 
not present; Giarratano stated that he threw the knife he used into 
the Kline‘s backyard, but no weapon was ever found. 
 13.  See generally MARGARET EDDS, AN EXPENDABLE MAN: THE NEAR-
EXECUTION OF EARL WASHINGTON JR. 83–95 (2003); WELSH S. WHITE, LITIGATING 
IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH: DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN CAPITAL CASES 65 (2006); 
FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, SUZANNA L. DE BOEF & AMBER E. BOYDSTUN, THE 
DECLINE OF THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE DISCOVERY OF INNOCENCE 87 (2008); 
PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL CONTROL 335 (Thomas G. Bloomberg & Stanley Cohen 
eds., 2d ed. 2003). Washington had given a false confession that was written up 
by police detectives and signed by Washington. Washington had once come with 
nine days of being executed, and he was only exonerated long after the crime 
through DNA testing done by a Virginia laboratory. ROBERT P. BURNS, KAFKA‘S 
LAW: THE TRIAL AND AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 104 (2014); JON B. GOULD, THE 
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system even though it might have consequences for him. 
―Giarratano‘s lawsuits regarding prisoners‘ rights,‖ two authors 
have observed, ―so infuriated Virginia prison officials that they 
transferred Giarratano to prisons in Utah and Illinois, until his 
hunger strike forced his return to Virginia.‖14 
Sentenced to death after being convicted of murdering Toni 
Kline and raping and murdering her 15-year-old daughter, Joe 
Giarratano—a white inmate prosecuted for murdering two white 
victims—spent more than ten years on the state‘s death row. He 
came within a few days of execution in the electric chair before 
then-Virginia Governor Douglas Wilder, in a conditional pardon, 
took him off death row in 1991 amid concerns about his 
innocence. ―The governor had received 5,978 telephone calls and 
letters urging him to spare Giarratano,‖ one newspaper reported 
of the conditional pardon, which imposed a life sentence but 
allowed for the possibility of parole after Giarratano served 25 
years behind bars.15 Among those supporting his clemency 
request: actor Mike Farrell, conservative columnist James J. 
Kilpatrick, singer Joan Baez, and members of Congress. Denied a 
retrial by the prosecutor though one had been urged by Governor 
Wilder,16 Giarratano was later stabbed in prison but survived,17 
                                                                                                     
INNOCENCE COMMISSION: PREVENTING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND RESTORING 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 29 (2008); CHRISTOPHER S. KUDLAC, PUBLIC 
EXECUTIONS: THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE MEDIA 121 (2007). 
 14.  See TODD C. PEPPERS & LAURA TREVVETT ANDERSON, ANATOMY OF AN 
EXECUTION: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF DOUGLAS CHRISTOPHER THOMAS 146 (2009) 
(discussing the Giarratano case in the context of another death penalty case). 
 15.  Id.; Loses New Trial Bid for Haunting Crime, BRYAN TIMES (Bryan, 
OH), Feb. 21, 1991, at 4; compare Jean McNair, Giarratano Studies Fine Print 
of Wilder Pardon, FREE LANCE-STAR, Feb. 20, 1991, at 1 (discussing the 
possibility of a pardon in the Giarratano case), with HAINES, supra note 12, at 
129:  
Eighty-two hours before Joe Giarratano was to be executed, Governor 
Wilder offered him a deal that canceled his execution on condition 
that he accept a life sentence. Should he successfully seek a retrial, 
he could be sentenced to death. Giarratano accepted the offer and 
appealed to the state attorney general, Mary Sue Terry, for a new 
trial. That request was denied . . . .  
 16.  In 1990, Governor L. Douglas Wilder—a man who grew up in a then-
segregated Richmond—became the first black elected governor. JESSIE CARNEY 
SMITH, BLACK FIRSTS: 4,000 GROUND-BREAKING AND PIONEERING HISTORICAL 
EVENTS 271 (3d ed. 2013); WILLIAM P. HUSTWIT, JAMES J. KILPATRICK: SALESMAN 
FOR SEGREGATION 215 (2013). 
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became the named plaintiff in a well-known U.S. Supreme Court 
case18 arguing for the constitutional right to counsel in habeas 
corpus cases, and continues, to this day, to maintain his 
innocence and to seek a new trial.19 
In her essay, Professor Goldfarb speaks of ―the pervasive 
racial influences on the contours of our contemporary justice 
systems.‖20 In discussing the confluence of capital punishment 
and race, she reminds readers of the U.S. Supreme Court‘s 
notorious decision in McCleskey v. Kemp.21 In that case, a 5-4 
decision, the Supreme Court—in an opinion authored by Justice 
                                                                                                     
 17.  See MIKE FARRELL, JUST CALL ME MIKE: A JOURNEY TO ACTOR AND 
ACTIVIST 214, 305 (2008) (describing Giarratano‘s imprisonment). 
 18.  See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 19.  See JEFFREY L. KIRCHMEIER, IMPRISONED BY THE PAST: WARREN 
MCCLESKEY AND THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY 177 (2015); MIKE FARRELL, OF 
MULE AND MAN 112 (2009); Former Death Row Inmate Giarratano Hurt in 
Stabbing, FREE LANCE-STAR, July 8, 1996, at C8; The Status of Joe‟s Case, FREE 
JOE GIARRATANO, http://freejoeg.com/case-status/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In 1987, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-
conviction proceedings—a holding it later affirmed, in the capital context, two 
years later. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987); Murray v. 
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989). 
 20.  Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 14. 
 21.  481 U.S. 279 (1987). The Supreme Court in McCleskey considered the 
case of Warren McCleskey, a black man sentenced to death in 1978 in Georgia 
for killing a white police officer. McCleskey‘s lawyers argued that their client‘s 
death sentence was part of a pattern of racial discrimination that violated the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: 
AMERICA‘S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF ABOLITION 282 (2010). After the 
Supreme Court rejected McCleskey‘s Eighth Amendment and Equal Protection 
Clause claims, several members of Congress pushed for the passage of the 
Racial Justice Act, which would have allowed capital defendants to make a 
statistical showing of racial disparity in the administration of their jurisdiction‘s 
capital punishment scheme. See Vada Berger, Nicole Walthour, Angela Dorn, 
Dan Lindsey, Pamela Thompson & Gretchen von Helms, Too Much Justice: A 
Legislative Response to McCleskey v. Kemp, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 437, 438 
(1989); see also THE INTERNATIONAL SOURCEBOOK ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 19 
(William A. Schabas ed., 1997) (―The Racial Justice Act was a modest proposal 
that would have required courts to have hearings on racial disparities in 
infliction of the death penalty and to look behind the disparities to determine 
whether they are related to race or some other factor.‖). That legislation, 
however, never passed. Id. (―Despite the pronounced racial disparities in the 
infliction of the death penalty in both state and federal capital cases, Congress 
refused to include the Racial Justice Act as part of the crime bill in 1994, just as 
it has refused to enact the act in previous years.‖). 
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Lewis Powell—upheld Warren McCleskey‘s death sentence in the 
face of compelling, never-refuted statistical evidence showing that 
a victim‘s race plays a major role in deciding who lives or dies.22 
That decision—one Justice Powell later told his biographer he 
regretted—turned a blind eye to racial bias in the death penalty‘s 
administration instead of forthrightly acknowledging that 
discrimination.23 ―Apparent discrepancies in sentencing are an 
inevitable part of our criminal justice system,‖ Powell wrote in 
McCleskey, asserting that ―if we accept McCleskey‘s claim that 
racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing 
decision, we could soon be faced with similar claims as to other 
types of penalty.‖24  ―McCleskey is the Dred Scott decision of our 
time,‖ death penalty opponent Anthony Amsterdam—the famed 
Supreme Court advocate and NYU law professor—once observed 
of Justice Powell‘s 1987 majority opinion.25 
America‘s death penalty—as Phyllis Goldfarb points out—is 
closely ―intertwined‖ with issues of race, gender and class.26 ―Our 
                                                                                                     
 22.  See Steven F. Shatz & Terry Dalton, Challenging the Death Penalty 
with Statistics: Furman, McCleskey, and a Single County Study, 34 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1127, 1236 (2013) (discussing the findings of the Baldus study). 
 23.  See Justice Powell‟s New Wisdom, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 1994), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/11/opinion/justice-powell-s-new-wisdom.html 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (―Too late for Warren McCleskey and numerous other 
executed prisoners, retired Justice Lewis Powell now concedes that he was 
wrong to cast the deciding fifth Supreme Court vote to uphold Mr. McCleskey‘s 
death sentence in a major case.‖) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 24.  See MARTIN GARBUS, COURTING DISASTER: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
UNMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 53 (2002). 
 25.  See Adam Liptak, New Look at Death Sentences and Race, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 29, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/29/us/29bar.html (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2016) (highlighting the case‘s lasting impact) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 26.  See Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 6. The Central Park jogger case, in which 
a 28-year-old investment banker was brutally assaulted, raped and sodomized 
on April 19, 1989, leaving her in a coma for twelve days, became ―one of the 
most widely publicized crimes of the 1980‘s.‖ TRISHA MEILI, I AM THE CENTRAL 
PARK JOGGER (2004); M. A. Farber, „Smart, Driven‟ Woman Overcomes 
Reluctance, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 1990), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/17/nyregion/smart-driven-woman-overcomes-
reluctance.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). ―As the case proceeded,‖ one source notes, ―it became a symbolic 
battleground for race, class, and gender issues in the late 1980s and early 
1990s.‖ ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RACE AND CRIME 98 (Helen Taylor Greene & Shaun L. 
Gabbidon eds., 2009). Notoriously, less than two weeks after the attack, then-
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criminal justice system,‖ she aptly notes after examining early 
American history, the scourge of lynchings, and the institution of 
slavery, ―was forged in America‘s racial cauldron and would not 
look as it does but for our racial history.‖27 At one time, slaves 
and free blacks were barred by law from testifying in court 
against whites,28 slaves were hanged, gibbeted, or burned to 
death for rebelling against their masters,29 and black men—even 
boys—were sadistically lynched, whether for sexually assaulting 
whites or for other actions, even perceived slights.30 ―Any negro or 
                                                                                                     
real estate mogul Donald Trump took out full-page advertisements in New York 
City newspapers that, in large capital letters, blared: ―BRING BACK THE 
DEATH PENALTY.‖ SARAH BURNS, THE CENTRAL PARK FIVE: THE UNTOLD STORY 
BEHIND ONE OF NEW YORK CITY‘S MOST INFAMOUS CRIMES 72 (2012); Goldie 
Taylor, Donald Trump Keeps Smearing the Long-Since Exonerated Central Park 
Five, DAILY BEAST (Oct. 7, 2016), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/10/07/donald-trump-keeps-
smearing-the-long-since-exonerated-central-park-five.html (last visited Dec. 19, 
2016) (―In 1989, as five boys—four black and one Latino—stood accused of gang-
raping and brutally beating a white female jogger in Central Park, Trump could 
not help but snatch some of the spotlight for himself at a time when tabloids 
screamed about ‗wolfpacks.‘‖) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). During the 2016 presidential campaign, then-candidate Trump 
inexplicably continued to insist on the guilt of the Central Park Five despite 
their exoneration more than a decade earlier. ―They admitted they were guilty,‖ 
Trump said to CNN in a statement even though DNA evidence had cleared them 
and another man had separately confessed to the crime in 2002. Ken Burns 
Blasts Trump for Insisting the Central Park 5 Are Guilty, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ken-burns-trump-central-
park-five_us_57f7ebf9e4b0e655eab3f20b (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Benjy Sarlin, Donald Trump Says 
Central Park Five Are Guilty, Despite DNA Evidence, NBC NEWS (Oct. 7, 2016), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/donald-trump-says-central-park-
five-are-guilty-despite-dna-n661941 (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 27.  See Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 14. 
 28.  See STANLEY W. CAMPBELL, SLAVE CATCHERS: ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW, 1850-1860, at 11 (1970). 
 29.  See ―PRETENDS TO BE FREE‖: RUNAWAY SLAVE ADVERTISEMENTS FROM 
COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY xx (Graham Russell 
Hodges & Alan Eward Brown eds., 1994); see also DOUGLAS R. EGERTON, 
GABRIEL‘S REBELLION: THE VIRGINIA SLAVE CONSPIRACIES OF 1800 AND 1802 
(2000). 
 30. See, e.g., CLIFFORD R. CALDWELL & RON DELORD, ETERNITY AT THE END 
OF A ROPE: EXECUTIONS, LYNCHINGS AND VIGILANTE JUSTICE IN TEXAS 1819–1912, 
at 362 (2015) (describing the torturing and burning to death of Henry Smith, a 
black man lynched in Texas in 1893); ANITA PRICE DAVIS, THE MARGARET 
MITCHELL ENCYCLOPEDIA 119 (2013) (―Between 1882 and 1968 there were 4,742 
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mulatto, bond or free,‖ read one Virginia law from 1819, ―shall be 
a good witness in pleas of the Commonwealth for or against 
negroes or mulattoes, bond or free, or in civil pleas where free 
negroes or mulattoes shall alone be parties, and in no other cases 
whatever.‖31 As the Montgomery, Alabama-based Equal Justice 
Initiative emphasizes of America‘s past:  
Racial terror lynchings during the period from 1877 to 1950 
killed thousands of black people, marginalized people of color 
politically, economically, and socially, and fueled a massive 
migration of black refugees out of the South. In addition, 
lynching and the era of racial terror inflicted deep trauma and 
psychic wounds on survivors, families, and entire 
communities.32 
                                                                                                     
black lynchings in the nation. Congressman John Lewis calls the period ‗one of 
the darkest and sickest periods in American history.‘‖); CHRISTOPHER METRESS, 
THE LYNCHING OF EMMETT TILL: A DOCUMENTARY NARRATIVE 3 (2002) (discussing 
the societal impact of the lynching of Emmett Till); see also ROBERT W. 
THURSTON, LYNCHING: AMERICAN MOB MURDER IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2011); 
AMY LOUISE WOOD, LYNCHING AND SPECTACLE: WITNESSING RACIAL VIOLENCE IN 
AMERICA, 1890-1940 (2009); CHRISTOPHER WALDREP, AFRICAN AMERICANS 
CONFRONT LYNCHING: STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS ERA (2009). After some lynchings, lynch mob participants actually 
posed for photographs with the bodies of the lynching victims and then mailed 
those photographs out as postcards. WITHOUT SANCTUARY: LYNCHING 
PHOTOGRAPHY IN AMERICA (James Allen ed., 2000); DORA APEL, IMAGERY OF 
LYNCHING: BLACK MEN, WHITE WOMEN, AND THE MOB (2004).  
 31.  See CIVIL RIGHTS AND AFRICAN AMERICANS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 60, 
62 (Albert P. Blaustein & Robert L. Zangrando eds., 1968) (reprinting the text of 
the Virginia law, ―An act reducing into one, the several acts concerning slaves, 
free Negroes, and mulattoes‖). This was the law in both Virginia and Maryland 
and similar provisions were put in place in states such as Alabama, Mississippi, 
Missouri, North Carolina and Tennessee. CHARLES M. CHRISTIAN, BLACK SAGA: 
THE AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE: A CHRONOLOGY 31 (1995). 
 32.  See History of Racial Injustice: Racial Terror Lynchings, EQUAL JUST. 
INITIATIVE, https://eji.org/history-racial-injustice-racial-terror-
lynchings.https://eji.org/history-racial-injustice-racial-terror-lynchings (last 
visited Dec. 16, 2016) (discussing the lasting impacts and effects on the lives of 
those witnessing lynchings in the South) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); Lynching in America: Confronting the Legacy of Racial Terror, 
EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, http://eji.org/reports/lynching-in-america (last visited 
Dec. 19, 2016) (describing how the Equal Justice Initiative documented 4,075 
cases of ―racial terror lynchings‖ of African Americans in Alabama, Arkansas, 
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia between 1877 and 1950) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). ―The death penalty is a direct descendent 
of lynching,‖ observes Christina Swarns of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. 
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Although the Declaration of Independence set lofty 
aspirations for the nation, early American political rhetoric did 
not line up with state practice. At its founding in 1776, the 
United States of America—through its Continental Congress—
promulgated the Declaration of Independence, which famously 
reads: ―We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are 
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty 
and the pursuit of Happiness.‖33 Yet, when a Richmond, Virginia-
area slave named Gabriel—born in 1776—plotted to gain his 
freedom, vowing ―Death or Liberty,‖ he and his co-conspirators 
were sent to the gallows.34 In Gabriel‘s Rebellion, its leader—a 
blacksmith who had recruited compatriots in rural areas and at 
black churches—became one of more than twenty slaves who 
were put to death.35 Ironically, though the country was founded 
on the principle of equality and the basis of natural rights,36 
Native Americans and African Americans—as well as women, not 
granted the right to vote until 192037—were, for many decades, 
systematically excluded from the nation‘s social compact.38  
                                                                                                     
―The states with the highest number of lynchings also have the highest numbers 
of death-penalty executions,‖ she notes. Lonnae O‘Neal Parker, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 31, 2012), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/2012/01/31/gIQAlKEPgQ_story.h
tml?utm_term=.2358d1dac6d1 (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 33.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). 
 34.  See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Did African-American Slaves Rebel?, PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/african-americans-many-rivers-to-cross/history/did-
african-american-slaves-rebel/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (characterizing 
Gabriel‘s Rebellion as a quest for freedom and noting that, after ―the state 
captured Gabriel and several co-conspirators,‖ ―[t]wenty-five African Americans, 
worth about $9,000 or so—money that cash-strapped Virginia surely thought it 
could ill afford—were hanged together before Gabriel went to the gallows and 
was executed‖) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 35.  See 1 MARY BETH NORTON, CAROL SHERIFF, DAVID M. KATZMAN, DAVID 
W. BLIGHT, HOWARD P. CHUDACOFF, FREDRIK LOGEVALL, BETH BAILEY & DEBRA 
MICHALS, A PEOPLE AND A NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 197 (8th ed. 
2010) (taking note of the punishment of the rebelling slaves). 
 36.  See MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE NEW REPUBLICANISM 
8 (1994). 
 37.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (guaranteeing women the right to vote). 
 38.  See JANE A. GRANT, THE NEW AMERICAN SOCIAL COMPACT: RIGHTS AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 2 (2008) (noting that ―African 
Americans, women, Native Americans, and newly arrived immigrants‖ were not 
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Phyllis Goldfarb‘s ―Matters of Strata‖ is a welcome addition 
to the sizeable, growing body of literature on capital punishment 
and inequality.39 In examining what she calls ―the interactive role 
of race, gender, and class in capital cases in general and the 
Giarratano case in particular,‖40 she sheds light and insight on 
the reality that race, gender stereotypes, and poverty have long 
shaped—and continue to shape—America‘s death penalty system. 
For example, she notes that ―abundant evidence reveals‖ that 
race and the death penalty are ―powerfully intertwined.‖41 That 
                                                                                                     
included in the country‘s social compact).  
 39.  See, e.g., FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN AMERICA 1 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2006) 
[hereinafter FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE] (―By now the connection 
between race and the killings of African-Americans, in particular through 
lynchings and the death penalty, is widely recognized among scholars, activists, 
and legal officials.‖); HOWARD W. ALLEN & JEROME M. CLUBB, RACE, CLASS, AND 
THE DEATH PENALTY: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 12 (2008) (―It is 
clear that over the long sweep of American history, racial and ethnic disparity in 
the use of the death penalty has been of substantial magnitude.‖); see also 
PETER IADICOLA & ANSON SHUPE, VIOLENCE, INEQUALITY, AND HUMAN FREEDOM 
311 (3d ed. 2013) (citations omitted): 
In looking at the population of those executed by the U.S. 
government, the majority have been members of ethnic populations 
and generally from the poorer strata of society. Of the 211 federal 
death penalty prosecutions authorized by the attorney general since 
1988, 75 percent have been against minorities. The U.S. General 
Accounting Office issued a report in 1990 which found that in 82 
percent of the studies reviewed, race of the victim was found to 
influence the likelihood of being charged with capital murder or being 
sentenced to execution. 
 40.  See Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 3. 
 41.  See id. at 6. The subject of women and capital punishment has been 
written about by a number of scholars. See, e.g., KATHLEEN A. O‘SHEA, WOMEN 
AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900–1998 (1999); Harry 
Greenlee & Shelia P. Greenlee, Women and the Death Penalty: Racial 
Disparities and Differences, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 319 (2008); Victor L. 
Streib, Rare and Inconsistent: The Death Penalty for Women, 33 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 609 (2006); Elizabeth Rapaport, Staying Alive: Executive Clemency, Equal 
Protection, and the Politics of Gender in Women‟s Capital Cases, 4 BUFF. CRIM. 
L. REV. 967 (2001); Andrea Shapiro, Unequal Before the Law: Men, Women and 
the Death Penalty, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L. 427 (2000). The stories of 
individual women sentenced to death are especially revealing of how female 
offenders are often portrayed by the media. See, e.g., KATHLEEN A. CAIRNS, THE 
ENIGMA WOMAN: THE DEATH SENTENCE OF NELLIE MAY MADISON (2007); 
KATHLEEN A. CAIRNS, PROOF OF GUILT: BARBARA GRAHAM AND THE POLITICS OF 
EXECUTING WOMEN IN AMERICA (2013); LINDA STROM, KARLA FAYE TUCKER SET 
FREE: LIFE AND FAITH ON DEATH ROW (2011). 
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the histories of capital punishment and lynching are inextricably 
linked with racial prejudice and oppression, in fact, is amply 
shown through Professor Goldfarb‘s observations about the 
Scottsboro cases42 and the Southern lynch mobs that took so 
many African-American lives.43 The death penalty has frequently 
targeted the illiterate, the poor, the intellectually disabled, and 
racial minorities, and often in not-so-subtle ways.44 And the 
                                                                                                     
 42.  See generally LITA SORENSEN, THE SCOTTSBORO BOYS TRIAL: A PRIMARY 
SOURCE ACCOUNT (2004) (discussing the case of nine young blacks accused in 
Alabama of raping two white women in 1931). 
 43.  See Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 12, 15 & n.57. Such lynchings—as Ta-
Nehisi Coates, a national correspondent for The Atlantic, writes—served to 
―dominate and control‖ blacks, not only in the South but throughout the United 
States. And the lack of accountability for such crimes was a despicable part of 
the terror associated with them. As Ta-Nehisi Coates writes in his book, 
Between the World and Me: ―In the era of mass lynching, it was so difficult to 
find who, specifically, served as executioner that such deaths were often 
reported by the press as having happened ‗at the hands of persons unknown.‘‖ 
TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 42, 97–98 (2015). Lynchings 
took place not just in the South, in states such as Alabama, Mississippi and 
Texas, but in northern states like Illinois and Minnesota. See, e.g., AMY LOUISE 
WOOD, LYNCHING AND SPECTACLE: WITNESSING RACIAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA, 
1890–1940 (2011); JOHN D. BESSLER, LEGACY OF VIOLENCE: LYNCH MOBS AND 
EXECUTIONS IN MINNESOTA (2003) [hereinafter BESSLER, LEGACY OF VIOLENCE]; 
PHILIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE LYNCHING OF BLACK 
AMERICA (2003). 
 44.  At America‘s last public execution, that of a twenty-two-year-old black 
man, Rainey Bethea, on August 14, 1936, in Owensboro, Kentucky, 
approximately 10,000 to 20,000 people were in attendance. Bethea was hanged 
for killing a 70-year-old white woman, and the scaffold was erected in a field so 
that thousands could witness it. ―So many people invaded Owensboro for the 
spectacle,‖ one commentator writes, ―that terrified local blacks fled the town, 
especially after receiving lynching threats from drunken white revelers.‖ Ray 
Moses, Persuading the Sentencing Body Not to Return a Death Verdict, 20 
CHAMPION 52, 54 (1996); John P. Rutledge, The Definitive Inhumanity of Capital 
Punishment, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 283, 290–91 (1998); Dane A. Drobny, Death 
TV: Media Access to Executions Under the First Amendment, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1179, 1187–88 (1992); Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions 
Constitutional?, 82 IOWA L. REV. 319, 447 n.820 (1997); see also id. (noting that 
under a 1920 Kentucky law providing for public hangings for the crime of rape, 
―[n]ine men, eight of them black, were punished under this law between 1920 
and 1938, when the law was repealed‖). As Stephen Bright—a Supreme Court 
litigator and the president of the Southern Center for Human Rights—puts it of 
those confined to death row: 
Those awaiting their deaths are no different from those selected for 
execution in the past: virtually all are poor; about half are members 
of racial minorities; and the overwhelming majority were sentenced to 
death for crimes against white victims. Many suffer from severe 
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punishment of death—initially rooted in the Old Testament45 and 
fertilized in prior centuries by then-prevailing religious 
orthodoxy46 and superstition47—has long been used mainly 
(almost exclusively) against men.48  
This response to Professor Goldfarb‘s essay explores the 
implications of her analysis for the U.S. Supreme Court‘s Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence and the 
constitutionality of capital punishment. In the twenty-first 
century, Americans have a growing awareness and 
understanding that their criminal justice system—frequently 
                                                                                                     
mental impairments or limitations, and many others were the victims 
of the most brutal physical, sexual, and psychological abuse during 
their childhoods. 
Stephen B. Bright, ―Discrimination, Death, and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial 
Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty,‖ in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE 
KILLING STATE , supra note 39, at 211. 
 45.  ROLANDO V. DEL CARMEN, THE DEATH PENALTY: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, 
COMMENTARIES, AND CASE BRIEFS 2 (2d ed. 2008) (noting that the crimes listed in 
the 1641 Body of Liberties—the penal code for the Massachusetts Bay Colony—
prescribed the death penalty for twelve offenses, including idolatry, witchcraft 
and blasphemy, and cited Old Testament verses as authority for proscribed 
acts). 
 46.  See, e.g., WALTER STAHR, JOHN JAY: FOUNDING FATHER (2012) 
(describing the life of John Jay, the first Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, and noting that he believed capital punishment ―was required by the 
Bible in cases of murder‖). 
 47.  In early America, executions were often conducted on Fridays. JOHN D. 
BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY AND THE 
FOUNDERS‘ EIGHTH AMENDMENT 266 (2012) [hereinafter BESSLER, CRUEL AND 
UNUSUAL]. It was during the Enlightenment—as legal historian Stuart Banner 
explains—that a more ―utilitarian calculus‖ made the gallows seem like ―a 
product of ignorance and superstition.‖ BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 
5, at 107. 
 48.  E.g., Matthew B. Robinson, Assessing Scholarly Opinion of Capital 
Punishment: The Experts Speak, in THE DEATH PENALTY TODAY 143 (Robert M. 
Bohm ed., 2008) (―Perhaps the clearest evidence of gender/sex bias offered by a 
death penalty expert was this response: ‗We just don‘t execute many women 
(they represent 1.5% of those on death row and about 1% of those executed since 
1977), even though they account for a significant proportion of murderers.‘‖). 
Before Ann Bilansky—convicted of poisoning her husband, and the only woman 
ever executed by the State of Minnesota—was put to death on Friday, March 23, 
1860, lawmakers actually took up a bill providing, ―No woman or girl convicted 
of murder in the first degree, shall suffer the penalty of death, but that 
punishment in such cases shall be imprisonment in the State prison for life.‖ 
BESSLER, LEGACY OF VIOLENCE, supra note 43, at 83–92. Had that bill become 
law, it would have made only men eligible for the death penalty in the state.  
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described as one of ―mass incarceration‖ and as ―overly 
punitive‖—is badly in need of reform.49 There are lots of non-
violent offenders living in American prisons,50 with the rise of 
private prisons perversely incentivizing incarceration and profit-
taking at the expense of people‘s lives.51 The American people 
now know that the capital punishment ―system‖ (if it can even be 
called that) is riddled with arbitrariness, error, geographic and 
racial disparities, and wrongful convictions.52 After examining the 
                                                                                                     
 49.  MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 4, 11–12, 188, 209 (2013);  ADVANCING CRIMINOLOGY 
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY 8 (Thomas G. Blomberg, Julie Mestre Brancale, 
Kevin M. Beaver & William D. Bales eds., 2016). 
 50.  MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING FRAGMENTS: PENAL REFORM IN AMERICA, 
1975–2025, at 206 (2016). 
 51.  See MICHAEL A. HALLETT, PRIVATE PRISONS IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL RACE 
PERSPECTIVE 18 (2006) (―[T]he incentive structure associated with for-profit 
imprisonment dramatically readjusts the crime control formula from 
attentiveness to crime-reduction strategies to acceptance and dependence upon 
high crime and harsh punishment for economic viability.‖); PUNISHMENT IN 
POPULAR CULTURE (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2015) (―In the 
United States, where the state has outsourced the burden of providing 
incarceration services to the lowest bidder—a company that has a fiduciary duty 
to keep the beds full and maximize profit—there is no incentive to not lock up or 
reduce recidivism.‖). In 2016, the U.S. Government announced that it would be 
gradually phasing out the use of private prisons, a development that the multi-
billion dollar private prison industry is actively fighting. Charlie Savage, U.S. to 
Phase Out Use of Private Prisons for Federal Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/19/us/us-to-phase-out-use-of-private-
prisons-for-federal-inmates.html?_r=0 (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (―The Obama 
administration said on Thursday that it would begin to phase out the use of 
private for-profit prisons to house federal inmates.‖) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Matt Zapotosky, DOJ Directive Riles Private 
Prisons, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2016, at A5 (―The private prison industry, which 
generates billions of dollars in revenue, has become a powerful lobbying force on 
Capitol Hill, and officials say they have tried since the Justice Department 
announcement to rally legislators to their side.‖). The election of billionaire 
businessman Donald Trump in November 2016 sent shares of Corrections 
Corporation of America (―CCA‖), the country‘s largest private prison company, 
soaring. James Surowiecki, Trump Sets Private Prisons Free, NEW YORKER, Dec. 
5, 2016, at 26 (noting that CCA‘s stock jumped forty-seven percent in the wake 
of Trump‘s election).   
 52.  See STEPHEN BREYER, AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY 72–80 (John D. 
Bessler ed. 2016) (discussing arbitrariness and wrongful convictions in his 2015 
dissent in Glossip v. Gross); National Polls Show Historic Declines in Support 
for Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Apr. 2015), 
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/national-polls-and-studies#Pew;CBS (last visited 
Dec. 19, 2016) (―Polls released this week by Pew Research Center and CBS 
News show that public support for the death penalty has declined to near 
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evidence, Goldfarb is right to conclude that ―the entanglement of 
race, gender, and class structures‖ in the capital decision-making 
process can no longer be overlooked—and, in fact, ―hang like a 
shadow over America‘s death penalty.‖53 Indeed, in the face of 
miscarriages of justice, a series of high-profile botched executions, 
and the long delays between death sentences and executions that 
inflict severe psychological torment on death row inmates, U.N. 
officials, academics and jurists, as well as members of the general 
public, are starting to talk about executions not just as cruel and 
unusual but through the lens of torture.54 Though the U.S. 
Constitution‘s Fourteenth Amendment, as recounted below, was 
intended in part to equalize the punishment of blacks and whites, 
America‘s death penalty has never separated itself from its 
terrifying, discriminatory past. 
  
II.  The Legacy of Slavery and Discrimination: Race, Gender and 
Class in Early America 
The United States of America was forged on the anvil of 
liberty. The motto of the American Revolution, ―No taxation 
without representation,‖ became a rallying cry for colonists 
angered by taxes on stamps, sugar and tea.55 ―Those who are 
taxed without consent expressed by themselves or our 
representatives are slaves,‖ John Dickinson wrote in 1768,56 
                                                                                                     
historic lows. Both polls reported that 56% of Americans support the death 
penalty.‖) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Besty Cooper, 
Rachel Lienesch & Robert P. Jones, Anxiety, Nostalgia, and Mistrust: Findings 
from the 2015 American Values Survey, PRRI (Nov. 17, 2015), 
http://www.prri.org/research/survey-anxiety-nostalgia-and-mistrust-findings-
from-the-2015-american-values-survey/#.VlR1qN-rR7N (last visited Dec. 19, 
2016) (―Americans are also closely divided over whether there are racial 
disparities in death penalty sentencing. A majority (53%) of Americans agree 
that a black person is more likely than a white person to receive the death 
penalty for the same crime, while 45% of Americans disagree.‖) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 53.  Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 5. 
 54.  See generally JOHN D. BESSLER, THE DEATH PENALTY AS TORTURE: FROM 
THE DARK AGES TO ABOLITION (forthcoming 2017). 
 55.  RORY RAVEN, BURNING THE GASPEE: REVOLUTION IN RHODE ISLAND 20–25 
(2012). 
 56.  HENRY M. GLADNEY, NO TAXATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION: 1768 
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conveying the heart-felt sentiments of North America‘s colonists 
in the wake of the Stamp Act riots of 1765 and in the lead up to 
the Boston Massacre (1770) and the Boston Tea Party (1773).57 
―Give me liberty or give me death!‖ Patrick Henry is said to have 
forcefully declared in 1775 at St. John‘s Church in Richmond, 
Virginia.58 After Paul Revere‘s midnight ride and the first shots 
were fired at Concord and Lexington, Massachusetts, the 
Revolutionary War (1775–1783) led to America‘s creation and the 
severing of political ties with England, the mother country.59 ―The 
history of the present King of Great Britain,‖ the Declaration of 
Independence audaciously proclaimed, ―is a history of repeated 
injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the 
establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States.‖60 
Yet, despite all the rhetoric about liberty and equality, the 
American Revolution did not lead to freedom and equality for all. 
As one source reports: ―Early America was governed primarily by 
English common law, which extended the vote only to men who 
possessed substantial property. Although there are no reliable 
statistics for what percentage of the population met the property 
qualifications in England, the number was roughly 10 percent of 
adult males.‖61 It took a tumultuous and bloody Civil War before 
the U.S. Constitution was amended to abolish slavery, to 
guarantee ―equal protection of the laws,‖ and—in 1870—to give 
African-Americans the franchise, though it took the passage of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to end the scourge of poll taxes and 
literacy tests.62 And even though Abigail Adams had insisted in a 
                                                                                                     
PETITION, MEMORIAL, AND REMONSTRANCE 139 (2014). 
 57.  JACK TAGER, BOSTON RIOTS: THREE CENTURIES OF SOCIAL VIOLENCE 15, 
50 (2001). 
 58.  AMERICAN RHETORIC: CONTEXT AND CRITICISM 19 (Thomas W. Benson 
ed., 1989); ARTHUR G. SHARP, NOT YOUR FATHER‘S FOUNDERS: AN ―AMENDED‖ 
LOOK AT AMERICA‘S FIRST PATRIOTS 113 (2012). 
 59.  DAVID F. MARLEY, WARS OF THE AMERICAS: A CHRONOLOGY OF ARMED 
CONFLICT IN THE NEW WORLD, 1492 TO THE PRESENT 304 (1998); JOEL J. MILLER, 
THE REVOLUTIONARY PAUL REVERE 190, 192–93 (2010). 
 60.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). 
 61.  DOROTHY A. MAYS, WOMEN IN EARLY AMERICA: STRUGGLE, SURVIVAL, AND 
FREEDOM IN A NEW WORLD 382 (2004).  
 62.  ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 145 (2000); MARSHA J. TYSON DARLING, 
CONTROVERSIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: COLLECTIONS OF DOCUMENTS AND 
ARTICLES ON MAJOR QUESTIONS OF AMERICAN LAW xiv (2001). The battle for civil 
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March 1776 letter to her husband, John, that he and his fellow 
legislators ―Remember the Ladies‖ and ―be more generous and 
favourable to them‖ than their ancestors had been, the women‘s 
suffrage movement had to struggle into the twentieth century 
before women got the right to vote.63 Even today, residents of the 
District of Columbia, where roughly half the population is black, 
scandalously have no voting representation in Congress.64 
Discrimination has deep roots, dating all the way back to the 
era of slavery and the race-based oppression and violence directed 
at indigenous peoples.65 America‘s founders viewed blacks as 
inferior,66 saw Indians as ―savages,‖67 and confined women 
                                                                                                     
rights played out on the streets of Selma, Alabama, in front of schools in Little 
Rock, Arkansas, through the Montgomery bus boycott, on the Edmund Pettus 
Bridge, at a Woolworth lunch counter in Greensboro, North Carolina, and in the 
halls of Congress. E.g., JOHN LEWIS (WITH MICHAEL D‘ORSO), WALKING WITH THE 
WIND: A MEMOIR OF THE MOVEMENT (1998); THOMAS F. JACKSON, FROM CIVIL 
RIGHTS TO HUMAN RIGHTS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
ECONOMIC JUSTICE (2007); TODD S. PURDUM, AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME: 
TWO PRESIDENTS, TWO PARTIES, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 
1964 (2014).  
 63.  THE FEMINIST PAPERS: FROM ADAMS TO DE BEAUVOIR 10 (Alice S. Rossi 
ed., 1973); ELIZABETH FROST-KNAPPMAN & KATHRYN CULLEN-DUPONT, WOMEN‘S 
SUFFRAGE IN AMERICA 425 (2005); see also JEFFREY D. SCHULTZ & LAURA VAN 
ASSENDELFT, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WOMEN IN POLITICS 156 (1999) (noting that the 
National Woman Suffrage Association was founded in 1869 by Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton and Susan B. Anthony). 
 64.  MICHAEL K. FAUNTROY, HOME RULE OR HOUSE RULE? CONGRESS AND THE 
EROSION OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 202 (2003); 2015 
COUNTY AND CITY EXTRA: ANNUAL METRO, CITY, AND COUNTY DATA BOOK 9 
(Deirdre A. Gaquin & Mary Meghan Ryan eds., 2015). In 1970, Congress 
restored the District of Columbia‘s non-voting delegate after that position had 
been abolished in 1875. The delegate was given all House privileges except that 
of voting on the floor. BRUCE J. SCHULMAN, STUDENT‘S GUIDE TO CONGRESS 221 
(2009). To this day, the license plates of vehicles registered in the District of 
Columbia bear the revolutionary motto, ―No taxation without representation.‖ 
TIMOTHY MASON ROBERTS, DISTANT REVOLUTIONS: 1848 AND THE CHALLENGE TO 
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 3 (2009). 
 65.  The new National Museum of African American History and Culture in 
Washington, D.C., meticulously documents, through thousands of artifacts, the 
long history of struggle, from slavery to emancipation and from shackles to 
public protest. Alicia DeSantis & Josh Williams, I, Too, Sing America: The 
National Museum of African American History and Culture, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/09/15/arts/design/national-
museum-of-african-american-history-and-culture.html?_r=0; (last visited Dec. 
19, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 66.  See SLAVERY IN AMERICA: A READER AND GUIDE 133 (Kenneth Morgan 
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largely to the domestic sphere of the household until the women‘s 
liberation movement of the 1960s and 1970s.68 The U.S. 
Constitution itself explicitly protected the slave trade until 1808, 
contained a fugitive slave clause, and counted slaves as ―three 
fifths‖ persons for purposes of apportioning representation for 
political institutions controlled by white men.69 Thomas 
Jefferson—the principal drafter of the Declaration of 
Independence—himself believed that blacks were ―much inferior‖ 
to whites in the ability to reason and were ―inferior to the whites 
in the endowments of body and mind.‖70 Records show Jefferson 
                                                                                                     
ed., 2005) (―The Founding Fathers of the United States were well aware of the 
contradiction between their espousal of political liberty at the time of the 
American Revolution and the continued presence of thousands of enslaved 
blacks throughout the new nation.‖). 
 67.  See FRANK LAMBERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF 
RELIGION IN AMERICA 70 (2010) (―Virginians regarded Indians, for example, as 
‗savages‘ and ‗infidels.‘ The epithet ‗savage‘ had a special and ignoble meaning 
in English political history because it was first used against another group of 
outsiders, the Irish.‖). 
 68.  Compare COKIE ROBERTS, FOUNDING MOTHERS: THE WOMEN WHO RAISED 
OUR NATION 12 (2004) (―Though many of the marriages of the Founders, like 
that of Abigail and John Adams, were true partnerships, the women had no 
legal rights. Under a system called ‗couverture,‘ their husbands essentially 
owned women.‖), with KATHLEEN C. BERKELEY, THE WOMEN‘S LIBERATION 
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (1999) (describing the women‘s liberation movement, 
feminism, and the history of the struggle for women‘s rights). 
 69.  BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 47, at 307; MICHAEL STOKES 
PAULSEN & LUKE PAULSEN, THE CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION 75 (2015). 
 70.  PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE 
AGE OF JEFFERSON 266 (3d ed. 2014). Early U.S. presidents—among them, 
George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, James Monroe, Andrew 
Jackson, John Tyler, James Polk and Zachary Taylor—owned slaves. Both 
George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, for example, owned hundreds of 
slaves during their lifetimes, with Jefferson‘s wife, Martha, bringing more than 
100 slaves as part of her dowry. GRAEME DONALD, LOOSE CANNONS: 101 MYTHS, 
MISHAPS AND MISADVENTURES OF MILITARY HISTORY 241 (2011); SHANE 
MOUNTJOY, CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR: THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NORTH AND 
SOUTH 22 (2009); TRUDI STRAIN TRUEIT, THOMAS JEFFERSON 34 (2010); Robert 
Blair St. George, ―Placing Race at Jefferson‘s Monticello,‖ in CULTURAL MEMORY 
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY 251 (Dan Ben-Amos & Liliane Weissberg 
eds., 1999). At the time of George Washington‘s death, 317 slaves owned by 
Washington himself were living at Mount Vernon. Another 153 slaves at Mount 
Vernon were dower slaves from the estate of Martha Washington‘s first 
husband, Daniel Parke Custis. Ten Facts About Washington and Slavery, 
George Washington‘s Mount Vernon, http://www.mountvernon.org/george-
washington/slavery/ten-facts-about-washington-slavery (last visited Dec. 19, 
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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owned more than 600 slaves, including boys, aged 10 to 16, who 
worked from dawn to dusk making nails at Monticello, and who 
were sometimes whipped by an overseer.71 
Colonial and early American slave codes, reflective of the 
widespread fear of slave rebellions, provided for death sentences 
for felonies such as insurrection, murder, rape, poisoning, arson, 
and assaulting a white person.72 ―Codes also applied to free 
blacks and mulattos, not just slaves,‖ one sources recalls, 
emphasizing: ―The specific provisions in codes frequently used 
inclusive language to apply laws to ‗all negroes,‘ such that free 
blacks were affected by slave code provisions.‖ ―Some slave 
codes,‖ The Cambridge History of Law in America observes, ―also 
included penalties for whites who attempted to aid blacks in 
insurrection attempts or enticed slaves to run away from their 
masters.‖73 ―Before the Civil War,‖ yet another source notes, 
―each Southern state had a slave code, which was a system of 
laws designed to safeguard property rights in slavery and to 
protect the white community against insurrection.‖74 In an 1852 
speech in Rochester, New York, the great orator, newspaper 
                                                                                                     
 71.  NATALIE BOBER, THOMAS JEFFERSON: DRAFTSMAN OF A NATION 229 
(2008); Karen Grigsby Bates, Life at Jefferson‟s Monticello, as His Slaves Saw It, 
NPR (Mar. 11, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/03/11/148305319/life-at-
jeffersons-monticello-as-his-slaves-saw-it (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Nailery, MONTICELLO, 
https://www.monticello.org/site/plantation-and-slavery/nailery (last visited Dec. 
19, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 72.  CHRISTIAN, supra note 31, at 28. For example, South Carolina adopted a 
slave code in 1712 that was revised at various points thereafter. South 
Carolina‘s slave code, which became a model for others, made it punishable by 
death to entice a slave to run away or for a slave to attempt to flee the 
jurisdiction. Id. at 27. Under the code, no owner was to be punished if a slave 
were to die under punishment, with the administration of corporal punishments 
a prominent feature of the slave code. Id. As one source notes: 
Any slave absconding or successfully evading capture for twenty days 
is to be publicly whipped for the first offense, branded with the letter 
R on the right check for the second offense, and lose one ear if absent 
thirty days for the third offense, and for the fourth offense, a male 
slave is to be castrated, a female slave is to be whipped, branded on 
the left cheek with the letter R, and lose her left ear. 
Id. 
 73.  1 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 271 (Michael Grossberg 
& Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008). 
 74.  2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICAN AMERICAN SOCIETY 779 (Gerald D. Jaynes 
ed., 2005). 
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editor and abolitionist Frederick Douglass pointed out that 
―[t]here are seventy-two crimes in the State of Virginia which, if 
committed by a black man (no matter how ignorant he be), 
subject him to the punishment of death; while only two of the 
same crimes will subject a white man to the like punishment.‖75 
In other words, the rhetoric of equality did not match up with 
the reality of how people were treated. In a still little-known fact, 
many of America‘s Founding Fathers—indeed, the Continental 
Congress as a whole—embraced the writings of, and proudly 
quoted, the Italian philosopher and criminal-law theorist Cesare 
Beccaria (1738–1794), the first Enlightenment thinker to make a 
comprehensive case against capital punishment.76 In Dei delitti e 
delle pene (1764), translated into English as An Essay on Crimes 
and Punishments (1767), Beccaria argued for proportion between 
crimes and punishments, opposed torture and the death penalty, 
and stressed that laws should be applied to all persons in an 
equal manner. Widely regarded as the founder of modern 
criminology, Beccaria believed that laws should be as clear and 
precise as possible, thereby reducing judicial discretion, the need 
for interpretation of the laws, and capricious decisions.77 Beccaria 
favored milder, more certain punishments, calling for certainty 
over severity in penal codes.78 As Jefferson, channeling Beccaria, 
once put it: ―Let mercy be the character of the law-giver, but let 
the judge be a mere machine.‖79 
In early America, the rhetoric-reality disconnect was 
palpable and very wide. One of the Founding Fathers‘ favorite 
quotes from Beccaria: ―In every human society there is an effort 
                                                                                                     
 75.  AFRICAN INTELLECTUAL HERITAGE: A BOOK OF SOURCES 637–38 (Molefi 
Kete Asante & Abu S. Abarry eds., 1996). 
 76.  John D. Bessler, The Death Penalty in Decline: From Colonial America 
to the Present, 50 CRIM. L. BULL. 245, 247–52 (2014); John D. Bessler, The 
Economist and the Enlightenment: How Cesare Beccaria Changed Western 
Civilization, 42 EUR. J. LAW & ECON. 1 (2016). 
 77.  SHAHID M. SHAHIDULLAH, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: 
GLOBAL AND LOCAL PERSPECTIVES 140 (2014); John D. Bessler, Cesare Beccaria: 
A 26-Year-Old Who Enlightened Our Founding Fathers, 20 ITALIAN AM. 28 
(2015). 
 78.  CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY: AN ANALYSIS OF ITS UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS 
60 (Werner J. Einstadter & Stuart Henry eds., 2006).  
 79.  MERRILL D. PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION: A 
BIOGRAPHY 126 (1970). 
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continually tending to confer on one part of the height of power 
and happiness, and to reduce the other to the extreme of 
weakness and misery. The intent of good laws is to oppose this 
effort, and to diffuse their influence universally and equally.‖ Yet, 
America‘s founders—merchants, land speculators, lawyers, 
physicians and plantation owners—were themselves wealthy 
elites, some spectacularly well-to-do, who tolerated—and in many 
cases, profited handsomely from—human bondage.80 As Phyllis 
Goldfarb reminds us: ―slavery constructed the meaning of race in 
America for more than two centuries‖ and America‘s social and 
political history—from colonial days through the era of Jim 
Crow—led to ―[s]tereotypes about black people,‖ with prevailing 
gender and class ideologies also byproducts of the nation‘s 
complex history.81 In describing the legacies of slavery and 
lynching, the ongoing societal problem of domestic violence, and 
class bias, ―Matters of Strata‖ reminds us that the past is not 
past—not by a long shot.82 
                                                                                                     
 80.  JOHN D. BESSLER, THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAW: AN ITALIAN 
PHILOSOPHER AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 8, 16 (2014); PAUL FINKELMAN, 
SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 31, 135 
(3d ed. 2014); The Founding Fathers: A Brief Overview, NAT‘L ARCHIVES, 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_founding_fathers_overvie
w.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2016) (listing the occupations of the Founding 
Fathers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 81.  Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 7–8, 30–42. 
 82.  See id. at 7–9, 33–34, 38 (describing the struggles of the 
disadvantaged). For an in-depth examination of the issue of race in American 
law, see F. MICHAEL HIGGINBOTHAM, RACE LAW: CASES, COMMENTARY, AND 
QUESTIONS (3d ed. 2010). The tactless invective and racially charged rhetoric of 
Donald Trump in his recent presidential campaign are a stark reminder that 
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which he spoke of Mexican migrants as drug traffickers, criminals and ―rapists,‖ 
to his call for ―a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United 
States,‖ to the third and final presidential debate, in which Trump spoke of ―bad 
hombres‖ and called Hillary Clinton ―a nasty woman,‖ Trump‘s coarse, 
insensitive language exemplify the kind of race and gender ideologies about 
which Professor Goldfarb writes. Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 7, 31; Michelle Ye 
Hee Lee, Donald Trump‟s False Comments Connecting Mexican Immigrants and 
Crime, WASH. POST. (July 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-
checker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-trumps-false-comments-connecting-mexican-
immigrants-and-crime/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (discussing Donald Trump‘s 
comments regarding Mexicans) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Jeremy Diamond, Donald Trump: Ban All Muslim Travel to U.S., CNN 
(Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/07/politics/donald-trump-muslim-
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In fact, the legal concept of ―cruel and unusual punishments‖ 
that jurists still wrestle with today—one rooted linguistically in 
the English Bill of Rights (1689) and the Virginia Declaration of 
Rights (1776), out of which the U.S. Constitution‘s Eighth 
Amendment came—itself became closely associated with slavery. 
For example, Alabama once had a law prohibiting the infliction of 
―cruel or unusual punishment‖ on any slave, making the offense 
punishable by a fine of fifty to one thousand dollars.83 Likewise, a 
law from Mississippi—from 1822—also prohibited the ―cruel or 
unusual punishment‖ of a slave, though the fine in that state 
could not exceed five hundred dollars.84 While a South Carolina 
law from 1740 prohibited the ―cruel punishment‖ of slaves, an 
early Louisiana statute set an ―unusual rigor‖ standard for their 
treatment.85 By the 1850s and early 1860s, the ―cruel or unusual‖ 
and ―cruel and unusual‖ terminology had become a standard 
usage for the prevailing legal duty to safeguard slaves—not for 
their own sake, but to protect the property interests of 
slaveholders.86 White plantation owners were concerned about 
                                                                                                     
ban-immigration/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (discussing Trump‘s comments 
regarding Muslims) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Erin 
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Debate Winners?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/21/us/politics/nasty-woman-and-bad-hombres-
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comments during the third presidential debate) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). The concept of the other—whether used in law or politics 
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employed to either generate fear (e.g., the Willie Horton 1988 attack ad run 
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EMBRACE: CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE ON THE DEATH PENALTY 96 
(2013); ALLAN D. COOPER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF GENOCIDE 28–32 (2009); accord 
LOIS PRESSER, WHY WE HARM 34 (2013) (noting that ―victims of the 1994 
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infamous ―Willie Horton Ad,‖ connecting race and the death penalty, began: 
―Bush and Dukakis on crime: Bush supports the death penalty for first-degree 
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murderers to have weekend passes from prison.‖ FRANK W. BAKER, POLITICAL 
CAMPAIGNS AND POLITICAL ADVERTISING: A MEDIA LITERACY GUIDE 122 (2009). 
 83.  BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 47, at 216–18. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 217–18, 314. 
 86.  Id. at 216–18; see also Alexander A. Reinert, Reconceptualizing the 
Eighth Amendment: Slaves, Prisoners, and “Cruel and Unusual” Punishment, 94 
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their property and their profits, and injured or maimed slaves—
unable to be as productive in cotton fields—were less valuable to 
slave owners.87 
The class ideologies Professor Goldfarb identifies and 
discusses in ―Matters of Strata‖ certainly find audible echoes in 
the historical record. Under the English common-law doctrine of 
―benefit of clergy,‖ for example, literate citizens were once spared 
from execution altogether. As Bryan Garner, the editor of Black‟s 
Law Dictionary, notes: ―By invoking the benefit of clergy—
usually by reading the so-called neck verse—a defendant could 
have the case transferred from the King‘s Court (which imposed 
the death penalty for a felony) to the Ecclesiastical Court (which 
dispensed far milder punishment).‖88 ―The test for benefit of 
clergy,‖ another source points out, ―came to be one of literacy, in 
which the court required the accused to read the text of the fifty-
first Psalm.‖89 ―In due time,‖ that criminology textbook adds of 
that neck verse, ―illiterate common criminals committed the 
psalm to memory so that they could pretend to read it and thus 
avoid the punishments of the king‘s courts.‖90 The life-saving 
                                                                                                     
N.C. L. REV. 817, 834–50 (2016) (arguing that the ―cruel and unusual 
punishments‖ terminology was intertwined with pre- and post-Revolutionary 
War notions of permissible limits on the treatment of slaves). As Alexander 
Reinert, a law professor at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, emphasizes: 
the State of Georgia at one time also prohibited anyone from willfully murdering 
a slave, and from ―inflict[ing] any other cruel punishments, other than by 
whipping or beating . . . or by putting irons on, or confining or imprisoning such 
slave.‖ Id. at 837. ―By the middle of the nineteenth century,‖ he adds, 
―numerous legislative provisions protected against ‗cruel‘ or ‗unusual‘ 
punishments (or both) including laws in South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and 
the Territories of Mississippi, Texas, Louisiana, Utah, and New Mexico.‖ Id. at 
838–39.    
 87.  See TIMOTHY JAMES LOCKLEY, LINES IN THE SAND: RACE AND CLASS IN 
LOWCOUNTRY GEORGIA 1750–1860, at 99 (2001):  
[W]hereas assaults by whites on whites were regarded fairly leniently 
by the criminal courts, violent acts that crossed the race divide were 
treated much more seriously. Physical violence carried out by 
nonslaveholding whites against bondspeople, and vice versa, merited 
intense scrutiny. Bondspeople were, of course, property, and injured 
or maimed slaves were temporarily or permanently unable to fulfill 
their normal duties. 
 88.  BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER‘S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 107 (2011). 
 89.  LAWRENCE F. TRAVIS III & BRADLEY D. EDWARDS, INTRODUCTION TO 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 389 (8th ed. 2015). 
 90.  Id. 
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Psalm 51 read: ―Have mercy upon me, O God, / according to thy 
loving kindness, / According to the multitude of thy tender mercies 
/ blot out my transgressions.‖91 Although the U.S. Congress 
abolished the benefit of clergy privilege in 1790, it was not 
eliminated in England until 1827 and remained available in 
North Carolina until 1854.92 While many elites, such as 
Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr, fought duels to settle their 
grievances, common, impoverished criminals often met their ends 
at the end of a noose.93 
Racial conflict or tensions have long dominated American 
life. For example, the ―Scottsboro boys‖—nine young blacks 
accused of raping two white girls on a train in 1931—were 
notoriously put on trial in Scottsboro, Alabama, and found guilty 
of the crime despite the lack of any meaningful access to counsel 
for their defense.94 The judge sentenced eight of the nine 
defendants to death, only sparing one of the defendants—a 
                                                                                                     
 91.  Id. 
 92.  JAMES W. ELY, JR. & THEODORE BROWN, JR., LEGAL PAPERS OF ANDREW 
JACKSON 213 (1987). 
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REPUBLIC 159 (2002); JENNIFER GRABER, THE FURNACE OF AFFLICTION: PRISONS 
AND RELIGION IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 18 (2011). 
 94.  See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 49 (1932) (referring to the 
Scottsboro defendants as ―negroes charged with the crime of rape, committed 
upon the persons of two white girls,‖ and noting that ―no counsel had been 
employed‖). In Powell, the U.S. Supreme Court observed that ―the trial judge, in 
response to a question, said that he had appointed all the members of the bar for 
the purpose of arraigning the defendants, and then, of course, anticipated that 
the members of the bar would continue to help the defendants if no counsel 
appeared.‖ Id. The Court noted that ―[e]ach of the three trials was completed 
within a single day,‖ and that ―[t]he juries found defendants guilty and imposed 
the death penalty upon all.‖ Id. at 50. In considering the denial of counsel claim, 
the Court specifically wrote that a member of the local bar had ―on the morning 
of the trial‖ offered to help a non-resident lawyer who himself had no chance to 
prepare a proper defense. ―[U]ntil the very morning of the trial,‖ the Court 
pointed out, however, ―no lawyer had been named or definitely designated to 
represent the defendants.‖ Id. at 56. As the Court described the scene: ―The 
defendants, young, ignorant, illiterate, surrounded by hostile sentiment, haled 
back and forth under guard of soldiers, charged with an atrocious crime 
regarded with especial horror in the community where they were to be tried, 
were thus put in peril of their lives within a few moments after counsel for the 
first time charged with any degree of responsibility began to represent them.‖ 
Id. at 57–58; see also id. at 58 (―Under the circumstances disclosed, we hold that 
defendants were not accorded the right of counsel in any substantial sense.‖).  
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twelve-year-old boy considered to be too young to die.95 Later, the 
U.S. Supreme Court—in Powell v. Alabama96—ordered a new 
trial, finding that it was the state‘s responsibility, under the 
Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due Process Clause, to provide counsel 
for defendants in capital cases. ―It was the duty of the court 
having their cases in charge,‖ the Supreme Court ruled, noting 
that the Scottsboro defendants were illiterate, ―to see that they 
were denied no necessary incident of a fair trial.‖97 Four of the 
young men were released and eventually—as one source notes—
―all of the Scottsboro Boys were paroled, freed, or pardoned, 
except for one, who was tried and convicted of rape and given the 
death penalty four times.‖98 
                                                                                                     
 95.  See id. at 50. In other places and in different circumstances, other black 
youths—some not even in their teens—were also sentenced to death or executed. 
For example, in 1828 in New Jersey, a twelve-year-old slave, James Guild, was 
executed for murdering a white grandmother from a prominent family. George 
Stinney, a 14-year-old black youth, was also executed in South Carolina in 1944 
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CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 43 (Michael L. Radelet ed., 1989). 
 96.  287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 97.  Id. at 52; see also id. at 71–72:  
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ignorance and illiteracy of the defendants, their youth, the 
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clear denial of due process . . . . 
All that it is necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that in a 
capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel and is 
incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, 
feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, 
whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary 
requisite of due process of law, and that duty is not discharged by an 
assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude 
the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case. To 
hold otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already 
adverted to, that there are certain immutable principles of justice 
which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of 
the Union may disregard. 
 98.  CHARLES J. SHIELDS, MOCKINGBIRD: A PORTRAIT OF HARPER LEE 117 
(2006); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BLACK STUDIES 432 (Molefi Kete Asante & Ama 
Mazama eds., 2005); JAMES MORTON, JUSTICE DENIED: EXTRAORDINARY 
MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE ch. 6 (2015). After the latter young man, Haywood 
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The poor have never fared particularly well in criminal 
justice systems. Before Gideon v. Wainwright,99 American states 
didn‘t even afford indigent criminal defendants with counsel at 
trial. In Chambers v. State of Florida,100 the U.S. Supreme 
Court—in writing of the origins and importance of protections for 
criminal suspects and defendants set forth in the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments—had this to say in 1940 about 
punishment and the indigent:  
The rack, the thumbscrew, the wheel, solitary confinement, 
protracted questioning and cross questioning, and other 
ingenious forms of entrapment of the helpless or unpopular 
had left their wake of mutilated bodies and shattered minds 
along the way to the cross, the guillotine, the stake and the 
hangman‘s noose. And they who have suffered most from 
secret and dictatorial proceedings have almost always been the 
poor, the ignorant, the numerically weak, the friendless, and 
the powerless.101  
The Supreme Court in Chambers went on to speak of ―the 
basic principle‖ of law ―that all people must stand on an equality 
before the bar of justice in every American court.‖102 The stocks, 
the pillory and the whipping post, of course, are most closely 
associated with early Anglo-American punishment of society‘s 
poor and downtrodden, be they slaves, sharecroppers or 
laborers.103 
In assessing the death penalty, the state‘s ultimate sanction, 
experts have made these representative statements about who 
ends up in the criminal justice system and who actually gets 
                                                                                                     
Patterson, escaped from an Alabama prison where he was laboring on a prison 
farm, he fled to Atlanta, then Chattanooga, before making his way to Detroit. 
After his apprehension by the FBI, Michigan‘s governor—standing on 
principle—refused to allow Patterson to be extradited, however. Patterson later 
ended up in a barroom brawl that resulted in a stabbing death, and he died in 
jail of lung cancer in 1952 after being convicted of manslaughter in a third 
trial—the first having ended in a hung jury and the second in a mistrial. THE 
SCOTTSBORO BOYS IN THEIR OWN WORDS: SELECTED LETTERS, 1931–1950, at 308 
(Kwando M. Kinshasa ed., 2014). 
 99.  372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 100.  309 U.S. 227 (1940). 
 101.  Id. at 235–38. 
 102.  Id. at 241. 
 103.  See, e.g., CHARLES C. BOLTON, POOR WHITES OF THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH: 
TENANTS AND LABORERS IN CENTRAL NORTH CAROLINA AND MISSISSIPPI 62 (1994). 
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effective legal representation: ―The effects of social class 
permeate society, from prenatal care to school to access to mental 
health services to the ability to hire top notch legal 
representation. Many of the effects of social class occur before 
engagement with the criminal justice system.‖ ―A relevant aspect 
of social class, maybe the main one, is whether or not the 
individual has the money to mount an effective defense.‖ ―The 
poor cannot afford good legal representation, and a good lawyer 
makes a great deal of difference.‖ ―With very few exceptions, only 
the poor are executed.‖ ―Those without the capital get the 
punishment.‖ ―The criminal justice system knows who pays for 
it—and no place in the world are they the poor.‖104 As Professor 
Goldfarb sums up one of the lessons of history: ―being poor in 
America may include being disproportionately subject to 
                                                                                                     
 104.  MATTHEW B. ROBINSON, THE DEATH PENALTY TODAY 139–40 (Robert M. 
Bohm ed., 2008). Often against all odds, despite the chronic shortage of counsel 
willing to represent death row inmates, the volunteer, post-conviction lawyers 
who take on these death penalty cases can achieve successes for their pro bono 
clients. See, e.g., Robin Maher, Volunteer Lawyers and Their Extraordinary Role 
in the Delivery of Justice to Death Row Prisoners, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 519, 519 
(2004) (―[I]t is something of a small miracle when we find the exceptional 
individuals whose belief in justice moves them past the obstacles that stop 
others.‖); Steven M. Pincus, “It‟s Good to Be Free”: An Essay about the 
Exoneration of Albert Burrell, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 27 (2001) (recounting an 
exoneration fight); May Lynn Smith, ―Life After Death Row: The Resurrection of 
Damon Thibodeaux‖ STARTRIBUNE (Aug. 2, 2015), 
http://www.startribune.com/life-after-death-row-damon-thibodeaux-s-
resurrection/318969021/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (describing the exoneration 
of former Louisiana death row inmate Damon Thibodeaux due to the work of a 
team of Minnesota lawyers, led by Minneapolis attorney Steve Kaplan, after 
Thibodeaux spent 16 years behind bars); Steven Z. Kaplan, Why Death Is 
Different: Minnesota‟s Experiment with Capital Punishment, 30 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 1113, 1113–14 (2004) (―[W]e now witness what has become nearly 
commonplace: the exoneration by DNA testing of an inmate sentenced to death 
or life imprisonment years ago for a capital offense that he did not commit.‖). 
But the poor quality of trial representation in capital cases is legendary, leading 
the American Bar Association to call for a halt to executions and to put in place 
lengthy guidelines in an effort to deal with ineffective assistance of counsel. THE 
STATE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2007–2008, at 156 (Victor Streib ed., 2008); 
American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of 
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913 (2003); Russell 
Stetler & Aurélie Tabuteau, The ABA Guidelines: A Historical Perspective, 43 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 731 (2015); see also Robin M. Maher, The ABA and the 
Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in 
Death Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763 (2008). 
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unjustified punishment, even lethal punishment.‖105 In that 
regard, the impulse behind the motto carved on the U.S. Supreme 
Court building—―Equal Justice Under Law‖—has yet to be 
actualized.106 
III.  From Black Codes to Civil Rights and Constitutional 
Protection 
A major blow to the inequality of punishments was struck 
with the passage by the United States Congress of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866.107 Section 1 of that Act provided in part: 
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to 
any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby 
declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, 
of every race and color, without regard to any previous 
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and 
Territory in the United States, . . . to full and equal benefit of 
the laws and proceedings for the security of person and 
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject 
to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, 
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the 
contrary notwithstanding. 
Section 2 of the Act, setting forth penalties for violations of it, 
further provided: 
That any person who, under color of any law, statute, 
ordinance, regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause to be 
subjected, any inhabitant of any State or Territory to the 
deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act, or to 
different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such 
person having at any time been held in a condition of slavery 
                                                                                                     
 105.  Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 39. 
 106.  LAURA LORIA, WHAT IS THE JUDICIAL BRANCH? 11 (2016). 
 107.  Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (Apr. 9, 1866), reenacted, 
Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 144 (May 31, 1870) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982); see also The Civil Rights Bill, BELMONT CHRONICLE, Apr. 
19, 1866, at 2 (―This law, which was passed by an imposing vote in both Houses, 
38 to 15 in the Senate, and 122 to 41 in the House, unquestionably expresses the 
profound determination of the people of the United States. They conferred 
freedom, and they have now defined what they mean by freedom.‖). 
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or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for any crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, or by reason 
of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of 
white persons, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, 
on conviction, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one 
thousand dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or 
both, in the discretion of the court.108 
That 1866 legislation—in the words of one newspaper—was 
―conceded by everyone to be the most important measure brought 
before Congress since the passage of the constitutional 
                                                                                                     
 108.  Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, §§ 1–2, 14 Stat. 27, 27. The Civil Rights 
Act of 1866—reenacted in 1870 after the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment—is currently codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which states that 
―[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same 
right in every State and Territory . . . to the full and equal benefit of all laws 
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white 
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, 
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) 
(emphasis added); see also Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 
722 (1989): 
[T]he 41st Congress reenacted the substance of the 1866 Act in the 
Fourteenth Amendment statute, the Enforcement Act of 1870. 16 
Stat. 144. Section 16 of the 1870 Act was modeled after § 1 of the 
1866 Act. Section 17 reenacted with some modification the criminal 
provisions of § 2 of the earlier civil rights law, and § 18 of the 1870 
Act provided that the entire 1866 Act was reenacted. We have thus 
recognized that present day 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is both a Thirteenth and 
a Fourteenth Amendment statute. 
(citations omitted); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 30 n.7 (1948) (―The Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 was reenacted in § 18 of the Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 144, 
passed subsequent to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.‖); Johnson v. 
Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1221 (8th Cir. 1978) (―In 1868 Congress declared that 
the fourteenth amendment had been validly ratified by the requisite number of 
states, and in 1870 Congress adopted new civil rights legislation which included 
a virtual reenactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.‖). Section 1981 and section 
1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code were enacted in different factual 
contexts. See League of United Latin American Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 
410 F. Supp. 873, 907 (C.D. Cal. 1976): 
The scope of the two prohibitions is radically different. Section 1983 
is a dragnet clause embracing constitutional violations of every type 
and description provided that state action is involved. Section 1981 is 
confined to violations involving racial discrimination independent of 
the existence of state action. Section 1981 is founded upon the 
Thirteenth Amendment; section 1983 is founded upon the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Section 1981 is a part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866; 
section 1983 is a part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. 
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amendment abolishing slavery.‖109 The U.S. Constitution‘s 
Thirteenth Amendment, signed by President Abraham Lincoln on 
February 1, 1865, and ratified by the requisite number of states 
in December 1865, contained two sections. Section 1, drafted in 
the wake of Lincoln‘s Emancipation Proclamation, read simply: 
―Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place 
subject to their jurisdiction.‖ And the sole sentence of section 2 of 
the Thirteenth Amendment provided: ―Congress shall have power 
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.‖110 ―The 
Thirteenth Amendment,‖ one scholar writes, ―is unusual in that 
it is one of the few provisions of the U.S. Constitution that 
regulates the power and conduct of private individuals.‖111 
In introducing the bill to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
less than three weeks after the Secretary of State certified the 
Thirteenth Amendment‘s ratification, Senator Lyman Trumbull 
of Illinois—then the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee—said that it would secure the ―great fundamental 
                                                                                                     
 109.  The Equality of Negroes and Indians—Important Legislation—Passage 
of Judge Trumbull‟s Bill, LOUISVILLE DAILY COURIER, Feb. 6, 1866, at 1; see also 
The Protection of Civil Rights, CLEVELAND DAILY LEADER, Feb. 6, 1866, at 1: 
Not the least important of the many measures by which the good men 
and true of the present Congress are laboring to conserve and 
perpetuate, in the interest of freedom, the result of the war, is Judge 
Trumbull‘s bill to protect the liberty and civil rights of all our citizens, 
and to furnish the means for the vindication of these rights.  
Protection of Civil Rights, EBENSBURG ALLEGHENIAN, Feb. 8, 1866, at 2: 
The following important bill, guaranteeing protection of civil rights to 
all citizens of the United States, was taken up in the Senate on 
Friday, and passed by a vote of 33 to 12 . . . . This bill expressly 
recognizes the colored natives of this county as citizens of the United 
States, and, as such, guarantees to them every civil right, equally 
with other citizens, allowing no State or other local authority to 
oppress or degrade them, or in any manner subject them to 
disabilities or indignities. In short, this bill fulfills the pledges given 
in President Lincoln‘s two Proclamations of Freedom, and in the 
passage of the Constitutional Amendment of last Session. 
 110.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; CHRISTIAN G. SAMITO, LINCOLN AND THE 
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 103 (2015) (noting President Lincoln‘s signing of the 
Thirteenth Amendment). 
 111.  2 DAVID SCHULTZ, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
735 (2010). 
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rights.‖ Those rights were said to include ―the right to acquire 
property, the right to go and come at pleasure, the right to 
enforce rights in court, to make contracts, and to inherit and 
dispose of property.‖ ―[A]ny statute which is not equal to all, and 
which deprives any citizen of civil rights which are secured to 
other citizens,‖ Senator Trumbull told his fellow legislators, ―is an 
unjust encroachment upon his liberty; and is, in fact, a badge of 
servitude which, by the Constitution, is prohibited.‖112 Section 1 
of the Act was intended to prohibit all racially motivated 
deprivations of the rights listed in the statute, although only 
those acts perpetrated ―under color of law‖ were to be criminally 
punishable under section 2. Senator Trumbull described section 2 
as ―the valuable section of the bill so far as protecting the rights 
of freedmen is concerned.‖ The legislative history of the 1866 
Act—as courts have made clear—manifested the intent of 
Congress ―to abolish all the remaining badges and vestiges of the 
slavery system,‖ ―to provide for equality of rights between 
persons of different races,‖ and ―to prevent racial discrimination 
by both public and private parties.‖113   
The passage of that legislation over President Andrew 
Johnson‘s veto114 was seen in the South as the death-knell of 
                                                                                                     
 112.  Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), Inc., 408 F. Supp. 916, 920 (S.D. Tex. 
1976). 
 113.  Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 715–16 (1989); 
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 426, 431–32 (1968); Mahone v. 
Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1030 (3d Cir. 1977); Perry v. Gold & Laine, P.C., 371 F. 
Supp.2d 622, 628 (D. N.J. 2005); Keller v. City of Portland, No. CV-98-263-ST, 
1998 WL 1060222 at *12 (D. Ore. Nov. 13, 1998); Dartmouth Review v. 
Dartmouth College, 709 F. Supp. 32, 35 (D. N.H. 1989); Mosher v. City of 
Lakewood, 807 P.2d 1235, 1238 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); White v. A D M Milling 
Co., 93 F.R.D. 872, 874 (W.D. Mo. 1982); Heff T Haul v. Sanitary Dist., No. 88 C 
8990, 1989 WL 135209 at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 1989). 
 114.  See KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES 
AND IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 137 (2014) (―On March 27, President 
Johnson‘s veto of the Civil Rights Bill exploded across newspaper headlines 
throughout the United States, with many papers printing his accompanying 
message in full.‖); Spiess, 408 F. Supp. at 923–24: 
President Andrew Johnson vetoed the bill and sent a message to 
Congress stating his reasons on March 27, 1866. . . . Upon return of 
the bill to the Senate, Senator Trumbull replied to the veto message 
on April 4. The veto was overridden on April 6 in the Senate by a 
margin of 33 to 15, and on April 9 in the House by a margin of 122 to 
41. One year after the Civil War had ended, the 1866 Civil Rights Act 
was enacted into law on April 9, 1866. 
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state sovereignty.115 The Intelligencer, a pro-slavery newspaper in 
Anderson, South Carolina, described the bill‘s final passage this 
way: ―The House of Representatives, as intimated in our last 
issue, passed the Civil Rights bill over the President‘s veto, and 
by an overwhelming vote. Yeas, 122—nays 41. Upon the 
announcement of the vote there was great excitement, and the 
cheering lasted several minutes.‖ As that southern newspaper, 
which called the law ―unconstitutional and disgraceful to Anglo-
Saxon blood,‖ described the scene: ―The galleries were crowded, 
and the floor of the House was filled with privileged persons. The 
number of Senators attracted thither was so large as to have left 
that body almost without a quorum.‖ ―The first section of the Bill, 
as it passed,‖ The Intelligencer emphasized, ―contains the most 
important feature, embodying the ‗Rights‘ conferred.‖116 
The intent behind the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was to 
prohibit discrimination; to put blacks on equal footing in the 
courts and as regard property rights; and to equalize 
punishments for whites and minorities.117 As the Chicago 
                                                                                                     
 115.  The Civil Rights Bill, WILMINGTON DAILY DISPATCH, Mar. 21, 1866, at 2 
(―The Civil Rights Bill having passed both Houses of Congress by decided 
majorities, may be considered a law of the land, there being scarcely a shadow of 
a doubt that the President will give it a signature.‖); id. (―The passage of this 
bill is a death-blow to State sovereignty, and annuls all acts of our State 
Legislature in relation to the blacks except the one prohibiting negro suffrage.‖); 
id. (―This bill, except in the matter of suffrage, places the negro on an equality 
with the white man in every State of the Union . . . .‖); Proceedings of Congress 
Yesterday, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 10, 1866, at 2 (―The civil rights bill, which last 
week passed the Senate over the President‘s veto, was called up in the House, 
and also passed that body by the required two-thirds vote—yeas 122, nays 41. It 
is, therefore, a law, and takes effect at once.‖). 
 116.  Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168–69 (1976); Passage of the Civil 
Rights Bill, INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 19, 1866, at 2. The Intelligencer—located in a 
former Confederate state and opposing the racial equality promised by the 
legislation—had this to say about the law‘s passage: ―How the heart sickens at 
the sight of an American Congress,—in a land of boasted enlightenment and 
intelligence,—placing the wooly-headed negroes of the South upon an equal 
footing with the white race!‖ Id. The publisher of The Intelligencer served in the 
Confederate Army during the Civil War, rising to the rank of colonel. AMERICAN 
LEGISLATIVE LEADERS IN THE SOUTH, 1911–1994, at 136 (James Roger Sharp & 
Nancy Weatherly Sharp eds., 1999). 
 117.  Civil Rights and Citizenship, NATIONAL REPUBLICAN, Mar. 8, 1866, at 2: 
The act is drawn with masterly skill, and is calculated to accomplish 
the noble object for which it was originated. Now, as heretofore, we 
give our unqualified assent to this necessary measure. It is demanded 
by the circumstances which the war entailed upon us, and the 
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Tribune, writing more than a century later, described the law‘s 
purpose: ―In 1866 Congress passed the first civil rights act. 
Specifically designed to wipe out the hardships imposed by the 
‗black codes,‘ it provided that Negroes should have the same right 
as white men ‗to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties 
and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and 
convey real and personal property, . . . and shall be subject to like 
punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, 
statutes, ordinance, regulations, or custom to the contrary 
notwithstanding.‖118 The principal problem addressed by the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia later emphasized, ―was the refusal of the recently 
defeated southern states to accord equal legal protection to 
blacks.‖119 
                                                                                                     
immortal act of emancipation would be incomplete without it. 
 118.  CHICAGO TRIB., May 19, 1968, at 7; see also GOVERNMENT 
DISCRIMINATION: EQUAL PROTECTION LAW AND LITIGATION (2016): 
In order to neutralize the ―Black Codes‖ by guaranteeing African 
Americans equal protection of the law, Republican leaders of the 39th 
Congress proposed and led the victorious enactment of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, overriding President Johnson‘s veto. The 
Act was an effective legislative repeal of the Supreme Court‘s Dred 
Scott decision . . . . 
 119.  Banks v. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co., 802 F.2d 1416, 1438 
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (Buckley, J., concurring); cf. id. at 1437: 
Section 1983 was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, also 
known as the Ku Klux Klan Act. As the Supreme Court observed in 
Garcia, ―[t]he specific historical catalyst for the Civil Rights Act of 
1871 was the campaign of violence and deception in the South, 
fomented by the Ku Klux Klan, which was denying decent citizens 
their civil and political rights.‖ The legislative history of this statute 
establishes that Congress wanted to stop the murders, lynchings, and 
whippings perpetrated by lawless elements in the South, as well as 
eliminate ―the refuge that local authorities extended to the authors of 
these outrageous incidents.‖ 
(citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985) & Eugene Gressman, The 
Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1334 
(1952)); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 802 (1966) (―Between 1866 and 
1870 there was much agitated criticism in the Congress and in the Nation 
because of the continued denial of rights to Negroes, sometimes accompanied by 
violent assaults. In response to the demands for more stringent legislation 
Congress enacted the Enforcement Act of 1870.‖). The Ku Klux Klan Act of 
1871, ―as indicated by the name, was directed at the Ku Klux Klan.‖ 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RACE AND CRIME 437 (Helen Taylor Greene & Shaun L. 
Gabbidon eds., 2009). As one source notes:  
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As another newspaper put it more contemporaneously, in the 
same year as the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866:  
There has been urged against it a single objection, puerile in 
itself, if anything infamous could be regarded as frivolous. It is 
charged that in certain States there are crimes which, when 
committed by black men, are punished with more severity 
than when they are committed by white persons. And this bill, 
it is said, will interfere with the right of a State to inflict its 
own degree of punishment for offences.120  
As that newspaper, Washington, D.C.‘s National Republican, 
concluded:  
We are aware that it does this, and commend it on this 
account. It deals with guilt as the great God deals with it, 
without ―respect of persons.‖ Civilization and Christianity 
alike require that the penalty for wrong-doing shall be meted 
out in accordance to the weight and nature of the crime rather 
than depend for its severity upon the color of the criminal. 
That perfidy finds no sanction in this measure.121  
The so-called ―Black Codes‖ were a series of laws put in place by 
state legislatures in the South between 1865 and 1866.122 
                                                                                                     
The Ku Klux Klan was a series of loosely affiliated gangs who used 
violence to impose their agenda on the state governments established 
following the Civil War by killing freed slaves and those supporting 
them. The act, aiming particularly as conspiracies, made it a federal 
offense to deny a person his or her civil rights.  
Id.; see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 559 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (2004): 
Section 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] authorizes Congress to 
create a cause of action through which the citizen may vindicate his 
Fourteenth Amendment rights. One of the first pieces of legislation 
passed under Congress‘s § 5 power was the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 
20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13, entitled ―An Act to enforce the Provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and 
for other Purposes. 
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 610 n.25 
(1979) (―The Act of 1871, known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, was directed at the 
organized terrorism in the Reconstruction South led by the Klan, and the 
unwillingness or inability of state officials to control the widespread violence.‖). 
 120.  Civil Rights and Citizenship, NATIONAL REPUBLICAN, Mar. 8, 1866, at 2.  
 121.  Id. 
 122.  ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BLACK STUDIES 120 (Molefi Kete Asante & Ama 
Mazama eds., 2005). As one source describes them: ―[T]he Black Codes enacted 
during the presidency of Andrew Johnson prevented blacks from sitting on 
juries, prohibited blacks from voting, limited blacks‘ testimony against whites, 
denied blacks the right to work in certain occupations, and legislated against 
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In the 1860s, infamous ―black codes‖ were being repealed in 
northern states,123 yet persisted—or were being enacted and 
embraced with great fervor—in southern states in the post-Civil 
War period, thus necessitating federal legislation to quash their 
overt discriminatory animus.124 As the New York Times described 
                                                                                                     
blacks carrying weapons.‖ Id.; see also id. (―[I]n April of 1866, President Johnson 
vetoed the civil rights bill, telling Governor Thomas C. Fletcher of Missouri, 
‗This is a country for white men, and by God, as long as I am President, it shall 
be a government for white men.‘‖); JERROLD M. PACKARD, AMERICAN NIGHTMARE: 
THE HISTORY OF JIM CROW 42 (2002) (noting that southern states in the post-
Civil War period ―intended to return to virtually the same social relationship 
between whites and now-freed blacks as that which had existed before the 
Confederacy‘s defeat‖ and that, ―[t]o achieve it, the Black Codes were 
deliberately designed to be restrictive and harsh in their application‖). 
 123.  See The Black Code of Illinois, PITTSBURGH GAZETTE, Jan. 31, 1865, at 2 
(―It is a matter of profound satisfaction that Illinois has repealed the infamous 
black code, which for so many years has disgraced its statute book, and 
dishonored its claim to freedom.‖); see also A Black Code Annulled, ST. CLOUD 
DEMOCRAT, Dec. 28, 1865, at 2: 
We are glad to learn via Memphis that by orders from Washington to 
Gen. Thomas, commanding the department which includes the State 
of Mississippi, the latter officer is instructed to disregard the ―Black 
Code‖ of Mississippi, as passed by the late Legislature, under the title 
of ―An Act to confer civil rights upon freedmen.‖ 
 124.  Who Are the Murderers?, LIBERATOR, June 23, 1865, at 1 (―When the 
Federal Government first ordered the enlistment of colored soldiers, he who is 
now a fugitive [Jefferson Davis] issued a proclamation announcing that the 
captured officers of negro troops would be tried by the murderous Black Codes of 
the Slave States.‖); Misrepresentation, NORFOLK POST, July 29, 1865, at 2 (―They 
. . . proceeded to put in force the obsolete black code of Virginia, oppressive to 
the negro race.‖); South Carolina Slave Code, PITTSBURGH GAZETTE, Nov. 16, 
1865, at 2: 
The Black Code of South Carolina, to which we have referred, which 
has been framed by a commission for the present legislature of that 
State, is the most infamous scheme yet begotten of Southern 
ingenuity. It is a special code for the freed blacks, thus making them 
a degraded caste, which concedes them nothing and exacts everything 
from them. 
Tennessee Black Code, DAILY OHIO STATESMAN, May 18, 1865, at 2: 
A bill has passed the Lower House of the Tennessee Legislature to 
enact a black code, which looks very much like a measure to retain 
slavery under another name, or as if it was designed to vent the spite 
of the masters against the freedmen. . . . [I]n most of the regulations 
of society it makes a separate caste of the free blacks, providing 
various exclusions and disabilities, and a different criminal code for 
their punishment. 
Political News and Gossip, WHEELING INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 19, 1865, at 1 (noting 
that a general from South Carolina, then a candidate for Congress, demanded 
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those discriminatory laws: ―The black codes adopted by the 
unreconstructed Southern Legislatures, after the close of the war, 
were adopted because they would give the whites the same power 
over the blacks which slavery had secured for them hitherto.‖125 
The codes were designed to ensure a subservient and stable labor 
force by, for example, imposing penalties on black laborers who 
―jumped‖ their labor contracts. Those contracts usually 
committed newly emancipated slaves to one-year work 
commitments, and they generally provided for very low wages. As 
one history puts it:  
These oppressive laws mocked the ideal of freedom, so recently 
purchased by buckets of blood. The Black Codes imposed 
terrible burdens on the unfettered blacks, struggling against 
mistreatment and poverty to make their way as free people. 
Thousands of impoverished former slaves slipped into virtual 
peonage as sharecropper farmers, as did many landless 
whites.126 
The authority of Congress to pass the Civil Rights Acts of 
1866, however, was questioned by many people, southerners and 
northerners alike. For example, one Pennsylvania newspaper 
                                                                                                     
―the enactment of a new and most stringent black code‖ to ―‗keep the freedmen 
in subjection‘‖).   
 125.  Status of the Southern Freedmen, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1868, at 4. 
 126.  2 DAVID M. KENNEDY, LIZABETH COHEN & MEL PIEHL, THE BRIEF 
AMERICAN PAGEANT: A HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC 353 (9th ed. 2017). The 
horrendous treatment of blacks in the Reconstruction Era is well documented.  
See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Making Race Matter in Death Matters, in 
FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE, supra note 39, at 57–58: 
During Reconstruction, once the era of slavery had formally ended, 
both black and white Southerners attempted to discern their roles in 
the new social system. While the South was under federal control, 
black men won the right to vote and some had been elected to 
Congress. Many whites resented the newfound rights of the freedmen 
and reacted violently, continuing in the trend devaluing black life 
that had begun during slavery. Federal workers stationed in the 
South observed these intentional killings that occurred over slight 
―offenses‖ by blacks. One black man was killed in 1866 for failing to 
take off his hat in the presence of a white man. Another report 
describes a black soldier killed at the hands of an identified (and 
unpunished) white man; fellow citizens justified the murder, 
describing the victim as ―a damned nigger.‖ To solidify their 
continued domination, white Southerners enacted Black Codes to 
allow them to maintain some of the control of blacks they had during 
slavery. 
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observed that ―the second section‖ of the bill ―exposes State 
judges and other officers to fine and imprisonment for construing 
or enforcing any law or regulation which may be held to conflict 
with the provisions of the act.‖ ―The idea of punishing a judge by 
a criminal prosecution for a mis-judgment or wrong judgment 
upon a question of law,‖ that newspaper editorialized, ―is 
monstrous.‖ ―But the most important question which is to be 
examined,‖ that paper stressed, ―is the question of power in 
Congress, under the Constitution, to enact the bill into a law, and 
particularly to enact the first section.‖ ―From whence is derived 
the authority to enact this section?‖ the paper queried.127 Black 
codes were seen as vestiges of slavery,128 but there was 
disagreement as to whether there needed to be a new 
constitutional amendment to wipe out such oppressive codes 
following the Thirteenth Amendment‘s adoption and 
ratification.129 
That Pennsylvania newspaper, in mulling over its rhetorical 
question about congressional authority, continued: ―It cannot be 
from the naturalization clause of the Constitution.‖ ―The 
argument then,‖ the paper added, ―must turn upon the 
                                                                                                     
 127.  See The Civil Rights Bill, COLUMBIAN, May 12, 1866, at 2.  
 128.  Senator Wilson on Negro Suffrage, CLEVELAND DAILY LEADER, July 13, 
1865, at 2 (―I want the South to understand that their black code and their black 
laws, and all they have done to hold men in slavery, were abolished for ever 
with slavery itself . . . .‖); Yale College, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1865, at 1 (―[W]e 
owe it to the memory of our dead to extirpate and sweep away every vestige of 
slavery . . . . The whole black code must go.‖). 
 129.  In an hour and a half speech, Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner 
emphasized: ―Slavery has been abolished in name; but that is all.‖ ―The work of 
liberation,‖ he stressed, ―is not yet completed.‖ ―Nor can it be completed,‖ he 
observed, ―until the equal rights of every person, once claimed as a slave, are 
placed under the safeguard of irreversible guarantees.‖ ―It is not enough to 
strike down the master; you must also lift up the slave,‖ he said, adding: ―It is 
not enough to declare that slavery is abolished. The whole black code, which is 
the supplement of slavery, must give place to that equality before the law which 
is the very essence of liberty.‖ The Massachusetts Republican Convention, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 15, 1865, at 1; accord Speech of Hon. Charles Sumner, at the 
Republican State Convention, in Worcester, Sept. 14, 1865, LIBERATOR, Sept. 22, 
1865, at 1 (―The whole Black Code, which is the supplement of Slavery, must 
give place to that Equality before the law which is the very essence of Liberty.‖). 
In 1856, Congressman Preston Brooks of South Carolina—a fierce proponent of 
slavery—had infamously beaten Sumner in the U.S. Senate chamber. STEPHEN 
PULEO, THE CANING: THE ASSAULT THAT DROVE AMERICA TO CIVIL WAR (2012).  
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amendment to the Constitution abolishing slavery.‖ As the 
newspaper argued as regards the Thirteenth Amendment: 
By that amendment Congress was authorized to enforce 
emancipation ‗by appropriate legislation.‘ Now appropriate 
legislation must mean here such laws as are necessary to 
execute and maintain the abolition of slavery decreed by the 
previous clause of the amendment. The relation of master and 
slave was to be broken, and never to be renewed.  Whatever is 
necessary to this end, and appropriate to its accomplishment, 
Congress may do in its legislative capacity; but it can do 
nothing else by virtue of this power. Testing the above section 
by this rule, it stands unsupported by any arguments or 
reason which can be accepted by a just and reasonable mind.  
―The power to enforce the abolition of slavery of negroes,‖ the 
paper continued, ―does not then extend to endowing them with all 
the privileges of citizenship in a State, or to conferring upon them 
all such civil or political rights as Congress may think useful or 
convenient to them.‖ The paper thus called the Civil Rights Bill of 
1866 ―both injudicious and unconstitutional; a measure not to be 
praised, but condemned.‖130 
To ward off legal challenges to the law‘s constitutionality, 
Congress incorporated its key features in the first section of the 
U.S. Constitution‘s Fourteenth Amendment, which got ratified in 
1868.131 That section of the Fourteenth Amendment—intended to 
                                                                                                     
 130.  The Civil Rights Bill, COLUMBIAN, May 12, 1866, at 2. 
 131.  CHICAGO TRIB., May 19, 1968, at 7; see also David E. Bernstein, The 
Law and Economics of Post-Civil War Restrictions on Interstate Migration by 
African-Americans, 76 TEX. L. REV. 781, 788 (1998) (―Congress passed the 
Fourteenth Amendment to ensure the constitutionality of the 1866 Civil Rights 
Act.‖). After ―black codes,‖ in effect, ―substantially restored slavery,‖ Americans 
moved to bar racial discrimination and, eventually, toward universal suffrage 
for blacks. A Retrospect, MARSHALL COUNTY REPUBLICAN, Jan. 2, 1868, at 1 (―Not 
until the evils resulting from the plan began to develop, in black codes that 
substantially restored slavery, did the people and politicians begin to move 
forward to universal suffrage.‖); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer 
Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 
1111, 1121 (1997): 
When southern states adopted Black Codes constricting land 
ownership and employment of freedmen in such a way as to tie the 
emancipated slaves to their former owners, Congress passed the 1866 
Civil Rights Act . . . . Because there was dispute about whether the 
Thirteenth Amendment‘s prohibition of slavery vested Congress with 
the power to define and protect civil rights in this fashion, Congress 
began work on the drafting and ratification of 
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constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866132—began: ―All 
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the state wherein they reside.‖ Section 1 then continued: ―No 
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.‖133 Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment then gave the U.S. Congress (as had the Thirteenth 
Amendment) express implementing authority, reading as follows: 
―The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article.‖134 Not only did the Civil 
                                                                                                     
the Fourteenth Amendment, and soon thereafter re[e]nacted the 
substance of the 1866 statute in the Civil Rights Act of 1870. When 
similar disputes arose over scope of rights protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress vested the emancipated slaves 
with the political right of voting through the Fifteenth Amendment. 
 132.  See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation 
Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 957–58 (1995): 
Any analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment must begin with its 
statutory precursor, the Civil Rights Act of 1866. . . . The bill was 
passed pursuant to Congress‘s authority to enforce the provisions of 
the Thirteenth Amendment, and was designed to counter the so-
called ―Black Codes‖ passed by the Southern states, denying 
fundamental civil rights to the freedmen. From its inception, 
however, the 1866 Act was plagued with doubts as to its 
constitutionality. President Andrew Johnson vetoed the Act for that 
reason, and although his veto was overridden, constitutional concerns 
were sufficiently serious that supporters of the Act set to work on a 
constitutional amendment to cure them. 
See also id. at 958: 
The principal draftsman of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Representative John A. Bingham of Ohio, was among those who 
believed the principles of the 1866 Act to be desirable, but Congress‘s 
power to be lacking. The principal purpose of Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, as virtually all students of the subject agree, 
was to provide a firm constitutional basis for the 1866 Act and to 
ensure that future Congresses would not be able to repeal it. 
 133.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, sec. 1. 
 134.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, sec. 5; see also Buckey v. County of Los 
Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that ―a denial of equal 
protection of the laws‖ was ―a wrong quite familiar to those in Congress who in 
1866 enacted the first civil rights act and promulgated the Fourteenth 
Amendment‖); Ray Sebastian Pantle, Blacker Than Death Row: How Current 
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Rights Act of 1866 demand ―like punishments, pains and 
penalties,‖ but so too did the Fourteenth Amendment‘s 
implementing legislation, the 1870 Enforcement Act, which re-
enacted the 1866 Civil Rights Act.135 
The Fourteenth Amendment was thus intended to equalize 
punishments as between black and white offenders—something 
that Professor Goldfarb and others point out has never been 
achieved in the death penalty context despite all the efforts of the 
courts to do so.136 As one West Virginia newspaper observed in 
1879:  
                                                                                                     
Equal Protection Analysis Fails Minorities Facing Capital Punishment, 35 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 811, 813 (2007): 
Those who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment specifically wished to 
overrule the laws passed after the Civil War, known as the Black 
Codes, which legislators implemented to maintain white supremacy. 
Many of these codes mandated more severe treatment for black 
defendants charged with a crime. Through 
the Equal Protection Clause, our nation ―constitutionalize[d]‘ 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, by guaranteeing that ‗inhabitants of 
every race and color . . . shall be subject to like punishment, pains 
and penalties, and no other.‘‖ 
(quoting Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14, Stat. 27 (1866)). 
 135.  WILLIAM B. GLIDDEN, CONGRESS AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: 
ENFORCING LIBERTY AND EQUALITY IN THE STATES 45 (2013). Section 16 of the 
1870 Enforcement Act provided in part as follows: ―That all persons within the 
jurisdiction of the United States . . . shall be subject to like punishment, pains, 
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and none other, any law, 
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.‖ An 
Act to enforce the Right of Citizens of the United States to vote in the several 
States of this Union, and for other Purposes, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 114 (May 
31, 1870) (emphasis added). Section 18 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, also 
known as the Civil Rights Act of 1870, provided: ―And be it further enacted, That 
the act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and 
furnish the means of their vindication, passed April nine, eighteen hundred and 
sixty-six, is hereby re-enacted; and sections sixteen and seventeen hereof shall 
be enforced according to the provisions of said act.‖ Id. § 18. 
 136.  In their new book, Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker—a sister and 
brother writing team—point to these damning statistics: 
In modern-era Louisiana, killers of whites are six times more likely to 
get a death sentence than killers of blacks, and fourteen times more 
likely to be executed; black men who kill white women are thirty 
times more likely to get a death sentence than black men who kill 
other black men. No white person has been executed in Louisiana for 
a crime against a black victim since 1752. 
STEIKER & STEIKER, COURTING DEATH, supra note 5, at 110. 
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We need not explain that the Fourteenth A[mendment] of the 
Constitution of the United States was manifestly intended to 
equalize and protect fully and fairly all the legal rights of 
citizens of the United States, be they white or black. The 
a[mendment] was not adopted to equalize and better protect 
the rights of white citizens, but to prevent any State of the 
Union from drawing a color or race line against any citizen of 
the United States whereby his full and equal citizenship could 
be impaired.137  
In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court itself emphasized that ―[m]any 
of the Members of the 39th Congress viewed § 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as ‗constitutionalizing‘ and expanding the 
protections of the 1866 Act and viewed what became § 5 of the 
Amendment as laying to rest doubts shared by both sides of the 
aisle concerning the constitutionality of that measure.‖138  
                                                                                                     
 137.  The Case of Taylor Strauder, INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 30, 1879, at 2; see 
also Important Decision, NASHVILLE UNION & AM., Sept. 13, 1871, at 3 (―The civil 
rights bill was . . . passed a short time before the fourteenth amendment 
received the sanction of the people of the United States. In May, 1870, Congress 
passed an act to carry into effect the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, and 
by section 18 reenacted the civil rights bill. 16 Stat. at L. 140.‖); FORT SCOTT 
WEEKLY MONITOR, June 18, 1885, at 2: 
Section 1,977 [of the U.S. Code provided:] ―All persons within the 
jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every 
state and territory to make and inforce contracts, to sue, be parties to, 
and give evidence to the full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings for the security of persons and property, as is enjoyed by 
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment . . . . 
 138.  Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 721–72 (1989) 
(citing Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2465 (1866) (Rep. Thayer) (―As I 
understand it, it is but incorporating in the Constitution of the United States 
the principle of the civil rights bill which has lately become a law.‖); id. at 2498 
(Rep. Broomall); id. at 2459 (Rep. Stevens); id. at 2461 (Rep. Finck); id. at 2467 
(Rep. Boyer)); see also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 32 (1948): 
Both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the joint resolution which was 
later adopted as the Fourteenth Amendment were passed in the first 
session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress. Frequent references to the Civil 
Rights Act are to be found in the record of the legislative debates on 
the adoption of the Amendment. It is clear that in many significant 
respects the statute and the Amendment were expressions of the 
same general congressional policy.  
Martinsen v. Mullaney, 85 F. Supp. 76, 79 (D. Alaska Terr. 1949) (―The rights 
protected in the first Civil Rights Act of 1866 were incorporated into the 
Fourteenth Amendment which was adopted in 1868 in order to remove doubts 
as to the constitutionality of the Act . . . .‖); Ryan D. Walters, The Thirteenth 
Amendment “Exception” to the State Action Doctrine: An Originalist 
THE INEQUALITY OF AMERICA‟S DEATH PENALTY 529 
The legislative debate over the Fourteenth Amendment is 
revealing, with many legal scholars explicitly noting how the 
Fourteenth Amendment ―constitutionalized‖ the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866.139 At the time, Republican Congressman Martin Russell 
Thayer of Pennsylvania—a respected lawyer140—asserted that 
the amendment ―incorporat[ed] in the Constitution of the United 
States the principle of the civil rights bill which has lately become 
a law . . . in order . . . that that provision so necessary for the 
equal administration of the law, so just in its operation, so 
necessary for the protection of the fundamental rights of 
citizenship, shall be forever incorporated in the Constitution of 
                                                                                                     
Reappraisal, 23 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 283, 323 (2013): 
The continuing doubts about Congress‘s power under the Thirteenth 
Amendment to enact the Civil Rights Act led to the drafting 
of Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution that had two purposes: 
to authorize, without doubt, Congress‘s authority to pass 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and further, to prevent its repeal by a 
future Congress by embedding its terms into the Constitution itself. 
 139.  See Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving 
v. Virginia, 2012 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1393, 1414 (2012) (―We know at a bare 
minimum that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866.‖); Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: 
An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide 
Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 111 (1984): 
The language of the fourteenth amendment itself, prohibiting the 
denial of ‗equal protection of the law,‘ speaks, if anything, more 
clearly of victims than of defendants. The sponsors of the fourteenth 
amendment unquestionably intended this language to prohibit 
unequal punishments for defendants of different races—indeed one of 
their major aims was to ‗constitutionalize‘ the provisions of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 . . . . 
Stan Robin Gregory, Capital Punishment and Equal Protection: Constitutional 
Problems, Race and the Death Penalty, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 257, 268–69 (1992): 
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to prohibit 
unequal punishments for defendants of all races. As the legislative 
history of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly illuminates, one of their 
main goals was to ―constitutionalize‖ the provision of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, to embrace the requirement that in every 
state ―inhabitants of every race and color, without regard to any 
previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude . . . shall be 
subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and no other.‖  
(quoting Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (Apr. 9, 1866)). 
 140.  2 THE PROGRESSIVE MEN OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 786–
87 (1900). 
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the United States.‖141 In No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Bill of Rights, scholar Michael Kent Curtis 
observes of the post-Civil War legislative debate: ―Several 
congressmen observed that the amendment would eliminate any 
question about the power of Congress to pass the Civil Rights bill. 
Others considered the amendment a reiteration of the Civil 
Rights bill.‖142 In a speech delivered on August 7, 1866, Speaker 
of the House Schuyler Colfax made this observation: 
We passed a bill on the ninth of April last year, over the 
President‘s veto, known as the Civil Rights Bill, that 
specifically and directly declares what the rights of a citizen of 
the United States are—that they may make and enforce 
contracts, sue and be parties, give evidence, purchase, lease, 
and sell property, and be subject to like punishments. That is 
the last law upon the subject.‖143 
The words of Republican Senator Jacob Howard of 
Michigan—a member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction—
are especially revealing. ―I look upon the first section, taken in 
connection with the fifth, as very important,‖ Senator Howard 
said in introducing the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866. ―It will, 
if adopted by the States,‖ Howard pointed out, ―forever disable 
every one of them from passing laws trenching upon those 
fundamental rights and privileges which pertain to citizens of the 
United States, and to all persons within their jurisdiction.‖ As 
Senator Howard, addressing the presiding officer, told his fellow 
lawmakers: ―It establishes equality before the law, and it gives to 
the humblest, the poorest, and the most despised of the race the 
same rights and the same protection before the law as it gives to 
the most powerful, the most wealthy, or the most haughty. That, 
sir, is republican government, as I understand it, and the only 
one which can claim the praise of a just Government.‖ In 
concluding, Howard made this plea: ―Without a principle of equal 
justice to all men and equal protection under the shield of the 
                                                                                                     
 141.  MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 86 (1986). 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  CHRISTOPHER R. GREEN, EQUAL CITIZENSHIP, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: THE ORIGINAL SENSE OF THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 46 
(2015). 
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law, there is no republican government and none that is really 
worth maintaining.‖144 
The historical context is critical to understanding the 
Fourteenth Amendment‘s purpose.  Southern ―Black Codes‖ were 
notorious for punishing African Americans more harshly than 
whites, and southern intransigence was palpable. As The 
Liberator, the anti-slavery Boston newspaper, put it in November 
1865: 
We are constantly hearing of the punishment of negroes in 
various States, under the old black code, or the introduction of 
new sets of laws on a basis similar to that, marking out the 
blacks as the subjects of special legislation, defining acts as 
criminal in them which are freely allowed to others, allotting 
heavier punishments to them for the same offence, denying 
them equal opportunities for education and employment, and 
in various ways undertaking to restrict them to a position of 
acknowledged inferiority.145 
Just one month after the Fourteenth Amendment‘s 
ratification, The Pittsburgh Commercial took note of a speech by 
a prominent Pittsburgh attorney, Robert B. Carnahan, the local 
U.S. District Attorney under Presidents Lincoln, Johnson and 
Grant. ―Mr. Carnahan,‖ the paper observed, ―referred to the 
‗black‘ codes of the South adopted in 1865 and 1866‖ that 
―demonstrated that the negro remained practically a slave until 
the adoption of the fourteenth amendment.‖ ―Acts were made 
crimes as respected the negro which were not crimes as respected 
the white man,‖ it was noted.146 
                                                                                                     
 144.  Id. at 159. 
 145.  Schemes and Opportunities, LIBERATOR, Nov. 17, 1865, at 2; see also 
Black Codes, CHICAGO TRIB., Nov. 29, 1865, at 2: 
At the commencement of the present effort to reconstruct the South 
on the rebel basis alone, we predicted that the cloven foot would 
appear when the State Legislatures should come to frame their 
―Black Codes.‖ It matters not to the late rebels whether their 
constitution reads ―slavery is abolished‖ or ―slavery is restored,‖ so 
long as the masters are at liberty to govern the servants by their own 
―Black Code.‖ . . . We lay down the fundamental proposition that the 
whites of a State have no more right to frame Black Code of any kind 
than to restore slavery in all its enormity. All laws made for blacks 
must apply to whites and vice verso.   
 146.  Steubenville, PITTSBURGH COMMERCIAL, Aug. 29, 1868, at 1. 
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In some places, the abandonment of ―black codes‖ was 
accompanied by an end to the use of whipping.147 But in other 
places, the attempt to enforce ―black codes‖ or their equivalents 
echoed with the reverberations of slavery, with southern 
lawmakers seeking to resort to the lash through vagrancy laws. 
For example, in early 1866, The Weekly Standard in Raleigh, 
North Carolina, reported that while ―United States authorities‖ 
had ―disallowed‖ the Mississippi Legislature‘s ―Black Code,‖ a 
vagrancy scheme called for an offender to receive ―thirty-nine 
lashes on his or her bare back‖ or to receive a fifty dollar fine.148 
Under that scheme, the judge also had the discretion to ―hire out 
such vagrant for not exceeding six months, instead of committing 
him to the jail or house of correction.‖149 As that newspaper noted 
of the supposedly race-neutral scheme: ―This law made no 
distinction between white vagrants and black ones. It is a 
stringent and summary law, well calculated to meet the 
exigencies of the times. There can be no question that severe 
measures must be resorted to to put down the evil of laziness 
among the negroes.‖150  Southern obstinacy made the need for 
federal intervention—and the need for the U.S. Constitution‘s 
Fourteenth Amendment and its Equal Protection Clause—crystal 
clear.151 
                                                                                                     
 147.  See Letter from Rev. E. M. Wheelock, LIBERATOR, Mar. 3, 1865, at 2 
(―[T]he mere presence of the army had strangled the infernal force of slavery, 
and arrested the action of its black code . . . [t]he use of the whip, and all cruel 
and unusual punishments, were forbidden.‖). 
 148. Alabama, WEEKLY STANDARD, Jan. 3, 1866, at 4. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id.; see also Negro Justice, PITTSBURGH DAILY POST, Mar. 21, 1868, at 3 
(reprinting a story from a Mississippi newspaper about a case involving the 
theft of a cow ―on a large plantation‖). According to the Pittsburgh Daily Post 
story, the theft of the cow ―illustrates the negro‘s idea of justice and his own 
views of the utility of the ‗black code.‘‖ Id. That story further reported that 
where ―[o]ne negro stole a cow from another and was detected,‖ the tribunal‘s 
judgment was that the culprit ―be taken thence to a convenient place, and there 
staked out on the ground by hands and feet, and receive one hundred and fifty 
stripes on his naked back, well laid on.‖ Id. 
 151.  See House of Representatives, PITTSBURGH COMMERCIAL, Feb. 2, 1866, at 
1 (―Mr. Donnelly concluded by giving abstracts of the black codes of the South, 
showing that the freedman would be speedily re-enslaved if the government did 
not interfere.‖); Telegraphic News, COURIER-J., Feb. 2, 1866, at 3 (discussing the 
speech of ―Mr. Donnelly, of Minnesota‖); compare BURLINGTON WEEKLY FREE 
PRESS, Apr. 6, 1866, at 1 (―What we want is the Black Code expunged from our 
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The death penalty‘s inequitable use against blacks in the 
nineteenth century was part and parcel of the ―black codes‖—and 
very much in line with how slaves had been treated in the past. 
In an ―Address of the Negroes to the Native Whites,‖ the ―colored 
citizens‖ of Charleston, South Carolina, made this appeal to their 
―FELLOW-CITIZENS‖: 
[Y]ou derided the idea of granting us the right to vote; when 
your Legislature met in 1865-66, you passed that infamous 
Black Code which is a disgrace to civilization; in that you 
denied us all rights in common with other people in the State; 
you, by these acts, denied our children the school-house; you 
imposed penalties on us, which were not imposed on white 
men; there were crimes which, if committed by a white man, 
he was imprisoned, but if committed by a black man, he was 
hung.152  
In September 1868, an article in the New York Times about 
Georgia‘s ―old slave code,‖ specifically took note of the Fourteenth 
Amendment‘s abrogation of statutes ―bearing on color.‖ That 
article spoke of the denial to ―colored people‖ of ―equal protection 
                                                                                                     
Southern statute books, and these people put upon the same platform as other 
people, to work for whom they may elect to work, and to have the same rights in 
our courts as white people have . . . .‖) with Constitutionality of the 
Reconstruction Acts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1868, at 4: 
The Southern revolutionists, while acknowledging their defeat, the 
loss of their cause, and the death of slavery, by their black codes and 
their rejection of the Fourteenth Amendment, distinctly refused the 
guarantee insisted upon by the loyal people—insisted upon a majority 
equal to that demanded by the continuation of the war in opposition 
to the disgraceful peace-at-any-price platform of the Democratic Party 
in 1864. 
 152.  South Carolina: Address of the Negroes to the Native Whites, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 8, 1868, at 1; see also A Frank Abandonment, CHARLESTON 
ADVOCATE, Nov. 21, 1868, at 3: 
Mr. John Quincy Adams made a little speech at his home after his 
return from his late Southern visit, in which he said that the ex-
rebels said to him that ―they had frankly abandoned what they fought 
for.‖ . . . . The first act of the same Legislatures [of the rebel States] 
was to pass infamous black codes in which the whole spirit of slavery 
was maintained, and under which orderly and tolerable society was 
impossible. The black codes re-established all of slavery but the 
name. The freedmen were made a pariah class; . . . the criminal laws 
discriminated wickedly against them; the black code virtually 
compelled them to be vagrants, and the vagrant laws sold them to 
service. (from Harper‟s Weekly). 
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in the administration of the laws,‖ with the article emphasizing 
that ―black codes were enacted as cruel, as unjust, and in all 
respects as infamous as those which disgraced the days before the 
war.‖ It was not until ―the authority of Congress was exerted,‖ 
the article observed, ―that an end was put to black codes and the 
outrages perpetrated under them.‖153 
The decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court that predate 
McCleskey also make clear the Fourteenth Amendment‘s purpose 
to end racial discrimination and to equalize punishments. In its 
1883 decision in United States v. Harris,154 the Supreme Court 
declared:  
Congress has, by virtue of this amendment, enacted that all 
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have 
the same right in every state and territory to make and 
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the 
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white 
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment . . . .155 
In its 1948 decision in Hurd v. Hodge,156 the Court emphasized of 
the 39th Congress, the one that debated the Fourteenth 
Amendment:  
Indeed, as the legislative debates reveal, one of the primary 
purposes of many members of Congress in supporting the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was to incorporate the 
guaranties of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in the organic law of 
the land. Others supported the adoption of the Amendment in 
order to eliminate doubt as to the constitutional validity of the 
Civil Rights Act as applied to the States.‖157 
                                                                                                     
 153.  Promises and Performances, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1868, at 4. 
 154.  106 U.S. 629 (1883). 
 155.  Id. at 640. 
 156.  334 U.S. 24 (1948). 
 157.  Id. at 32–33: 
Both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the joint resolution which was 
later adopted as the Fourteenth Amendment were passed in the first 
session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress. Frequent references to the Civil 
Rights Act are to be found in the record of the legislative debates on 
the adoption of the Amendment. It is clear that in many significant 
respects the statute and the Amendment were expressions of the 
same general congressional policy.  
See also id. at 33: 
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And in its 1964 decision in McLaughlin v. State of Florida,158 the 
Supreme Court made a similar statement as regards the origins 
of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Equal Protection Clause.159   
An 1880 U.S. Supreme Court decision also makes the point. 
In that case, Strauder v. West Virginia,160 the Supreme Court 
held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited a state from 
                                                                                                     
The close relationship between § 1 of the Civil Rights Act and the 
Fourteenth Amendment was given specific recognition by this Court 
in Buchanan v. Warley, [245 U.S. 60, 79 (1917).] There, the Court 
observed that, not only through the operation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but also by virtue of the ‗statutes enacted in furtherance 
of its purpose,‘ including the provisions here considered, a colored 
man is granted the right to acquire property free from interference by 
discriminatory state legislation.  
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was inspired in part by unequal punishments in 
the South and the urgent need to remedy that disparity. See Delenda est 
Carthago—The Only Remedy for Southern Tyranny,‖ EVENING TELEGRAPH , Jan. 
5, 1866, at 4: 
At the very moment that the fact of the passage of this black code is 
received, comes the intelligence that Senator TRUMBULL will move a 
bill in the Senate, [o]ne object of which is to enlarge the powers of the 
Freedman‘s Bureau, and the other to protect all persons in the United 
States in their civil rights, and furnish the means of their vindication. 
The first provides that in insurrectionary districts where, by State 
law or custom, any of the civil rights belonging to white persons are 
denied to negroes or mulattoes, or where they are subjected to 
different punishment than is prescribed for whites, the officers and 
agents of the Freedmen‘s Bureau shall, so long as such discrimination 
continues, have jurisdiction of all such cases affecting such negroes or 
mulattoes. It also provides for punishing by fine and imprisonment, 
through the courts of the Freedman‘s Bureau, any person who shall 
subject a negro or mulatto, in consequence of his race or color, to any 
other or different punishment than is prescribed for white persons, or 
shall deny any civil rights which belong to the white race. 
 158.  379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
 159.  Id. at 192: 
We deal here with a racial classification embodied in a criminal 
statute. In this context, where the power of the State weighs most 
heavily upon the individual or the group, we must be especially 
sensitive to the policies of the Equal Protection Clause which, as 
reflected in congressional enactments dating from 1870, were 
intended to secure ―the full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings for the security of persons and property‖ and to subject 
all persons ―to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and 
exactions of every kind, and to no other.‖  
(citation omitted). 
 160.  100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
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denying ―colored‖ citizens the right to participate in the 
administration of the laws as jurors. The language of that 
landmark decision, laden with racism but finding West Virginia‘s 
exclusion of blacks from juries to violate the Equal Protection 
Clause, shows how black citizens were viewed in the post-Civil 
War era by a wide swath of society. In writing about the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court made this late 
nineteenth-century observation: ―This is one of a series of 
constitutional provisions having a common purpose; namely, 
securing to a race recently emancipated, a race that through 
many generations had been held in slavery, all the civil rights 
that the superior race enjoy.‖161 When the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ―incorporated into the Constitution,‖ the Court 
noted,  
it required little knowledge of human nature to anticipate that 
those who had long been regarded as an inferior and subject 
race would, when suddenly raised to the rank of citizenship, be 
looked upon with jealousy and positive dislike, and that State 
laws might be enacted or enforced to perpetuate the 
distinctions that had before existed.162  
As the Supreme Court further emphasized in Strauder: 
Discriminations against them had been habitual. It was well 
known that in some States laws making such discriminations 
then existed, and others might well be expected. The colored 
race, as a race, was abject and ignorant, and in that condition 
was unfitted to command the respect of those who had 
superior intelligence. Their training had left them mere 
children, and as such they needed the protection which a wise 
                                                                                                     
 161.  Id. at 306. 
 162.  Id.; see also THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA: 
AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 1721 (Wilbur R. Miller ed., 2012): 
The 1880 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Strauder v. West Virginia 
looked to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
invalidate a West Virginia policy excluding individuals from serving 
on juries because of their race. The policy was carried out in a statute 
limiting jury service to ―all white male persons.‖ The case was argued 
before the Supreme Court on October 21, 1879. It was decided on 
March 1, 1880. The decision struck down jury exclusion practices 
common among southern states, which sought to empanel white-only 
juries despite the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 that made 
it a crime to violate the principle that all citizens had a right to serve 
on both state and federal juries. 
THE INEQUALITY OF AMERICA‟S DEATH PENALTY 537 
government extends to those who are unable to protect 
themselves. They especially needed protection against 
unfriendly action in the States where they were resident.163  
―It was in view of these considerations,‖ the Court stressed, ―the 
Fourteenth Amendment was framed and adopted.‖ ―It was 
designed,‖ the Court pointed out, ―to assure to the colored race 
the enjoyment of all the civil rights that under the law are 
enjoyed by white persons, and to give to that race the protection 
of the general government, in that enjoyment, whenever it should 
be denied by the States.‖164  The Strauder ruling was the first 
time in American history that the Supreme Court recognized the 
right of blacks to participate in the jury system.165 
In its 1966 decision in Baines v. City of Danville, Virginia,166 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit—in speaking of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and its relation to the Fourteenth 
Amendment—emphasized its importance this way: 
Both supporters and opponents of the measure understood 
that the civil rights granted in section 1 were to be given the 
broadest possible scope, and it was only to dispel any doubts 
concerning the authority of Congress to grant such sweeping 
rights to the Negro that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
proposed and submitted to the states by the same Congress 
that enacted section 1 of the Civil Rights Act.167 
―The enactment of the Equal Protection Clause, in language 
closely paralleling section 1 of the 1866 statute,‖ the Fourth 
Circuit wrote, ―legitimated beyond question Congress‘ attempt to 
protect the type of rights granted in the statute, and there is no 
reason to think that the rights contemplated by section 1 are of 
less breadth than those contemplated by the Equal Protection 
Clause.‖168 The Equal Protection Clause, American courts have 
                                                                                                     
 163.  Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  HIROSHI FUKURAI, EDGAR W. BUTLER & RICHARD KROOTH, RACE AND THE 
JURY: RACIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 88 (1993). 
 166.  357 F.2d 756 (4th Cir. 1966). 
 167.  Id. at 775. 
 168.  Id.; see also id. at 775–76 (―Contemporary legislators and the Supreme 
Court have consistently read the two provisions together.‖); Martinsen v. 
Mullaney, 85 F. Supp. 76, 79 (Alaska Terr. Dist. Ct. 1949) (―The rights protected 
in the first Civil Rights Act of 1866 were incorporated into the Fourteenth 
Amendment which was adopted in 1868 in order to remove doubts as to the 
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held, ―requires that all persons who are similarly situated should 
be treated alike.‖169   
                                                                                                     
constitutionality of the Act.‖); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 
675 (1898): 
The same congress, shortly afterwards, evidently thinking it unwise, 
and perhaps unsafe, to leave so important a declaration of rights to 
depend upon an ordinary act of legislation, which might be repealed 
by any subsequent congress, framed the fourteenth amendment of the 
constitution, and on June 16, 1866, by joint resolution, proposed it to 
the legislatures of the several states; and on July 28, 1868, the 
secretary of state issued a proclamation showing it to have been 
ratified by the legislatures of the requisite number of states. 
(citing Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (Apr. 9, 1866); 14 Stat. 358; 15 Stat. 
708); State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 395 (1871) (―This act took effect on the 9th 
day of April, 1866, which was prior to the ratification of the fourteenth 
amendment. This amendment seems to have been mainly copied from, or 
modelled after the section above quoted from the civil rights bill.‖) (citing Civil 
Rights Act of 1866). 
 169.  Jackson v. California, No. 1:13-cv-01055-LJO-SA, 2015 WL 2414938 at 
*11 (E.D. Cal. May 20, 2015) (citations omitted); see also State v. Maniscalco, 
Nos. 98-S-482-485, 98-S-591-594, 2001 WL 34012424 at *2 (N.H. Super. Ct. May 
14, 2001) (―‗The first question in an equal protection analysis is whether the 
State action in question treats similarly situated persons differently.‘‖) (citation 
omitted); H.B. Rowe Co., Inc. v. Tippett, No. 5:03-CV-278-BO, 2007 WL 7766702 
at *5 n.6 (E.D. N.C. Mar. 30, 2007) (―The prohibition of discrimination contained 
in Section 1981 is co-extensive with the Equal Protection Clause.‖) (citation 
omitted); Jones v. State Bd. of Ed. of and for State of Tennessee, 279 F. Supp. 
190, 203 (M.D. Tenn. 1968) (―Equal protection of the law guarantees against 
invidious discrimination between persons in similar circumstances. The law 
may not lay an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the 
same quality of offense.‖); cf. Pruitt v. Howard County Sheriff‘s Department, 623 
A.2d 696, 703–704 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (―Appellants cannot succeed on 
their equal protection claim unless they can show that other, similarly situated 
individuals did not receive the same treatment, i.e., they were not subject to like 
punishment for like behavior.‖); People v. Finley, 94 P. 248, 249 (Cal. 1908) (―we 
cannot perceive that appellant was denied the equal protection of the laws, for 
every other person in like cases with him, and convicted as he has been, would 
be subjected to like punishment‖); In re Boggs, 45 F. 475, 475–76 (Cir. Ct., D. 
Ky. 1891): 
It is also contended that this statute is class legislation, as it 
punishes ex-convicts more severely for the same offenses than it does 
those not theretofore convicted of a felony, and is within the 
prohibition of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution, 
which declares no state shall ―deny to any person the equal protection 
of the laws.‖ . . . .  This statu[t]e does not deny the petitioner the 
equal protection of the laws, within the meaning of this amendment.  
Every other person convicted as he has been would be subject to like 
punishment as that he has received. This is all the amendment 
means. 
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In the mid-nineteenth century, the right to be free from 
―cruel and unusual punishments‖ was—among many other 
rights—often described as one of the ―privileges and immunities‖ 
of citizenship.170 As adopted, the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that ―[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States‖ and that no state shall ―deprive‖ any person of 
―life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.‖171 When, in 
1866, Representative John Bingham of Ohio referred to privileges 
and immunities as ―the inborn rights of every person,‖ he cited 
the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishments as an example. Bingham—a drafter of the 
Fourteenth Amendment—did not support the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 because of his belief that Congress lacked constitutional 
authority, but on the subject of the privileges and immunities of 
U.S. citizens, he passionately observed: ―[M]any instances of 
State injustice and oppression have already occurred in the State 
legislation of this Union, of flagrant violations of the guarantied 
privileges of citizens of the United States, for which the national 
Government furnished, and could furnish by law no remedy 
whatsoever.‖ ―Contrary to the express letter of your 
Constitution,‖ Bingham emphasized, ―‗cruel and unusual 
punishment‘ have been inflicted under State laws within this 
Union upon citizens, not only for crimes committed, but for sacred 
duty done, for which and against which the Government of the 
United States had provided no remedy and could provide 
none.‖172 
In that era, a distinction was made between natural rights 
and political rights. In an 1859 debate about the meaning of due 
process, Bingham had spoken of ―natural or inherent rights‖ as 
those that ―belong to all men irrespective of all conventional 
regulations‖ and as ―sacred rights which are as universal and 
                                                                                                     
 170.  BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 47, at 204; see also ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, May 20, 1874, at 5 (―The following are most if not all the 
privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States: The right to the writ 
of habeas corpus; . . . from excessive bail; from excessive fines; from cruel and 
unusual punishment; from the condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, 
except as a punishment . . . .‖) 
 171.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 172.  LASH, supra note 114, at 151–52.   
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indestructible as the human race.‖ By contrast, Bingham viewed 
―political rights‖ as ―conventional not natural; limited, not 
universal.‖ Yet, Bingham asserted then that ―[a]ll free persons, 
then, born and domiciled in any State of the Union, are citizens of 
the United States; and, although not equal in respect of political 
rights, are equal in respect of natural rights.‖173 In the debate 
over the Fourteenth Amendment itself, Congressman Frederick 
E. Woodbridge described its purpose as empowering Congress to 
pass ―those laws which will give to a citizen of the United States 
the natural rights which necessarily pertain to citizenship‖ and 
―those privileges and immunities which are guarantied to him 
under the Constitution of the United States.‖174 
The concept of ―privileges and immunities‖ had long been 
associated with ―fundamental‖ rights, those ―which belong, of 
right, to the citizens of all free governments.‖ James Madison had 
described the freedom of the press and the right of conscience as 
the ―choicest privileges of the people‖ and as ―invaluable 
privileges.‖175 And for nineteenth-century abolitionists, the rights 
set forth in the first eight amendments to the U.S. Constitution 
were expressly viewed as falling within the scope of ―privileges 
and immunities.‖ Likewise, in 1866, Republican Senator Jacob 
Howard of Michigan spoke of ―the character of the privileges and 
immunities spoken of in the second section of the fourth article of 
the Constitution.‖176  
                                                                                                     
 173.  BERNARD H. SIEGAN, THE SUPREME COURT‘S CONSTITUTION: AN INQUIRY 
INTO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ITS IMPACT ON SOCIETY 56–61 (1993). 
 174.  FRANK J. SCATURRO, THE SUPREME COURT‘S RETREAT FROM 
RECONSTRUCTION: A DISTORTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 32 (2000); 
see also id.: 
The amendment in its final version was given a broad interpretation 
by Senator Andrew J. Rogers, a Democratic opponent of the 
amendment who tried to alarm his colleagues by defining ―all the 
rights we have under the laws of the country‖ as ―privileges and 
immunities.‖ The Privileges and Immunities Clause would ―prevent 
any State from refusing to allow anything to anybody embraced 
under this term of privileges and immunities,‖ including the rights to 
vote, marry, contract, be a juror, or be a judge or president. 
 175.  SLAVERY AND THE LAW 192 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2002). 
 176.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, sec. 2 (―The citizens of each state shall be entitled 
to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.‖); MICHAEL 
KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS 88 (1986) (quoting Senator Howard). 
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To these privileges and immunities, whatever they may be—
for they are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire 
extent and precise nature—to these should be added the 
personal rights guarantied and secured by the first eight 
amendments of the Constitution; such as the freedom of 
speech and of the press; . . . and also the right to be secure 
against excessive bail and against cruel and unusual 
punishments.177 
In an 1849 description of the ―privileges‖ and ―immunities‖ of 
U.S. citizens, abolitionist Joel Tiffany had also listed among them 
―the right to be exempt from excessive bail, or fines, &c., from 
cruel and unusual punishments.‖ ―The paradigmatic example of 
protected privileges or immunities,‖ constitutional law scholar 
Kurt Lash has written, ―would be those rights listed in the first 
eight amendments to the Constitution.‖178 
In his speech introducing the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Senator Jacob Howard emphasized that it ―abolishes all class 
legislation in the States and does away with the injustice of 
subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to the 
other.‖179 As Senator Howard observed: 
It prohibits the hanging of a black man for a crime for which 
the white man is not to be hanged. It protects the black man in 
his fundamental rights as a citizen with the same shield which 
it throws over the white man. Is it not time, Mr. President, 
that we extend to the black man, I had almost called it the 
poor privilege of the equal protection of the law?180 
After asking that rhetorical question, Howard posed yet another: 
Ought not the time to be now passed when one measure of 
justice is to be meted out to a member of one caste while 
another and a different measure is meted out to the member of 
another caste, both castes being alike citizens of the United 
States, both bound to obey the same laws, to sustain the 
burdens of the same Government, and both equally 
responsible to justice and to God for the deeds done in the 
body?181 
                                                                                                     
 177.  CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 176, at 88.   
 178.  LASH, supra note 114, at 76–77, 157, 289. 
 179. GREEN, supra note 143, at 158–59. 
 180. Id. 
 181.  Id. 
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The Fourteenth Amendment played a transformative role in 
shaping America‘s criminal law. ―For almost a century after the 
beginning of the United States,‖ one source notes, various 
provisions of the Bill of Rights ―applied only to actions by the 
federal government.‖ But as that criminology text emphasizes: 
―The Fourteenth Amendment, passed in 1868 after the Civil War, 
began to change this legal thinking. Designed to protect the 
rights of the newly freed slaves, this amendment declared that no 
state could deprive anyone of ‗life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.‘‖182 In accordance with that 
―spacious language,‖ the U.S. Supreme Court stressed in Duncan 
v. Louisiana,183 ―many of the rights guaranteed by the first eight 
Amendments to the Constitution have been held to be protected 
against state action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.‖184  As the Court held in that specific case in the late 
1960s:  
Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is 
fundamental to the American scheme of justice, we hold that 
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in 
all criminal cases which—were they to be tried in a federal 
court—would come within the Sixth Amendment‘s 
guarantee.185 
IV. The Geography of Arbitrariness and Discrimination: The 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Implications of the Death 
Penalty‟s Inequality 
In modern constitutional litigation, the Eighth Amendment‘s 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,186 made applicable to 
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment,187 still plays a central 
                                                                                                     
 182.  STEVEN E. BARKAN & GEORGE J. BRYJAK, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW 135 (2d ed. 2011). 
 183.  391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 184.  Id. at 148. 
 185.  Id. at 149. 
 186.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (―Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.‖). 
 187.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (―No state shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
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role in criminal cases. The Eighth Amendment has already been 
read to bar non-lethal corporal punishments—punishments that 
have long been abandoned in the American penal system.188 In 
Weems v. United States,189 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a 
corporal punishment known as cadena temporal that was 
imposed in the Philippine Islands.190 That punishment consisted 
of more than a decade of ―hard and painful labor,‖ with prisoners 
required to ―always carry a chain at the ankle, hanging from the 
wrists.‖191 In Hope v. Pelzer,192 the Supreme Court held that 
Alabama prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment by 
handcuffing a shirtless inmate to a hitching post for seven hours, 
leading to the prisoner‘s prolonged thirst, heat exposure and 
sunburning.193 ―[T]he Eighth Amendment violation,‖ the Court 
ruled of that inmate‘s legal claim, ―is obvious.‖194 And in Jackson 
v. Bishop,195 the late Justice Harry Blackmun—then writing for 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit—held in 1968 
that whipping Arkansas prisoners to discipline them constituted 
an Eighth Amendment violation.196 ―Corporal punishment,‖ 
                                                                                                     
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.‖); see also Elizabeth Keyes, Defining American: The 
DREAM Act, Immigration Reform and Citizenship, 14 NEV. L. REV. 101, 128 
(2013) (―Before the Fourteenth Amendment, African-Americans could not be 
regarded as citizens, whether slave or free. . . . [T]he Supreme Court itself 
determined in Dred Scott v. Sanford that even when free, black Americans could 
not be considered citizens.‖) (citing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 430 
(1856)); GARRETT EPPS, AMERICAN EPIC: READING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 171 
(2013) (discussing the Equal Protection Clause and noting that ―[t]his is the first 
time in the Constitution that the word ‗equal‘ is used to apply to human 
beings‖). 
 188.  See John D. Bessler, The Anomaly of Executions: The Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause in the 21st Century, 2 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUDIES 
297, 430–34 (2013) (explaining the abandonment of non-lethal corporal 
punishments in the U.S. penal system). 
 189.  217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
 190.  Id. at 364. 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  536 U.S. 730 (2002). 
 193.  Id. at 734–35. 
 194.  Id. at 738. 
 195.  404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968). 
 196.  Id. at 579. 
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Blackmun wrote, ―is degrading to the punisher and to the 
punished alike.‖197 
In her essay, ―Matters of Strata,‖ Professor Goldfarb writes 
that ―race, gender, and class structures‖ raise the prospect of 
―inequality and unfairness in the selection of defendants for 
death.‖198 In the context of taking on death sentences, those lethal 
punishments, she notes that the Eighth Amendment‘s Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits arbitrary199 and 
discriminatory punishments.200 She also observes that ideologies 
of race, gender and class ―create a complex hierarchy that 
separates the classes of those who decide others‘ fate from those 
whose fates are decided.‖201 In fact, death penalty adjudications 
are still tied up tightly with discrimination because the U.S 
Supreme Court still allows ―death-qualified‖ juries.202 That line of 
                                                                                                     
 197.  Id. at 580. 
 198.  Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 3. 
 199.  See id. at 3–4. The U.S. Supreme Court has long expressed concerns 
about arbitrariness in capital sentencing. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 
(1987) (―The Constitution . . . requires that death penalty statutes be structured 
so as to prevent the penalty from being administered in an arbitrary and 
unpredictable fashion.‖). 
 200.  See Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 3–4. In striking down Connecticut‘s 
death penalty as unconstitutional in 2015, the Supreme Court of Connecticut 
put it this way: 
It goes without saying, moreover, that the eighth amendment is 
offended not only by the random or arbitrary imposition of the death 
penalty, but also by the greater evils of racial discrimination and 
other forms of pernicious bias in the selection of who will be executed. 
The eighth amendment, then, requires that any capital sentencing 
scheme determine which defendants will be eligible for the death 
penalty on the basis of legitimate, rational, nondiscriminatory factors. 
State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 19 (Conn. 2015) (citations omitted). 
 201.  Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 6. 
 202.  See CRAIG HANEY, DEATH BY DESIGN: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AS A SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEM 106 (2005) (―Death qualification significantly skews the 
composition of the jury panel in ways that make it less balanced and fair, and 
the process itself has a biasing effect on the jurors who pass through it.‖); id. at 
106–07 (―[A] process that selects eligible jurors on the basis of death penalty 
support will exclude disproportionately greater numbers of women and 
blacks . . . because blacks are already underrepresented on the jury lists in 
many parts of the country, death qualification may act to compound a 
preexisting problem.‖); id. at 121 (―By requiring the attorneys and judge to dwell 
on penalty at the very start of the trial, the death-qualification process implies a 
heightened level of belief in the guilt of the defendant on the part of these major 
trial participants.‖). 
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cases, which traces back to the Supreme Court‘s 1968 decision in 
Witherspoon v. Illinois,203 has the highly disturbing, perverse 
effect of systematically excluding a disproportionate number of 
minorities, women, Catholics, young people, and other groups 
from sitting in judgment in capital cases.204 
In southern ―Death Belt‖ states, judicial factfinders—be they 
judges or capital juries stripped of large numbers of 
minorities205—have been, and still are, subject to enormous 
political pressure206 and what Professor Goldfarb calls the 
                                                                                                     
 203.  391 U.S. 510 (1968); see also SCOTT VOLLUM, ROLANDO V. DEL CARMEN, 
DURANT FRANTZEN, CLAUDIA SAN MIGUEL & KELLY CHEESEMAN, THE DEATH 
PENALTY: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, COMMENTARIES, AND CASE BRIEFS 139 (2014). 
 204.  See Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 20–23 (explaining that minorities, 
including African-Americans, are underrepresented on juries in capital trials 
because of jury selection practices and the use by prosecutors of peremptory 
challenges to strike prospective African-American jurors); Baxter Oliphant, 
Support for Death Penalty Lowest in More Than Four Decades, PEW RES.CTR. 
(Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/29/support-for-
death-penalty-lowest-in-more-than-four-decades/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) 
(examining surveys which show that women and minorities view the death 
penalty less favorably than white men) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 205.  Only in recent years has the bench and bar become more diverse. See, 
e.g., DAVID W. NEUBAUER & STEPHEN S. MEINHOLD, JUDICIAL PROCESS: LAW, 
COURTS, AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 169 (7th ed. 2016): 
The United States is experiencing a revolutionary change in 
composition of the bench. The dominant profile of judges as white 
male Protestants has begun to change, but, to some, change has not 
come fast enough. Women and racial minorities historically have 
faced tremendous obstacles to becoming lawyers and judges. . . . Until 
the twentieth century, the number of women judges in America was 
so small it could be counted on one hand. . . . Today, an estimated 27 
percent of the American bench is staffed by women lawyers. 
The book goes on to note that—per the American Bar Association—only about 
four percent of all state court judges are African American. Id. 
 206.  State court judges in southern states, where the death penalty is more 
popular than it is elsewhere in the country, are subject to elections and electoral 
politics and, thus, political pressure. A report of the Brennan Center for Justice 
at New York University School of Law, see KATE BERRY, HOW JUDICIAL 
ELECTIONS IMPACT CRIMINAL CASES 7 (2015), notes: 
[O]ne study found that trial judges in Alabama—who have a uniquely 
powerful role in determining death sentences due to the state‘s 
system of judicial override, by which a judge can override a jury‘s 
sentence in a capital case—are more likely to impose death over jury 
verdicts of life imprisonment during election years.  
See also id. at 11 (―[S]tates with appointed justices reversed death penalty 
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―[r]acial dynamics‖ of ―states of the old Confederacy.‖207 The 
―Death Belt‖—as Professor Charles Ogletree has explained—
includes the nine southern states that account for the vast 
number of executions carried out since 1976. Those states: 
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia.208 The use of 
highly discretionary ―peremptory‖ challenges injects still more 
racial bias into capital prosecutions, with the U.S. Supreme Court 
in recent cases finding that prospective black jurors were in fact 
systematically stricken on the basis of race.209 Though defense 
lawyers are entitled to challenge prosecutors‘ peremptory strikes 
under Batson v. Kentucky,210 it is often extremely difficult to 
prove that prosecutors‘ actions were racially motivated. Only 
occasionally, when ―smoking gun‖ evidence emerges, are racist 
attitudes or race-based peremptory strikes exposed and 
censured.211 
                                                                                                     
sentences at the highest rate—26 percent. States with judicial elections had 
substantially lower reversal rates: 15 percent in states with appointed justices 
who must face retention elections and 11 percent in states where justices are 
elected in contested elections.‖). 
 207.  Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 25–28. 
 208.  Matthew C. Heise, The Geography of Mercy: An Empirical Analysis of 
Clemency for Death Row Inmates, 39 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 3, 10–11 (2013); see 
also Andrew E. Taslitz, Daredevil and the Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
699, 706 (2004) (―The states of the Old Confederacy accounted for the vast 
majority of lynchings in the twentieth century, while there was no such 
vigilante system at work in the American Northeast.‖); Hugo Adam Bedau, 
Causes and Consequences of Wrongful Convictions: An Essay-Review, 86 
JUDICATURE 115, 118 (2002) (―[J]ust as the paradigm lynchings in American 
history were carried out by white mobs on helpless black men as a populist 
method of ruthless social control, so the death penalty is to a troubling extent a 
socially approved practice of white-on-black violence, especially where the 
crimes involved are black-on-white.‖). 
 209.  Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1755 (2016); Miller-El v. Dretke, 
545 U.S. 231, 238 (2005). 
 210.  476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 211.  Sadly, racial discrimination in jury selection is still a modern reality. 
See, e.g., DAVID K. SHIPLER, THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE: HOW OUR SEARCH FOR 
SAFETY INVADES OUR LIBERTIES 123 (2012): 
Methods of weaving race into the selection process were outlined by a 
senior prosecutor in the Philadelphia district attorney‘s office, Jack 
McMahon, in a training video for fellow prosecutors. ―In selecting 
blacks, you don‘t want the real educated ones,‖ he declared. ―Avoid 
selecting older black women when the defendant is a young black 
man,‖ he advised. ―If you get, like, a white teacher teaching in a black 
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In Foster v. Chatman,212 the U.S. Supreme Court recently 
weighed in on an especially disturbing case where, at trial, the 
prosecution invidiously used peremptory strikes against all four 
black prospective jurors qualified to serve.213 In an opinion 
written by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Supreme Court noted 
that in the prosecution‘s jury venire list—one that listed ―B‖ for 
―Blacks‖ in a legend in the upper right hand corner—the names 
of the black prospective jurors were highlighted in bright 
green.214 The Court further emphasized that, under one of the 
names of black prospective jurors, Clayton Lundy—an 
investigator who helped the prosecution during jury selection—
wrote: ―If it comes down to having to pick one of the black jurors, 
[this one] might be okay.‖215 Prospective black jurors were 
identified by ―B#1,‖ ―B#2,‖ and ―B#3,‖ and, on questionnaires, 
juror responses about their race had been circled.216 After noting 
that ―[t]he ‗Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective 
juror for a discriminatory purpose,‘‖217 and that ―[t]he first five 
names‖ on the prosecution‘s ―definite NO‘s‘ list‖ were black,218 the 
Supreme Court observed that there was a ―persistent focus on 
race in the prosecution‘s file.‖219 ―[W]e are left with the firm 
conviction,‖ the Supreme Court concluded, that the prosecution‘s 
peremptory strikes ―were ‗motivated in substantial part by 
discriminatory intent.‘‖220 
In the post-Furman era, American courts have routinely 
rejected challenges to death sentences based on race, gender and 
                                                                                                     
school that‘s sick of these guys maybe, that may be one you accept,‖ 
he said. ―The only way you‘re going to do your best is to get jurors 
that are unfair.‖ The tape, made public as McMahon campaigned for 
district attorney, contributed to his defeat. 
 212. 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016). 
 213. Id. at 1742–43.  
 214. Id. at 1744. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 1747 (quoting Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008)). 
 218. Id. at 1749–50. 
 219. Id. at 1754.  
 220. Id. (quoting Snyder, 552 U.S. at 478, 485). As the Supreme Court ruled: 
―[T]he focus on race in the prosecution‘s file plainly demonstrates a concerted 
effort to keep black prospective jurors off the jury.‖ Id. at 1755. 
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geography.221 ―As long as McCleskey remains good law,‖ two 
scholars emphasize, ―a statistical showing of disparities in the 
application of the death penalty—whether the disparities shown 
are by race, gender, geography, or all three, and whether proved 
on a statewide or county-level basis—will not prove an Eighth 
Amendment violation.‖222 While the Eighth Amendment forbids 
―cruel and unusual punishments,‖ the Fourteenth Amendment 
was put in place in part to end the nineteenth-century scourge of 
unequal punishments based on race. As one scholar writes:  
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to 
prohibit unequal punishments for defendants of all races. As 
the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly 
illuminates, one of their main goals was to ―constitutionalize‖ 
the provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, to embrace the 
requirement that in every state ―‗inhabitants of every race and 
color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or 
involuntary servitude . . . shall be subject to like punishment, 
pains and penalties, and no other.‘.‖223 
                                                                                                     
 221. See United States v. Fell, 944 F. Supp.2d 297, 349–51 (D. Vt. 2013) 
(rejecting claim that then-U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft decided to seek 
the death penalty ―on the basis of race, gender and geography, in violation of the 
Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments‖); see also United States v. Williams, No. 
4:08-cr-00070, 2013 WL 1335599 at *7 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (refusing to hold 
evidentiary hearing on defendant‘s claim that he had ―the right to not be 
subjected to an arbitrary and capricious system of capital punishment directly 
impacted by race, geography, and gender‖); Jackson v. United States, 638 F. 
Supp.2d 514, 616 (W.D. N.C. 2009) (holding that claim asserting that he was 
subjected to death penalty on the basis of race or gender of the victim was 
procedurally defaulted); Brown v. United States, 583 F. Supp.2d 1330, 1349 
(S.D. Ga. 2008) (discrimination-based claims found to be meritless ―as they have 
been addressed elsewhere‖). 
 222.  Steven F. Shatz & Terry Dalton, Challenging the Death Penalty with 
Statistics: Furman, McCleskey, and a Single County Case Study, 34 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1227, 1277 (2013). 
 223.  Stan Robin Gregory, Capital Punishment and Equal Protection: 
Constitutional Problems, Race and the Death Penalty, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 257, 
268–69 (1992). Interestingly, the Ku Klux Klan Act—passed by Congress in 
1871, and intended (as reflected in its very title) ―to enforce the Provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,‖ included a provision that prohibited conspiracies 
aimed at, among other things, ―depriving any person or any class of persons of 
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the 
laws, or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of 
any State from giving or securing to all persons within such State the equal 
protection of the laws.‖ An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes, 
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As Professor Goldfarb demonstrates, context and history 
matter, though the law—as it inevitably does—evolves and 
sometimes even changes radically over time.224 In 2016, for 
example, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Hurst v. Florida225 that 
the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to find the aggravating 
factors necessary for imposing the death penalty.226 But while 
that decision struck down Florida‘s capital sentencing scheme, 
juries—due to the death-qualification process—will continue to be 
less diverse than the populations from which they are drawn 
                                                                                                     
42nd Cong., Sess. I, ch. 22, § 2 (Apr. 20, 1871) (italics in original in the title of 
the Act; italics added to the text of the Act). The Act itself sought to protect not 
just individuals but ―any portion or class of the people.‖  See id. § 3: 
That in all cases where insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful 
combinations, or conspiracies in any State shall so obstruct or hinder 
the execution of the laws thereof, and of the United States, as to 
deprive any portion or class of the people of such State of any of the 
rights, privileges, or immunities, or protection, named in the 
Constitution and secured by this act, and the constituted authorities 
of such State shall either be unable to protect, or shall, from any 
cause, fail in or refuse protection of the people in such rights, such 
facts shall be deemed a denial by such State of the equal protection of 
the laws to which they are entitled under the Constitution of the 
United States . . . . 
(emphasis added). Today, federal law still prohibits conspiracies ―for the purpose 
of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the 
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the 
laws.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (emphasis added). The original purpose of section 
1985(3), derived from the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, was ―‗to enforce the rights 
of African Americans and their supporters.‘‖ Huling v. City of Los Banos, 869 F. 
Supp.2d 1139 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2012) (citation omitted); see also United Broth. 
of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 
825, 836 (1983) (―The predominate purpose of § 1985(3) was to combat the 
prevalent animus against Negroes and their supporters.‖). In 1971, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that 1985(3) covers ―private conspiracies.‖ Griffin v. 
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101 (1971). In that case, the Supreme Court 
emphasized: ―The conspiracy . . . must aim at a deprivation of the equal 
enjoyment of rights by the law to all.‖ Id. at 102. 
 224.  A couple of cases in point: the prohibitions on the execution of juvenile 
offenders and the intellectually disabled. Both of the U.S. Supreme Court 
rulings putting those bars in place—ones grounded in the U.S. Constitution—
came about only after earlier precedents were overruled. See Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551 (2005), overruling Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), overruling Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 
302 (1989). 
 225.  136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). 
 226.  Id. at 619. 
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unless the Supreme Court jettisons the ―death-qualification‖ 
scheme altogether.227 A 2010 report by the Equal Justice 
Initiative—the non-profit founded by lawyer Bryan Stevenson, a 
Harvard Law School graduate and the New York Times best-
selling author of Just Mercy who has helped exonerate black 
death row inmates228—specifically found a pattern of ―jury 
bleaching.‖ That odious practice, the striking of black jurors using 
―peremptory strikes,‖ has led to all-white or predominantly white 
juries even in places where the majority of the population is 
black. ―All-white juries,‖ the evidence shows, ―are significantly 
more likely to sentence black defendants to death, particularly in 
cases involving a white victim.‖229 Because the function of juries 
is ―to maintain a link between contemporary community values 
                                                                                                     
 227.  1 JURY PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIAL ASPECTS OF TRIAL PROCESSES 163 (Joel D. 
Lieberman & Daniel A. Krauss eds., 2016) (―The death qualification process has 
been more extensively studied, and the existing research suggests that the 
process itself contributes to some notable biases in shaping the capital jury as a 
decision-making body.‖); Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death, and Denial: 
Race and the Death Penalty, in MACHINERY OF DEATH: THE REALITY OF AMERICA‘S 
DEATH PENALTY REGIME 54 (David R. Dow & Mark Dow eds., 2002) (noting that 
the ―death qualification‖ process ―often results in the removal of more 
prospective jurors who are members of minority groups than those who are 
white‖ and that ―[o]ften the death qualification process reduces the number of 
minority jurors to few enough that those remaining can be eliminated by the 
prosecutor with peremptory strikes‖). 
 228. See BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND 
REDEMPTION (2014); see also One Lawyer‟s Fight for Young Blacks and ‗Just 
Mercy‘, NPR (Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/10/20/356964925/one-
lawyers-fight-for-young-blacks-and-just-mercy (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) 
(providing an interview with Bryan Stevenson on his book) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Anthony Ray Hinton, U.S. Death Row 
Inmate, Freed After 30 Years, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 2, 2015), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/anthony-ray-hinton-u-s-death-row-inmate-freed-
after-30-years-1.3020464 (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (highlighting a death row 
inmate Stevenson argued was innocent and who was exonerated) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). African Americans make up a 
disproportionate percentage of America‘s death row inmates. ALAN W. CLARKE & 
LAURELYN WHITT, THE BITTER FRUIT OF AMERICAN JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL AND 
DOMESTIC RESISTANCE TO THE DEATH PENALTY 88 (2007) (―[B]lacks, who are 
about 12.3 percent of the population, constitute nearly 42 percent of people on 
death row, and 34 percent (350) of all modern executions have been carried out 
on African Americans, thus generating numbers large enough for statistical 
comparison.‖). 
 229.  1 RACE AND RACISM IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
AMERICAN MOSAIC 999 (Charles Gallagher & Cameron D. Lippard eds., 2014). 
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and the penal system,‖230 and because the U.S. Supreme Court 
looks to jury verdicts to evaluate the ―evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,‖231 juries 
that do not reflect an entire community cannot possibly reflect the 
conscience of that community.232 
Provisions of the U.S. Constitution cannot be read in 
isolation. The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments must be read 
together,233 though the Eighth Amendment was adopted decades 
earlier than the latter amendment. The Eighth Amendment 
prohibits ―cruel and unusual punishments‖ as well as ―excessive‖ 
bail and fines.234 At the time of its ratification in 1791, however, 
that prohibition only applied to the federal government.235 It was 
not until the post-Civil War period—and after the Fourteenth 
Amendment, ratified in 1868, was held to apply the Bill of Rights 
against the states—that states were found to be constrained by 
the U.S. Constitution‘s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
and the U.S. Supreme Court‘s interpretation of it.236 As Professor 
Goldfarb explains:  
                                                                                                     
 230.  Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 542 n.15 (1968). 
 231.  This is the test that the U.S. Supreme Court has employed since 1958 
to evaluate Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause claims. Trop v. Dulles, 356 
U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
 232. See JOHN D. BESSLER, DEATH IN THE DARK: MIDNIGHT EXECUTIONS IN 
AMERICA 159–60 (1997) [hereinafter BESSLER, DEATH IN THE DARK]. By allowing 
death-qualified juries, the Supreme Court is skewing the data it gets about the 
public‘s views on capital cases as jurors who oppose the death penalty are not 
allowed to serve. JOHN D. BESSLER, KISS OF DEATH: AMERICA‘S LOVE AFFAIR WITH 
THE DEATH PENALTY 81–83 (2003). This is especially troubling because the 
Supreme Court uses jury verdicts, along with legislation, to assess the ―evolving 
standards of decency.‖ The Court treats jury verdicts as ―a significant and 
reliable objective index of contemporary values‖ because jurors are ―so directly 
involved.‖ Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976); Coker v. Georgia, 433 
U.S. 584, 595 (1977). 
 233. See BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 47, at 215 (―The Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments, however interpreted, operate together to prohibit 
arbitrary and discriminatory punishments and set a constitutional floor beneath 
which neither federal nor state officials can traverse.‖). 
 234.  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 235.  BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 47, at 28–29. 
 236.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The first time the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that the U.S. Constitution‘s Eighth Amendment was applicable to the states by 
virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment was in 1962. See Robinson v. California, 
370 U.S. 660 (1962). Initially, the Supreme Court did not utilize the Fourteenth 
Amendment to stop discriminatory actions. See RICHARD S. CONLEY, HISTORICAL 
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The Fourteenth Amendment, part of the package of 
Reconstruction Amendments that followed soon after the end 
of the Civil War, imposed the first explicit constitutional limits 
on the power of states, because one outgrowth of the Civil War 
was an awareness that tyranny could come not just from a 
centralized federal power but also from decentralized state 
authorities.237  
The Fourteenth Amendment is so important that it has been 
called a ―Second Bill of Rights‖ or a ―Second Constitution.‖238 
As I have argued elsewhere, the adoption and ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment necessarily changed the Eighth 
Amendment calculus. In addition to making the Eighth 
Amendment applicable to the states, the Fourteenth Amendment 
enshrined the concept of ―equal protection of the laws‖ into U.S. 
law.239 Whereas punishments in the pre-Fourteenth Amendment 
era did not need to be imposed in a non-discriminatory fashion, it 
is now unconstitutional for jurors to be stricken on the grounds of 
race or gender240 or for punishments to be imposed arbitrarily241 
                                                                                                     
DICTIONARY OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 96–97 (2016): 
In the Slaughterhouse Cases (1873) the Supreme Court took a narrow 
view of equal protection of the law and ruled that the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not apply to state actions. In the Civil Rights Cases 
(1883), a consolidation of five cases, the high court struck down the 
1875 Civil Rights Act, which set out to prohibit segregation, as 
unconstitutional. In 1896 the Supreme Court affirmed ―separate but 
equal‖ facilities for the races in the Plessy v. Ferguson decision. That 
doctrine remained in place for 58 years until the Supreme Court 
overturned it in the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education 
(1954). 
See also id. at 97 (―It was not until the early 20th century that the Supreme 
Court selectively incorporated the Bill of Rights to state actions through the 
Fourteenth Amendment‘s provisions for privileges and immunities, due process, 
and equal protection of the laws.‖). 
 237. Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 12. 
 238. DAVID L. HUDSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: EQUAL PROTECTION 
UNDER THE LAW 3–4 (2002); see also GARRETT EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR 
AMERICA (2007). 
 239. BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 47, at 306, 308. 
 240. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986) (―If the trial court 
decides that the facts establish . . . purposeful discrimination and the prosecutor 
does not come forward with a neutral explanation for his action, our precedents 
require that petitioner‘s conviction be reversed.‖); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 
127, 143 (1994) (concluding that jurors cannot be struck on the basis of gender); 
Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016) (reaffirming that jurors cannot be 
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or on the invidious bases of race242 or gender.243 When the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments are read together, punishments 
                                                                                                     
struck based on race). 
 241. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 238–39 (2005) (―The 
Framers of the Constitution understood the threat of ‗judicial despotism‘ that 
could arise from ‗arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary convictions‘ without the 
benefit of a jury in criminal cases.‖); LINDA E. CARTER, ELLEN S. KREITZBERG & 
SCOTT HOWE, UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 346 (3d ed. 2012) (―In 1972, 
in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court declared the death penalty 
unconstitutional due, in part, to the arbitrary and capricious manner in which it 
was imposed.‖) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)); Furman, 408 
U.S. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that ―the English history of the 
Clause reveals a particular concern with the establishment of a safeguard 
against arbitrary punishments‖) (citing Anthony F. Granucci, „Nor Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Inflicted‟: The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 
857–60 (1969)); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 
408, 416 (2003) (―The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a 
tortfeasor.‖); Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 352 (2007): 
[W]e have emphasized the need to avoid an arbitrary determination 
of an award‘s amount. Unless a State insists upon proper standards 
that will cabin the jury‘s discretionary authority, its punitive damage 
system . . . may threaten ―arbitrary punishments,‖ i.e., punishments 
that reflect not an ―application of law‖ but ―a decisionmaker‘s caprice. 
Sandlin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995) (―[A]rbitrary corporal punishment 
represents an invasion of personal security . . . .‖); Barenblatt v. United States, 
360 U.S. 109, 162 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting): 
It is the protection from arbitrary punishments through the right to a 
judicial trial with all these safeguards which over the years has 
distinguished America from lands where drumhead courts and other 
similar ―tribunals‖ deprive the weak and the unorthodox of life, 
liberty and property without due process of law. 
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2759 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (―The 
arbitrary imposition of punishment is the antithesis of the rule of law.‖). 
 242.  See Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis 
of Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 27, 110–11 (1984): 
A long line of cases holds that the equal protection clause prohibits 
discrimination in criminal sentencing by the race of the defendant, 
but no cases to date discuss its implications for discrimination by the 
race of the victim. The language of the fourteenth amendment itself, 
prohibiting the denial of ‗equal protection of the law,‘ speaks, if 
anything, more clearly of victims than of defendants. The sponsors of 
the fourteenth amendment unquestionably intended this language to 
prohibit unequal punishments for defendants of different races—
indeed one of their major aims was to ‗constitutionalize‘ the 
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, including the requirement 
that in every state ‗inhabitants of every race and color, without 
regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary 
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cannot be ―cruel and unusual‖ and, to avoid that nomenclature, 
they must not be inflicted in an unequal manner either.244 The 
words that adorn the U.S. Supreme Court building—―EQUAL 
JUSTICE UNDER LAW‖—must be given effect in the context of 
punishment (just as they were, for example, in the context of 
public education in Brown v. Board of Education) if the 
Fourteenth Amendment is to be meaningful and fully 
implemented.245  
V. The Need for Equal Protection of the Laws: From 
Discrimination and Arbitrariness to Abolition and the Protection 
of Universal Rights 
The basic rule of equal protection is that persons ―similarly 
situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law must 
receive like treatment.‖246 The purpose of the Fourteenth 
                                                                                                     
servitude . . . shall be subject to like punishment, pains and penalties, 
and no other‘—but they were concerned about protecting black 
victims as well. 
 243. See 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 301 (2016) (―[E]qual protection is 
violated when different punishments for offenses is grounded merely on the 
basis of gender.‖); see also Hobson v. Pow, 434 F. Supp. 362, 366 (N.D. Ala. 1977) 
(―[T]the principle of equal protection is violated when different punishment for 
offenses is grounded merely on the basis of gender.‖) (citations omitted). 
 244.  The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments are frequently cited and read 
together. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Free v. Peters, 778 F. Supp. 431, 439 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 
1991): 
[W]hile Free purports to be advancing two grounds for recovery, one 
based on the Eighth Amendment, the other based on the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it is evident that these grounds must be read together 
as one claim, since there is no basis for relief against the state based 
solely on the Eighth Amendment without the requisite incorporation 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 245.  BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 47, at 306. 
 246.  E.g., People v. Barrera, 14 Cal. App.4th 1555, 1565 (Cal. Ct. App., 5th 
Dist. 1993); see also Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization of California, 451 U.S. 648, 660 (1981) (―[T]he Fourteenth 
Amendment, ratified in 1868, introduced the constitutional requirement of 
equal protection, prohibiting the States from acting arbitrarily or treating 
similarly situated persons differently even with respect to privileges formerly 
dispensed at the State‟s discretion.‖); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 
(2003) (O‘Connor, J., concurring) (―The Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment ‗is essentially a direction that all persons similarly 
situated should be treated alike.‘‖) (quoting City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne 
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Amendment‘s Equal Protection Clause—it has been written—is 
―to secure every person within the State‘s jurisdiction against 
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by 
express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through 
duly constituted agents.‖247 In that regard, the Equal Protection 
Clause is, logically, an ideal vehicle for enforcing universal rights, 
such as the rights to be free from torture, cruelty and 
discrimination.248 No one, not even prisoners, are to be subjected 
to torture or gratuitous cruelty, and similarly situated offenders 
should be treated alike under the law.249 The death penalty, it is 
                                                                                                     
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241–
42 (1970) (―[O]nce the State has defined the outer limits of incarceration 
necessary to satisfy its penological interests and policies, it may not then subject 
a certain class of convicted defendants to a period of imprisonment beyond the 
statutory maximum . . . .‖). 
 247.  Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, Neb., 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923) 
(quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Tp., 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918)). In 
the context of criminal statutes, McLaughlin v. State of Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 
192 (1964), emphasized: 
[W]e must be especially sensitive to the policies of the Equal 
Protection Clause which, as reflected in congressional enactments 
dating from 1870, were intended to secure ―the full and equal benefit 
of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property‘ 
and to subject all persons ‗to like punishment, pains, penalties, . . . .‖ 
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.  
(citations omitted); cf. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–65 (1996):  
[T]he decision whether to prosecute may not be based on ―an 
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary 
classification.‖ A defendant may demonstrate that the administration 
of a criminal law is ―directed so exclusively against a particular class 
of persons . . . with a mind so unequal and oppressive‖ that the 
system of prosecution amounts to ―a practical denial‖ of equal 
protection of the law. 
(citations omitted). 
 248.  See JEAN THOMAS, PUBLIC RIGHTS, PRIVATE RELATIONS 86 (2015) (―The 
right to be free from torture, for example, protects an interest whose importance 
would be difficult to make sense of if it did not protect all persons equally.‖); see 
also G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. General 
Assembly Resolution 217 A(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), Art. 5 (―No one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.‖). 
 249. See People v. Hamilton, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1615, 1619 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1995) (―Equal protection requires that like defendants be treated alike; a state‘s 
classification of crimes and punishments must be reasonable.‖); see also Ex 
parte Sizemore, 8 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Tex. Ct. App. 1928) (―Due process of law 
under the Fourteenth Amendment and the equal protection of the law are 
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true, has been a fixture of American life since colonial days. But 
the legal landscape—both in the U.S. and abroad—is changing 
rapidly, if not at lightning speed.250 While a U.N. effort seeking a 
global moratorium on executions is gaining momentum,251 
American anti-death penalty advocacy has been focused in the 
courts and on the state level—and with some successes, with 
courts declaring certain practices to be unconstitutional252 and 
with six states abolishing the death penalty since 2000.253 
While the U.S. Supreme Court has held that race and gender 
discrimination are unconstitutional in a series of cases,254 it has 
yet to effectuate the Fourteenth Amendment‘s dictates in the 
                                                                                                     
secured if the law operates on all alike and do not subject the individual to the 
arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.‖) (citations omitted). 
 250.  E.g., John D. Bessler, Capital Punishment Law and Practices: History, 
Trends, and Developments, in AMERICA‘S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE 
PENAL SANCTION 19 (James R. Acker, Robert M. Bohm & Charles S. Lanier eds., 
3d ed. 2014); John D. Bessler, The Death Penalty in Decline: From Colonial 
America to the Present, 50 CRIM. L. BULL. 245 (2014) (tracing the law‘s 
evolution); Sheherezade C. Malik & D. Paul Holdsworth, A Survey of the History 
of the Death Penalty in the United States, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 693, 709 (2015): 
The general global trend away from the death penalty, including 
among America‘s greatest allies, makes the intrepid nature of capital 
punishment within the fabric of our society more glaring. Altogether, 
this makes for the possibility of very drastic changes in the near 
future as to how we approach, prosecute, and punish those whose 
conduct exceeds the tolerable bounds of moral depravity. 
 251. See ROGER HOOD & CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE 
PERSPECTIVE 41–44 (5th ed. 2015); see also Sandra Babcock, The Global Debate 
on the Death Penalty, 34 HUM. RTS. 17, 17 (2007) (―The international trend 
toward abolition reflects a shift in the death penalty paradigm. Whereas the 
death penalty was once viewed as a matter of domestic penal policy, now it is 
seen as a human rights issue.‖). 
 252.  E.g., Adam Liptak, Electrocution Is Banned in Last State to Rely on It, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/09/us/09penalty.html (last visited Dec. 19, 
2016) (noting that the Nebraska Supreme Court declared the electric chair to be 
unconstitutional) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 253.  DANIEL LACHANCE, EXECUTING FREEDOM: THE CULTURAL LIFE OF 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 248 n.11 (2016). 
 254. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling the 
―separate but equal‖ doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and 
declaring unconstitutional state laws establishing separate public schools for 
black and white students); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 
(1996) (striking down the Virginia Military Institute‘s male-only admission 
policy). 
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context of America‘s death penalty system. Thus, in McCleskey, 
the Supreme Court held that the Baldus study, the statistical 
study showing discrimination in Georgia‘s death penalty system, 
was ―clearly insufficient‖ to support an inference that any of the 
decisionmakers in that particular criminal case ―acted with 
discriminatory purpose.‖255 In minimizing the role of race in 
death penalty adjudications writ large and rejecting Warren 
McCleskey‘s Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection claims, a bare majority of the Supreme Court 
sidestepped the Baldus study‘s alarming findings by concluding: 
―Statistics at most may show only a likelihood that a particular 
factor entered into some decisions. There is, of course, some risk 
of racial prejudice influencing a jury‘s decision in a criminal case. 
There are similar risks that other kinds of prejudice will 
influence other criminal trials.‖ Ultimately, the Court in 
McCleskey determined that the presence of that risk of racial 
prejudice was not ―constitutionally unacceptable.‖256   
In reaching its decision, the Court in McCleskey touted the 
―substantial benefits‖ of discretion.257 Although it determined 
that the Baldus study ―indicates a discrepancy that appears to 
correlate with race,‖ the Court nonetheless found that ―[t]he 
discrepancy indicated by the Baldus study is ‗a far cry from the 
major systemic defects identified in Furman.‘‖258 The Court in 
McCleskey then made this slippery slope argument: 
[I]f we accepted McCleskey‘s claim that racial bias has 
impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we 
could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of 
penalty. Moreover, the claim that his sentence rests on the 
irrelevant factor of race easily could be extended to apply to 
claims based on unexplained discrepancies that correlate to 
membership in other minority groups, and even to gender.259 
As Justice Powell, in extending his slippery slope argument, 
continued: 
                                                                                                     
 255. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987). 
 256. Id. at 308–09. 
 257. Id. at 311–12. 
 258. Id. at 312–13 (quoting Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 54 (1984)). 
 259. Id. at 314–17. 
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Also, there is no logical reason that such a claim need be 
limited to racial or sexual bias. If arbitrary and capricious 
punishment is the touchstone under the Eighth Amendment, 
such a claim could—at least in theory—be based upon any 
arbitrary variable, such as the defendant‘s facial 
characteristics, or the physical attractiveness of the defendant 
or the victim, that some statistical study indicates may be 
influential in jury decisionmaking.260 
But McCleskey wasn‘t about a defendant‘s physical 
attractiveness; it was about a man‘s life. And in the modern era, 
the death penalty‘s legitimacy has been corroded by the 
punishment‘s arbitrary, errant, and highly discriminatory 
application. Indeed, many people now see capital punishment—
and increasingly and properly so—as violating basic and 
fundamental human rights, including the right to life and the 
rights to be free from torture and cruelty. The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a widely ratified 
international treaty, itself expressly provides that ―[n]o one shall 
be arbitrarily deprived of his life.‖261 The language of that treaty, 
put in place in 1966, thus makes clear that the arbitrary 
infliction of death sentences has been a violation of international 
law for fifty years now.262 While the treaty‘s use of the 
masculine—―his‖—reflects its 1960s vintage and that executions 
have long been used mainly to kill men, the death penalty‘s 
arbitrary and discriminatory character (which a number of U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices spoke of in 1972 in Furman v. Georgia263) 
has yet to be remedied.264 
Not only does the arbitrary infliction of death sentences 
violate long-standing international law principles, but the death 
                                                                                                     
 260.  Id. at 317–18 (footnotes omitted). 
 261.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Assembly 
resolution 2200 A (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966), S. Exec. Doc. No. 95–2, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 [hereinafter ―ICCPR‖], Art. 6.  
 262.  See David Weissbrodt & Terri Rosen, Principles Against Executions, 13 
HAMLINE L. REV. 579, 579 (1990) (―The right to be free from extra-legal, 
arbitrary, or summary executions is recognized in a number of international 
human rights instruments.‖) (citing ICCPR, art. 6). 
 263.  408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 264.  In 2015, in their dissent in Glossip v. Gross, Justices Stephen Breyer 
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg also spoke of the death penalty‘s arbitrary and 
discriminatory character. See STEPHEN BREYER, AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY 
76–80 (John D. Bessler ed. 2016). 
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penalty should be found to be a torturous punishment265 and to 
violate existing American constitutional law as well.266 In fact, 
just as the Convention Against Torture now prohibits acts of 
torture and cruelty,267 the U.S. Constitution‘s Fourteenth 
Amendment has long forbidden arbitrary, discriminatory, and 
excessive punishments,268 with the U.S. Supreme Court 
                                                                                                     
 265.  In a forthcoming book, I make that argument in extensive detail. For 
example, I explain how various non-lethal acts, including mock or simulated 
executions, are already considered to be acts of torture, and then argue that real 
executions—far more severe in nature than mock executions—should qualify as 
acts of torture, too. See JOHN D. BESSLER, THE DEATH PENALTY AS TORTURE: FROM 
THE DARK AGES TO ABOLITION (forthcoming 2017). 
 266.  Not only has the Eighth Amendment long been read to bar torturous 
punishments, but the U.S. Constitution has been read to forbid race- and 
gender-based discrimination. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879) (―[I]t is 
safe to affirm that punishments of torture . . . and all others in the same line of 
unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment.‖); City of Cleburne, 
Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (noting that laws 
that classify by ―race, alienage, or national origin‖ are ―subjected to strict 
scrutiny‖ because those classifications ―are so seldom relevant to the 
achievement of any legitimate state interest‖ and ―are deemed to reflect 
prejudice and antipathy—a view that those in the burdened class are not as 
worthy or deserving as others‖); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) (―By 
providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are thus similarly 
situated, the challenged section violates the Equal Protection Clause.‖).  
 267.  Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Arts. 1 & 16, reprinted in WILLIAM A. 
SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 403 (3d 
ed. 2002). 
 268.  See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 
(2003) (―The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the 
imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor.‖); 
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 585 (1998) (noting that the Equal 
Protection Clause prohibits ―race and gender discrimination‖); Godfrey v. 
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (―if a State wishes to authorize capital 
punishment it has a constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a 
manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death 
penalty‖); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) 
(―There is increasing recognition of the fact that the basic theme of equal 
protection is implicit in ‗cruel and unusual‘ punishments. ‗A penalty . . . should 
be considered ‗unusually‘ imposed if it is administered arbitrarily or 
discriminatory.‘‖) (quoting Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring 
the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1790 (1970)); 
Furman, 408 U.S. at 256–57 (Douglas, J., concurring) (―[T]hese discretionary 
statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They are pregnant with 
discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea 
of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on ‗cruel and unusual‘ 
punishments.‖); see also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 59–60 (1984) (Brennan, 
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articulating the Equal Protection Clause‘s scope in a series of 
cases.269 ―When those who appear similarly situated are 
nevertheless treated differently,‖ the U.S. Supreme Court has 
ruled, ―the Equal Protection Clause requires at least a rational 
reason for the difference, to ensure that all persons subject to 
legislation or regulation are indeed being ‗treated alike, under 
like circumstances and conditions.‘‖270 
For fundamental rights, such as the right to be free from 
racial discrimination, the U.S. Supreme Court naturally imposes 
heightened protection, subjecting such laws to ―strict scrutiny.‖ 
Though the Supreme Court, in McCleskey, gave short shrift to the 
statistics demonstrating racial bias (something Justice Harry 
Blackmun pointed out in his dissent),271 it is clear that the rights 
to be free from torture, cruelty, and discrimination are 
fundamental ones and must be respected and protected.272 The 
                                                                                                     
J., dissenting): 
Almost 12 years ago, in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the 
Court concluded that the death penalty, as then administered under 
various state and federal statutes, constituted a cruel and unusual 
punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
At that time, the Court was convinced that death sentences were 
being imposed in a manner that was so arbitrary and capricious that 
no individual death sentence could be constitutionally justified. 
 269.  See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA‘S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 185–86 (2012); WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, 
ENFORCING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE: CONGRESSIONAL POWER, JUDICIAL 
DOCTRINE, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 120 (2015). 
 270.  Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 602 (2008) (―Thus, 
when it appears that an individual is being singled out by the government, the 
specter of arbitrary classification is fairly raised, and the Equal Protection 
Clause requires a ‗rational basis for the difference in treatment.‘‖) (citing Village 
of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam)). 
 271.  See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 347–48 (1987) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting): 
The Court today seems to give a new meaning to our recognition that 
death is different. Rather than requiring ―a correspondingly greater 
degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination,‖ the Court 
relies on the very fact that this is a case involving capital punishment 
to apply a lesser standard of scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause.  
(quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998–99 (1983)). 
 272.  See Colleen Costello, Challenging the Practice of Transfer to Torture in 
U.S. Courts: A Model Brief for Practitioners, 1 NE. U. L.J. 157, 214 (2009) (―The 
right to be free from torture is a fundamental and universal right. Any 
classification impinging on a fundamental right is subject to strict scrutiny, and 
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right to equality, like the right to be free from cruelty and 
torture, is itself a universal right.273 The right to equal treatment 
under the law used to be, as noted earlier, more rhetoric than 
reality, especially since Thomas Jefferson‘s Declaration of 
Independence, which speaks of the equality of men, was 
promulgated in an era of slavery and overt racial and gender 
discrimination. But Jefferson‘s lofty rhetoric is, increasingly, 
being actualized in the United States, with the U.S. Supreme 
Court‘s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,274 for example, 
guaranteeing same-sex couples the right to marry.275 
It is clear—as Professor Goldfarb aptly notes—that ―capital 
punishment has been reserved primarily for those convicted of 
killing white people‖ and is ―disproportionately‖ imposed on men, 
especially those who victimize whites such as the innocents Joe 
Giarratano was convicted (perhaps falsely) of murdering. The 
first recorded execution of a woman in what is now the United 
States—that of Jane Champion—took place in Virginia in 1632, 
and in America women represent only a small percentage, 2.5 
percent, of all persons executed by state and local authorities 
since 1608.276 Justice Thurgood Marshall himself once recognized 
                                                                                                     
will only be upheld if ‗narrowly tailored to further compelling government 
interests.‘‖) (citations omitted); Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1755 (2016) 
(finding that the peremptory strikes of two black prospective jurors violated the 
petitioner‘s constitutional rights under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), 
and ruling that ―the focus on race in the prosecution‘s file plainly demonstrates 
a concerted effort to keep black prospective jurors off the jury . . . . Two 
peremptory strikes on the basis of race are two more than the Constitution 
allows‖); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 238 (2005) (explaining that racial 
discrimination in jury selection offends the U.S. Constitution‘s Equal Protection 
Clause). 
 273.  See Amy J. McMaster, Human Rights at the Crossroads: When East 
Meets West, 29 VT. L. REV. 109, 119 (2004) (noting that the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights establishes equality before the law as a universal 
right). 
 274.  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 275.  See Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, The Case for LGBT Equality: 
Reviving the Political Process Doctrine and Repurposing the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1015, 1018 & n.14 (2016) (citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) and noting that ―the U.S. Supreme Court has definitively 
recognized the right of same-sex couples to marry‖); see also Loving v. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 4, 11–12 (1966) (striking down a statute 
that prohibited marriages between whites and ―coloreds‖ on due process and 
equal protection grounds). 
 276.  O‘SHEA, supra note 41, at 4. 
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the ―overwhelming evidence that the death penalty is employed 
against men and not women.‖ After taking notice of that fact, 
Justice Marshall observed: ―It is difficult to understand why 
women have received such favored treatment since the purposes 
allegedly served by capital punishment seemingly are applicable 
to both sexes.‖277  
But in her essay, Professor Goldfarb offers a compelling 
explanation for why women (at least those whose conduct 
conforms to traditional gender stereotypes) are less harshly 
punished, an explanation rooted in society‘s history of patriarchy 
and the ―chivalrous norms‖ associated with the treatment of 
women.278 Her essay also explains why men who kill women, 
especially black men who kill white women, have long received 
the law‘s harshest treatment and are sentenced to death. Men 
who kill women have not only failed to protect, they have 
murderously harmed, the members of society whom earlier 
generations of Anglo-Americans once called ―the weaker sex.‖279 
As Goldfarb adds after studying American executions and 
Giarratano‘s death sentence and laying out preexisting race, 
gender and class stereotypes and ideologies: ―Inflicting harsh 
punishment, including death sentences, in situations like these 
supports the status quo and its multiple intersecting hierarchies, 
allowing chivalrous impulses to be expressed primarily against 
poor men, men of color, and other men lacking in social and 
material power.‖280  
The gross inequalities associated with capital punishment 
have long been clear, though the U.S. Supreme Court has been 
                                                                                                     
 277.  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 365  (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 278.  Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 30–31. A Connecticut law—one put in place 
in 1893—only permitted ―adult males‖ to attend executions. BESSLER, DEATH IN 
THE DARK, supra note 232, at 63. 
 279.  See, e.g., SUZANNE LE-MAY SHEFFIELD, WOMEN AND SCIENCE: SOCIAL 
IMPACT AND INTERACTION 32–33 (2004) (―Women were understood to be the 
weaker sex long before the advent of the new science in the seventeenth 
century. Religion, philosophy, the legal system, and the western social hierarchy 
all reflected the belief that women were physically weaker than, and 
intellectually and morally inferior to, men.‖); 1 SEX AND SOCIETY 254 (2010) 
(―[S]ociety has generally expected women to be feminine. Expressions such as 
‗the weaker sex‘ reinforce the idea that women are in some ways lesser than, or 
reliant on, their male counterparts. In that way, ideas of femininity can serve to 
perpetuate inequality.‖). 
 280.  Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 29, 36–37. 
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slow to recognize them. The death penalty‘s ―original sin,‖ law 
professors Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker write, tracing 
executions from colonial days through today, is ―the stain of racial 
discrimination.‖281 As they explain of the death penalty‘s close 
and inerasable association with slavery: 
[T]he large increase in executions, especially of blacks, in the 
South during the eighteenth century was the direct result of 
the large influx of African slaves to that region. As the South‘s 
slave labor economy grew, so did the demand by slave owners 
for state assistance in disciplining the growing enslaved 
population, to promote economic productivity and to protect 
the increasingly outnumbered white population from much-
feared slave violence or revolt.282 
―The extent to which capital punishment for slaves was perceived 
as a public good,‖ they write, ―is demonstrated by the provision of 
state compensation to the owners of executed slaves, in the same 
way that property owners today are compensated when their land 
is taken by the state for a public use such as a highway.‖283 In 
other words, human beings as property; to be disposed of—in the 
language of that era—as ―chattels.‖284 
For far too long, the U.S. Supreme has ignored the realities 
of discrimination associated with death sentences and executions. 
When America‘s death penalty came under attack in the 1960s 
and 1970s, it was the NAACP‘s Legal Defense and Educational 
Fund that led the campaign.285 In cases that came before the 
Supreme Court, leading civil rights organizations—from the 
NAACP and the National Urban League to the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference, the Mexican-American Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund, and the National Council of 
Negro Women—submitted or joined amici briefs. ―The total 
                                                                                                     
 281.  STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 5, at 3. 
 282. Id. at 19. 
 283.  Id. 
 284.  See, e.g., THE LAWS OF SLAVERY IN TEXAS: HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS AND 
ESSAYS 1 (Randolph B. Campbell ed., 2010) (―The institution of African slavery 
as practiced in the antebellum United States depended on the ownership of 
humans as chattels, pieces of movable personal property.‖); MILTON MEITZER, 
SLAVERY: A WORLD HISTORY 3 (1971) (―Often the word ‗chattel‘ is used in 
connection with slavery. Chattel means property or capital. It means livestock, 
too, such as cattle—or a slave.‖). 
 285.  STEIKER & STEIKER, , supra note 5, at 78–79. 
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history of the administration of capital punishment in America, 
both through formal authority, and informally,‖ the NACCP 
argued in one submission, ―is persuasive evidence, that racial 
discrimination was, and still is, an impermissible factor in the 
disproportionate imposition of the death penalty upon non-white 
American citizens.‖286  Yet, as the Steikers so cogently explain: 
Despite ample ammunition in the amicus briefs, none of the 
justices seemed willing to offer a detailed history of the role of 
race in shaping capital statutes and practices for over 200 
years; Justices Douglas and Marshall, the only two justices 
who addressed race at all, both stopped short of placing the 
practice in its historical, slavery-rooted context.287 
This was, clearly, a missed opportunity, though the Supreme 
Court undoubtedly made a conscious decision at the time to play 
down the issue of racial discrimination in the death penalty‘s 
administration. In their thoughtful and compelling book, 
Courting Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 
Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker offer this analysis: ―The Court‘s 
deafening silence on the subject of race in its foundational capital 
punishment cases is striking but, on reflection, perhaps not 
altogether surprising. Ample reasons of various kinds—strategic, 
institutional, ideological, and psychological—help explain what 
otherwise might appear to be a baffling obtuseness.‖288  ―In light 
of the Court‘s ongoing role in the school desegregation battle,‖ 
they observe, ―it is no wonder that Chief Justice Warren, the 
architect of the Court‘s unanimous opinion in Brown, hesitated to 
add capital punishment to the simmering pot of racial issues.‖289  
―The Warren Court‘s desegregation rulings and its criminal 
procedure revolution,‖ they add, ―already seemed to target 
Southern institutions, and these decisions engendered 
substantial backlash in that region.‖290 ―A race-based abolition,‖ 
they conclude, ―would have amounted to an acknowledgment that 
the effects of institutionalized racism could not be erased by 
constitutional intervention—the very last message that the 
                                                                                                     
 286.  BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 47, at 1–3. 
 287.  STEIKER & STEIKER, , supra note 5, at 90. 
 288.  Id. at 98. 
 289.  Id. at 99. 
 290.  Id. at 100. 
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Supreme Court wanted to send in the era of constitutionally 
mandated school desegregation and criminal procedure 
reform.‖291 
But in this second decade of the twenty-first century, the 
U.S. Supreme Court now finds itself at a crossroads as regards 
the punishment of death. It can let it continue, or it can say no 
more—no more will the United States of America engage in state-
sanctioned killing. ―The most profound consequence of the Court‘s 
failure to address the issue of race in its capital jurisprudence,‖ 
the Steikers aptly note, ―is that the unjust influence of race in the 
capital punishment process continues unchecked.‖292 As they 
explain in their book: 
More broadly, the Court‘s failure to address forthrightly the 
death penalty‘s racialized history and current practice has 
disserved the Court in its role as chronicler of history and 
social and political practices. Had the Court framed its 
constitutional regulation of capital punishment against the 
backdrop of antebellum codes, lynchings, mob-dominated 
trials, and disparate enforcement patterns, the Court would 
have done a much better job of explaining why the American 
death penalty deserved the sustained attention of the 
American judiciary. This would have been true even if the 
Court ultimately had framed its doctrines in nonracial 
terms.293 
VI. Conclusion 
The death penalty‘s racial and gender bias is clear.294 
Congressman John Conyers once took note of the ―gender 
                                                                                                     
 291.  Id. at 105. 
 292.  Id. at 110. 
 293.  Id. at 111. 
 294.  See Amanda Oliver, The Death Penalty Has a Gender Bias, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 1, 2015, 12:40 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amanda-oliver/are-women-getting-away-
wi_b_8227690.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); see also Steven F. Shatz & Naomi R. Shatz, Chivalry Is Not 
Dead: Murder, Gender, and the Death Penalty, 27 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & 
JUST. 64, 84 (2012): 
Studies of gender and the death penalty have, for the most part, 
focused on the gender of the defendant and have consistently found 
that women are sentenced to death and executed at significantly 
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discrimination‖ associated with capital sentencing,295 and 
Professor Elizabeth Rapaport—a law professor at the University 
of New Mexico School of Law—has written of the ―chivalrous 
disinclination to sentence women to die.‖ While articulating her 
―chivalry‖ theory, she simultaneously posits an ―evil woman‖ 
hypothesis to explain ―the gender stereotyping that has 
historically dehumanized despised female murderers‖ and 
resulted in their execution when they violate ―sex role 
expectations‖ (e.g., by killing their children or husbands).296 The 
Washington, D.C.-based Death Penalty Information Center, 
documenting the racial prejudice in the death penalty‘s 
administration, also cites study after study showing that killers 
of whites are much more likely to be sentenced to death than 
killers of blacks. In the modern era, the statistics for those 
                                                                                                     
lower rates than men. A study of the death penalty applied to women 
from 1973–2005 found that at every stage of the process female 
defendants appear to be diverted away from the death penalty at a 
greater rate than men. While 10% of people arrested for murder are 
women, only 2% of death sentences imposed at trial are imposed upon 
women, and women account for only 1.1% of persons actually 
executed. Men arrested for murder are six times more likely to be 
sentenced to death than are women arrested for murder. 
 295.  See Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some 
Thoughts about the Department of Justice‟s Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 378 
n.170 (1999). 
 296.  Elizabeth Rapaport, Equality of the Damned: The Execution of Women 
on the Cusp of the 21st Century, 26 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 581, 600 (2000); Elizabeth 
Rapaport, Some Questions About Gender and the Death Penalty, 20 GOLDEN 
GATE U. L. REV. 501, 503–504, 513 (1990); see also DAVID W. NEUBAUER & HENRY 
F. FRADELLA, AMERICA‘S COURTS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 441 (12th ed. 
2015): 
The evil woman hypothesis focuses on traditional sex-role 
expectations. This hypothesis emphasizes that women lose the 
advantages normally provided by chivalry and paternalism when 
they are convicted of ―manly‖ crimes such as robbery or assault. This 
evil woman view argues that women might actually be treated more 
harshly than men when they deviate from stereotypical sex-role 
expectations. 
Andrea L. Lewis & Sara L. Sommervold, Death, But Is It Murder? The Role of 
Stereotypes and Cultural Perceptions in the Wrongful Convictions of Women, 78 
ALB. L. REV. 1035, 1039 (2015) (―Historically, Western society has considered a 
woman‘s role to be that of wife and mother.‖); Joan W. Howarth, Executing 
White Masculinities: Learning from Karla Faye Tucker, 81 ORE. L. REV. 183, 185 
(2002) (―Gender helps to explain why we execute, and it helps to determine who 
we execute.‖). 
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executed for interracial homicides are particularly telling. While 
20 people have been executed for interracial homicides involving 
a white defendant and a black victim, an exponentially higher 
number of people—282—have been executed where the defendant 
was black and the victim was white.297 
Such discrimination calls for a remedy, and in the case of the 
death penalty, the only remedy that will suffice is the death 
penalty‘s abolition. In ―Matters of Strata,‖ Professor Goldfarb 
emphasizes that ―when race, gender, and class play an 
explanatory role in decisions about who receives a death 
sentence, under the Supreme Court‘s death penalty jurisprudence 
those decisions constitute cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.‖298 And her perceptive essay, 
in tracing Joseph Giarratano‘s case and the ideologies and long 
history of discrimination undergirding the death penalty that 
―undermine‖ its legitimacy,299 makes clear that, as a society, we 
need ―to find other approaches.‖300 Just as the U.S. Supreme 
Court, in Shelley v. Kraemer,301 held in the 1940s that judicial 
enforcement of restrictive covenants attempting to bar minorities 
from ownership or occupancy of real property violated due process 
and equal protection principles, a wholly arbitrary and 
discriminatory death penalty regime—one still in place in the 
twenty-first century—should not be tolerated.302 A government 
                                                                                                     
 297.  Facts about the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. 2 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf. 
 298.  Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 4. 
 299.  Id. at 5. 
 300.  Id. at 49. 
 301.  334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 302.  See THE OXFORD GUIDE TO UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
283 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1999) (discussing Shelley v. Kraemer and the ―state 
action‖ doctrine). In 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a private litigant 
may not use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on account of their race 
since race-based exclusion violates the equal protection rights of the challenged 
jurors. As the Supreme Court ruled in that civil case that post-dates its 1987 
decision in McCleskey v. Kemp: ―Race discrimination within the courtroom 
raises serious questions as to the fairness of the proceedings conducted there. 
Racial bias mars the integrity of the judicial system and prevents the idea of 
democratic government from becoming a reality.‖ Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991); see also id. at 619 (―Racial 
discrimination, though invidious in all contexts, violates the Constitution only 
when it may be attributed to state action.‖). 
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should not involve itself with such a cruel and torturous 
punishment—one that, throughout American history, has been 
imbibed with racial discrimination, gender inequities, malice and 
hatred, and lottery-like arbitrariness.303 
In their 2015 dissent in Glossip v. Gross,304 Justice Stephen 
Breyer—joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg—called for a ―full 
briefing‖ on whether capital punishment violates the Eighth 
Amendment and concluded that it is ―highly likely‖ that it 
does.305 In a subsequent speech in Chicago, Illinois, Justice 
Ginsburg—in talking about their dissenting opinion in Glossip—
specifically highlighted the death penalty‘s arbitrariness, telling 
her audience: ―Factors that should not affect imposition of the 
death penalty, studies documented, often do, prime among those 
factors, race and geography.‖306 ―Ultimately,‖ she said, ―the 
considerations Justice Breyer discussed at length may bring us 
back to the years 1972–76, when no executions took place in the 
United States.‖307 Already, the American death penalty is actively 
                                                                                                     
 303.  The administration of America‘s death penalty—at bottom—resembles 
the kind of arbitrariness and inhuman cruelty described in a famous short story 
published in The New Yorker after World War II. See Shirley Jackson, The 
Lottery, NEW YORKER, June 26, 1948, at 25 (describing a fictional small town in 
America in which an annual ritual, known as ―the lottery,‖ takes place—a 
lottery in which, every year, a name is drawn out of a black box and the 
unfortunate person selected is then stoned to death). Its author, Shirley 
Jackson, later gave this statement to the San Francisco Chronicle when pressed 
to explain the story‘s meaning: ―Explaining just what I had hoped the story to 
say is very difficult. I suppose, I hoped, by setting a particularly brutal ancient 
rite in the present and in my own village to shock the story‘s readers with a 
graphic dramatization of the pointless violence and general inhumanity in their 
own lives.‖ SHIRLEY JACKSON 33–34 (Harold Bloom ed., 2001). While people 
living under Sharia law are still stoned to death for adultery and prostitution, 
the modern American death penalty is, in fact, nothing more than a primitive 
rite—something right out of the Dark Ages. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMM. OF THE 
NAT‘L COUNCIL OF RESISTANCE OF IRAN, WOMEN, ISLAM & EQUALITY 22–24 (1995) 
(noting how women are lashed, stoned to death, or thrown off buildings for 
adultery or other acts under religious-based penal codes in places such as Iran); 
MORRIS BERMAN, DARK AGES AMERICA: THE FINAL PHASE OF EMPIRE 8 (2006) 
(noting that ―the American legal system, at one time the world standard, is now 
regarded by many other nations as outmoded and provincial, or even barbaric, 
given our use of the death penalty‖). 
 304.  135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015). 
 305.  STEPHEN BREYER, AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY 96 (John D. Bessler ed. 
2016). 
 306.  RUTH BADER GINSBURG, MY OWN WORDS 36 (2016). 
 307.  Id. at 35–36. The first execution after the U.S. Supreme Court‘s 
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used in only a small fraction of U.S. counties.308 As Emily Bazelon 
wrote for the New York Times Magazine in 2016: ―A new 
geography of capital punishment is taking shape, with just 2 
percent of the nation‘s counties now accounting for a majority of 
the people sitting on death row.‖309 
In State v. Santiago,310 the Connecticut Supreme Court 
declared that state‘s death penalty unconstitutional. In doing so, 
it held that ―the eighth amendment is offended not only by the 
random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, but also by 
the greater evils of racial discrimination and other forms of 
pernicious bias in the selection of who will be executed.‖311 As 
that court emphasized: ―Unfortunately, numerous studies have 
found that ‗[e]rrors can and have been made repeatedly in the 
trial of death penalty cases because of poor representation, racial 
prejudice, prosecutorial misconduct, or simply the presentation of 
erroneous evidence.‘‖312 ―A study of all death sentences in the 
United States in the two decades following Furman,‖ it pointed 
out, ―found ‗extremely high error rates‘ . . . ; with at least two 
thirds of capital sentences eventually overturned on appeal.‖313 
―Statistical analyses studies,‖ it added, ―have demonstrated to a 
near certainty that innocent Americans have been and will 
continue to be executed in the post-Furman era.‖314 As the court 
concluded after compiling all of the evidence: ―To the extent that 
the ultimate punishment is imposed on an offender on the basis 
                                                                                                     
decision in Furman v. Georgia took place in 1977 when Gary Gilmore was 
executed by firing squad in Utah. See MICHAEL KRONENWETTER, CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 129 (2d ed. 2001); MIKAL GILMORE, SHOT 
IN THE HEART 368 (1994). 
 308.  See Matt Ford, The Death Penalty Becomes Rare, ATLANTIC (Apr. 21, 
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-death-penalty-
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and Lee Law Review). 
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of impermissible considerations such as his, or his victim‘s, race, 
ethnicity, or socio-economic status, rather than the severity of his 
crime, his execution does not restore but, rather, tarnishes the 
moral order.‖315 
Hopefully, the U.S. Supreme Court will soon follow suit, 
looking to the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Connecticut 
and other judicial systems around the world that have already 
outlawed the punishment of death. Way back in 1995, South 
Africa‘s Constitutional Court—in the wake of apartheid‘s 
demise—declared the death penalty to be unconstitutional as a 
―cruel, inhuman or degrading‖ punishment.316 Ironically, the 
President of the Court, Arthur Chaskalson, in writing for South 
                                                                                                     
 315.  Id. at 66. Death sentences are tied up with issues of poverty, race and 
poor legal representation as cases like those of Earl Washington and Ronald 
Jones make clear. Washington—a black man with an IQ of 69—falsely confessed 
to a rape and murder he did not commit. At his trial, his lawyer did little to 
convince the jury of Washington‘s innocence, and it took years before he was 
exonerated. BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 10, 29–30, 145–48, 154 (2011); PETER NEUFELD & 
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opening lyrics: Southern trees bear a strange fruit / Blood on the leaves and blood 
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Records 1995), Vol. 4, Track 12. An anti–lynching song written by Bronx high 
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performed the song in Harlem in 1939 at Café Society, at the time New York 
City‘s only integrated nightclub. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RACE RIOTS 782 
(Walter Rucker & James Nathaniel Upton, eds. 2007); 1 RACE AND RACISM IN 
THE UNITED STATES: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN MOSAIC 541 (Charles A. 
Gallagher & Cameron D. Lippard, eds. 2014). Abel and Ann Meeropol also 
gained notoriety after Ethel and Julius Rosenberg were executed for espionage 
in 1953. Abel and Ann Meeropol adopted the ten-year-old and six-year-old sons 
of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg following their deaths in New York‘s electric 
chair. ROBERT NIEMI, HISTORY IN THE MEDIA: FILM AND TELEVISION 251 (2006); L. 
KAY GILLESPIE, EXECUTED WOMEN OF THE 20TH AND 21ST CENTURIES 69 (2009). 
 316.  State v. Makwanyane and Another, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at paras. 8, 
26; (S. Afr.); HANS GÖRAN FRANCK, THE BARBARIC PUNISHMENT: ABOLISHING THE 
DEATH PENALTY 75–78 (William Schabas ed. 2003). 
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Africa‘s highest court, looked to the reasoning of an American 
case—Furman v. Georgia—to support the propositions that ―[a]t 
every stage of the process there is an element of chance‖ and that 
―poverty, race and chance play roles in the outcome of capital 
cases and in the final decision as to who should live and who 
should die.‖317 If the present-day U.S. Supreme Court would only 
return to its own roots—Furman‘s denunciation of the death 
penalty as a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments318—the American legal system could finally uproot 
a barbaric, discriminatory practice rooted in the Dark Ages and 
the institution of slavery. 
 
                                                                                                     
 317.  State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at paras. 43, 48, 51–52, 77, 
97.  
 318.  Before Justices Breyer and Ginsburg issued their dissent in Glossip v. 
Gross, Justices Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan had, during their 
tenures, called upon America‘s judicial system to outlaw the punishment of 
death. See, e.g., MICHAEL MELLO, AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY: THE RELENTLESS 
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against capital punishment in more than 2,500 cases); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 
U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (Marshall, J. concurring) (―I continued to believe that the 
death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden 
by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.‖); id. at 442: 
I remain hopeful that even if the Court is unwilling to accept the view 
that the death penalty is so barbaric that it is in all circumstances 
cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, it may eventually conclude that the effort 
to eliminate arbitrariness in the infliction of that ultimate sanction is 
so plainly doomed to failure that it—and the death penalty—must be 
abandoned altogether. 
